Blue Line – The Imminent Threat Hezbollah Poses to Israel

2 August, 2024

by Sam Biden, Junior Fellow

While the attacks against Israel in early October last year peaked international interest towards Hamas, the slow rise in tensions with Hezbollah, the better armed, superiorly structured and far more militarily capable terrorist organisation situated in Lebanon, may result in a fierce and violent war within the coming months.

Origin and Structure

Hezbollah emerged in the wake of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, which itself took place against the backdrop of Lebanon’s civil war which began in 1975. Religious diversity within Lebanon was officially welcomed in 1943 with the signing of the National Pact, equipping Lebanon with a Sunni Muslim Prime Minister, Maronite Christian President and a Shiite Muslim Parliamentary Speaker. This balance was disrupted as the Sunni population increased with the influx of Palestinian refugees, adding to pre-existing Shiites feelings of marginalisation by what had become a ruling Christian minority, leading to violent clashes. Meanwhile, hostilities between Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) rapidly escalated, culminating in the Israeli invasions of southern Lebanon in 1978 and 1982, with the aim of expelling Palestinian guerilla fighters. A group of Shiites took up arms against the ongoing Israeli occupation, being supported by Iran both financially and militarily, eventually naming themselves Hezbollah, or “Party of God”. Hezbollah positions itself as a Shiite resistance movement, enshrining its ideology in a 1985 manifesto that vowed to expel Western powers from Lebanon while simultaneously calling for the destruction of Israel.

Hezbollah takes its structural influences from a typical political system, with various bodies acting to create order within the organisation. The primary council, known as a Shura Council, an Islam-specific body, offers guidance to 5 sub-Councils under their control, the political, jihad, parliamentary, executive and judicial assemblies. This sophisticated network allowed Hezbollah to exert control over much of Lebanon’s Shiite-majority areas, including the large sects of southern Lebanon. Despite the sophistication of Hezbollah, support from Iran and Syria remains their primary source of power, providing extensive training, weaponry and funding, allegedly in the hundreds of millions of dollars per year.

Tensions with Israel

Since its inception, Hezbollah has been in continual conflict with Israel. Despite the early intervention and presence of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) after its establishment in 1978, Israel and Hezbollah have continued to engage in periodic skirmishes throughout the 1980s and 1990s, leading to Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000.

This withdrawal would not hinder the efforts of Hezbollah as they continued their assaults, citing the occupation of Shebaa Farms, a small territory lying on an intersection along the Blue Line dividing Israel and Lebanon, as justification. Hezbollah maintained that Shebaa Farms was Lebanese territory, despite the United Nations’ conclusion that the area was Syrian and that Israel had fully evacuated Lebanon. Similar land contests continued with Ghajar, a small village west of Shebaa Farms with dual Israeli and Lebanese citizens, eventually being forcefully occupied by Israel in 2006.

Following the occupation of Ghajar, the previously simmering conflict between Israel and Hezbollah erupted into full-scale war in 2006 after a Hezbollah cross-border kidnapping operation, resulting in over 100 Israeli and approximately 500 Hezbollah fighters’ deaths. The conflict concluded with the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1701, which established a demilitarised zone between the Blue Line and the Litani River along the borders of Israel, Lebanon and Syria. According to Resolution 1701, this area was to be free of any armed personnel, assets and weapons except those of the Lebanese government and UNIFIL. Despite the implementation of these provisions, Israeli intelligence warned of Hezbollah rebuilding their forces from 2007 onwards, a claim largely ignored by the UN.

7 October 2023 Attacks

The 7 October attacks significantly heightened Israeli insecurity. The surprise attack resulted in the deaths of Israeli civilians and caused major damage to critical infrastructure. The aforementioned attacks were carried out by Hamas, the far less equipped and organised of the two primary militant groups on Israel’s borders, yet an estimated 1,139 lives were still lost. The understanding of the damage that could potentially be caused by the far more well-equipped Hezbollah has led to real concern.

In the following days, Israel swiftly reinforced northern units and evacuated border communities to prevent Hezbollah’s Radwan special forces units from launching their own assault, yet a full scale offence by the IDF was not carried out. While there was minimal fighting between Hezbollah and Israel in the months preceding the 7 October attack, the 15 weeks following the attack witnessed over 4,400 injuries and deaths. The aftermath of the 7 October attacks and subsequent clashes between Hezbollah and Israel have displaced over 160,000 people on both sides of the Israel-Lebanon border, roughly 60,000 civilians from northern Israel and 100,000 from southern Lebanon.

The ramp up of Hezbollah’s involvement should not come as a surprise to the international community, given the group has repeatedly violated Resolution 1701 by deploying forces in the zone between the Blue Line and the Litani River, sometimes under the guise of the fake NGO titled “Green Without Borders”. Footage from Hezbollah propaganda videos indicates that Hezbollah anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) have struck Israeli forces from concealed launch sites within 5km of the Blue Line on at least 17 occasions since 7 October, constituting clear violations of Resolution 1701. These attacks have predominantly targeted Israeli military bases and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) systems, resulting in the deaths of at least seven Israeli civilians and approximately ten IDF soldiers.

