The Pitfalls of Russian-North Korean Friendship

22 August, 2024

by Oleksandra Zadesenets, Research Assistant

The Origins of the Close Ties

Since the splitting of Korea following its liberation from Japan, Russia – whether in the guise of the USSR or the contemporary Russian Federation – has had an extended and amiable partnership with North Korea. While initially united by communist ideology, Moscow’s departure from Marxist-Leninism has seen the contemporary relationship reformed in support of a more general mutual authoritarian ideology and hostility to the West.

The USSR was one of the first states to recognise North Korea. The role of Moscow in the Korean War (1950-1953) cannot be overstated — the Kremlin is credited for the division of the Korean peninsula and providing North Korea with substantial military aid and strategic curation. Following the conflict, one of the most significant landmarks of Pyongyang and Moscow’s relations was the conclusion of the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance of 1961, which enshrined each countries’ commitment to mutual defence. While China has also played a critical role in North Korea’s development, has its own pact with Pyongyang in the form of the Sino-North Korean Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation, and Mutual Assistance – also signed in 1962 and Beijing’s only such treaty – and has facilitated the regime’s survival over the last three decades through the supply of aid, it is fair to say that North Korea’s form as the political entity it is today can be substantially attributed to the Kremlin’s influence. While the 1961 agreement between Moscow and Pyongyang was replaced by a weaker ‘treaty of friendship’ in 2000 and Russia has at least officially participated in the UN sanctions resulting from North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile programmes, links have remained solid.

Given this strong relationship, it is difficult to envision North Korea remaining neutral or indifferent in a major conflict featuring direct Russian involvement. This has been manifested in Pyongyang’s supply of artillery shells and missiles for use in Ukraine. Putin’s visit to North Korea in June signified the most significant development in their relations since the end of the Cold War. But how concerned should we be?

Understanding Putin’s Visit

It is important to emphasise the secrecy of the new agreement between North Korea and Russia and the provisions it holds. However, the chief conclusion can already be made: the friendship of these states has manifested another mutual assistance agreement. Accordingly, there is significant concern that Russia could offer forms of aid that can jeopardise South Korea and the United States security, especially in the nuclear realm. Russia can assist North Korea in adopting more advanced technologies for weapons of mass destruction, as well as enhancing its capabilities in the development of ballistic missiles, satellites and other weaponry.

This development of bilateral ties is a clear “win” for Kim Jong-un, whose apprehension over the threat from South Korea and domestic political insecurity appears tangible. Putin’s assistance will be targeted at the survival of Kim’s family leadership amid the new South Korean defence strategy. South Korea has stated a policy of responding with immediate and decisive retaliation against the command posts of the North Korean forces responsible for initiating any attack. South Korea’s high emphasis on the removal of leadership might have been misperceived by the Northern leadership, deeming the attack imminent rather than as a response to hostilities. Being targeted by international isolation which is perceived as contributing to its insecurity, Kim sees Russia as a crucial ally. The perception of Russia as an immediate supporter would enhance hope for the survival of the regime.

Is the Threat from the South Real?

Despite its offensive nature, the military strategy of South Korea can be considered mainly defensive, with a high emphasis on the deterrence of the North, rather than planning to stage a pre-emptive attack. In October 2023, South Korea’s newly appointed Defense Minister Shin Won-sik outlined the country’s national security strategy as “PISU: Punish Immediately, Strongly, and Until the End.” However, it is relevant to note that this radical response is primarily threatened as an outcome of the provocations from the North, serving as a constraint for this nuclear country. Consequently, the chances of South Korea deciding to strike North Korea are minimal if the latter does not instigate any aggression.

South Korea’s ‘Kill Chain’ concept envisages defense against missiles by striking the source of the attack, intercepting the missiles in flight, and retaliating against their supporting command and control infrastructure, including the DPRK’s leadership. This radicalism is caused by the challenging position South Korea is placed in: being a country with only conventional armament, it is forced to resist a nuclear state, renowned for increasingly hostile behaviour. While a US treaty ally and in theory under Washington’s nuclear umbrella, nothing can be taken for granted.