Post-7 October

Between October last year and February this year there was a drastic increase in violent exchanges between the IDF and Hezbollah. During this period, UNIFIL documented nearly 9,000 projectiles fired across the Blue Line, with an estimated 8,000 originating from the southern side. In total, reports indicate that 60 Lebanese civilians and 289 Hezbollah fighters have been killed during this period.

By 5 January, 670 operations against Israeli military targets and villages had been carried out by Hezbollah, directly resulting in the deaths of 159 of their own forces alongside 35 civilians. The next day, Hezbollah launched ATGMs, attack drones and 62 rockets at Israel’s northern air control unit on Mount Meron, causing minor damage, claiming the attack was retaliation against the assassination of senior Hamas official Saleh al-Arouri in Beirut days earlier. Combating this retaliation, the IDF targeted Hezbollah military compounds and other military units in southern Lebanon, followed by an IDF strike that killed another key Hezbollah figure, Wissam al-Tawil, a senior commander in the Radwan Special Forces. Later in April, Israel’s defence minister delivered promising news, claiming Israeli strikes had killed half of Hezbollah’s commanders in southern Lebanon, yet this has been denied by Hezbollah.

This gradual escalation led some observers to anticipate a larger conflict, as both Israel and Hezbollah appear to be intensifying their activities, increasing the risk to the civilians living along the Blue Line. Previously, mitigation was handled exclusively by Lebanon and Israel with the support of UNIFIL, yet if a non-international armed conflict arises from the situation, allies of both sides may become involved. This has been noted by Western states, particularly the US, who suggest the Lebanese Armed Forces and UNIFIL must align to mitigate the potential conflict on the horizon, yet an agreement is yet to be made. The primary barrier to this agreement is the requirement by Hezbollah that Israel first halt fighting in Gaza, an unlikely scenario.

Military Arsenal of Hezbollah

The Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) has analysed Hezbollah’s arsenal as well as potential scenarios that may play out should war ensue. Hezbollah fields about 30,000 active fighters with a further 20,000 in reserve, mostly composed of light infantry units. While a central command exists, subordinate figures in the units can make decisions themselves based on overall orders given, leading to a complex but versatile composition.

CSIS has analysed the rockets, missiles and Unmanned Aerial Systems (UASs) in possession of Hezbollah. The rockets and missiles pose major threats to Israel given their quick deployment and capability to cause vast damage to infrastructure and civilian life. Predictions put Hezbollah’s rocket and missile count as upwards of 200,000, making them the most heavily armed non-state armed group in the world. Alongside this, close ally Iran has a strong presence in Syria allowing them to quickly resupply Hezbollah. Hezbollah also has a significant UAS arsenal, a series of both autonomous and remotely operated aerial vehicles for both surveillance and combat efforts. For example, the Qods Yasir in possession of Hezbollah is capable of conducting surveillance and battlefield analysis from 20,000ft with a 280 mile range, while the Shahed-129 carries 34kg precision guided bombs with a range of 2000 km, capable of causing significant damage to infrastructure. These are two of various surveillance and combat-based UASs at Hezbollah’s disposal. Since 7 October, Hezbollah has deployed UASs around 40 times, and while not all uses were successful, some Israeli military sites were damaged with IDF soldiers being killed alongside.

In preparation for the advanced capabilities of Israel, Hezbollah has placed an emphasis on enhancing its air defence capabilities to challenge Israeli air superiority. Their air defences, primarily Iranian and Russian-made, include anti-aircraft guns, man-portable air-defence systems (MANPADS) and short- and medium-range surface to air missile systems (SAMs). CSIS predicts that Hezbollah’s air defences would likely force Israeli aircraft to higher altitudes, potentially reducing bombing accuracy if Israel finds its stockpiles of precision-guided munitions pressed due to the number of targets and has to resort to their unguided counterparts. However, CSIS suggest that air defence sites will be a major priority for Israel as destroying them would offer a significant advantage.

Conclusion

The escalating tensions between Israel and Hezbollah has caused a heightened and critical concern for regional stability. If Hamas is joined by Hezbollah in an all-out armed conflict with Israel, the lives lost, and damage done will multiply to unimaginable levels. With Hezbollah’s vast sophistication and arsenal, any renewed hostilities could lead to a major spillover, potentially involving further allied forces to help stabilise the already fragile Blue Line. The international community, particularly UNIFIL and the US, must intensify efforts to de-escalate tensions and enforce existing resolutions before a major conflict arises.

Image: a stockpile of rockets destined for Hezbollah after being seized by the IDF (Source: IDF/CC BY-SA 2.0)