While the direct threat from the South is seen as rather distant, the military doctrine of North Korea encourages the usage of nuclear weapons preemptively, on paper at least leaving Pyongyang the dominant aggressor on the peninsula. The same can be said of Pyongyang’s non-nuclear aggression, and actions in recent history show how this manifests in the real world. For example, in 2010 the world witnessed the attack on Yeonpyeong Island in South Korea. North Korea launched around 100 artillery shells, resulting in the deaths of two South Korean marines and two civilians, with 16 South Korean citizens suffering injuries. This came only a few months after a North Korean submarine sank a South Korean corvette without provocation. Such events served as a basis for the adoption of the ‘Three Axis System’ upon which the Kill Chain approach is based.

The considerations of preemptive nuclear strikes have intensified in light of South Korea’s recent defensive developments, which potentially target Kim’s leadership in the event of an attack from the North. North Korea’s embracement of the last resort option signifies its insecurity amid the absence of strong allies willing and capable of giving a decisive response to the anticipated aggression from the South. This dynamic puts Kim in his vicious circle, escalating the tensions and his apprehensions, making the nuclear threat more prominent.

The position of North Korea’s great power ally had been persistently vacant. Despite being the recipient of economic assistance from Beijing, North Korea resists China’s aspiration to world dominance, making the strong military alliance between these states on equal terms rather unattainable. Hence, Putin’s hand would fill this vacuum, soothing Kim’s insecurity regarding his leadership’s further survival.

Putin’s Trap

Kim claimed that the renewed bilateral relationship between Russia and North Korea has reached the level of an alliance, whilst Putin stated that the treaty guarantees mutual assistance in case of aggression against either country. However, the agreement appears to be asymmetrical, and has been referred to as “Putin’s trap” by Bruce W. Bennett, a senior international/defence researcher at RAND. According to this narrative, Russian President Vladimir Putin receives military assistance from North Korea, but North Korean leader Kim Jong-un cannot anticipate similar support in return. The genuineness of the mutual defence treaty from Russia’s side can be challenged by two factors: a) the attack from Seoul is considered unlikely, as it can arise only as a retaliatory measure; b) realistically, Russian troops cannot be deployed to North Korea at scale anytime soon, as Russia is consumed with the battle for Ukraine.

However, North Korea has significant concerns about the prospect of attack from South Korea, despite the strict conditionality and distance of this threat. Hence, this agreement can be seen as Putin’s strategic maneuver to exploit Kim Jong-un’s insecurities and apprehensions regarding a potential attack for Russia’s advantage in the war with Ukraine. Consequently, Putin may propose the deployment of Russian troops to North Korea in the event of an attack from the South, with the implicit expectation of reciprocal support – even though such an attack is highly unlikely to occur unprovoked. If a Ukrainian counteroffensive were to occur in the occupied territories, which Russia considers part of its domain, Moscow could then request the deployment of North Korean troops to these territories to counter the perceived threat to its sovereignty – a more realistic prospect given the war is already in progress.

North Korea is just one of the powers being drawn into the war in Ukraine. Being initially seen as a potential mediating power, now China is alleged to be supplying or preparing to supply Russia with lethal aid for its war against Ukraine, as claimed by British defence minister Grant Shapps. Although, it is important to emphasise that Shapps refrained from providing the evidence supporting this accusation, therefore time will reveal the truth about the potential formation of coalitions. Certainly, China has supplied Russia with the sub-components necessary to sustain its military production in the face of Western sanctions.

The New Cold War?

Lastly, this agreement implied increased weaponisation of North Korea in Moscow’s campaign against the West. Putin characterised this development as a reaction to NATO allies supplying Ukraine with longer-range weapons to target Russia. He stated that he was ready to fight until the bitter end to obtain the objectives in Ukraine.

The potential implications of significant Russian assistance to North Korea in developing its military has, however, triggered a counteraction which may have consequences on the Ukrainian battlefield. South Korea, previously adhering to the policy of abstaining from arming the states in conflict, started considering the possibility of arming Ukraine following the signing of a strategic pact between Russia and North Korea.

The highly militaristic nature of the North Korean-Russian alliance can escalate the tensions on the Korean peninsula, making it a global concern. This tendency holds the potential to create a new world division, signifying the new stage of Cold War following over 30 years of hot peace. It is ironic that during the Korean War, many in the West felt the conflict was a distraction from defending Europe from Moscow. Now, the fate of Europe and the Korean Peninsula are once again entangled.

Image: Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong Un in Pyongyang, North Korea, 19 June 2024 (Source: Kremlin.ru via CC BY 4.0)