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Bosnia and Herzegovina’s long road to the EU

16 July, 2024

By Oliver Hegglin – Junior Fellow; and Katharina Jansen & Jan Philipp Götze – students at Leipzig University

In December 2022, the European Union (EU) agreed to make Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH) a formal candidate for membership of the Bloc. This follows Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine and the fear that subsequent instability may spread to the volatile western Balkans. BiH was first identified as a potential EU member candidate in June 2003 and applied for membership in February 2016. In March 2024, the European Council decided to open accession negotiations. Despite general support for BiH’s European path among current EU members, concerns have been raised about the country’s ethnic divisions, internal deadlocks and delays in reform. Party politics, the struggle with corruption, and the presence of an international EU-led peace support mission, each present challenges BiH must overcome before the path to EU membership can reach its end.

Party Politics in a Deadlock

Of great concern for the accession process are huge insufficiencies on the political level. Central to these are the Serb and Croat party leaders Milorad Dodik and Dragan Covic. Both have managed to position themselves as the strong authentic leaders of their respective ethnic parties and have become decisive on policy progress of BiH. Since progress on the path to EU accession could lead to losses of their powers, neither of them is intrinsically interested in it. Both are profiting from the current insufficiencies of the government, which make it easier for them to push for further independent governance of their own ethnicities. Though publicly supporting BiH’s path towards EU accession, Dodik, as well as Covic, remain very alert to “historic and present power imbalances”, using every chance to proclaim a potential threat to the existence of their ethnicity to further push their nationalist agenda, and in doing so, further increase their influence.

Trapped in Political Egoism

This destructive spiral can be highlighted by Dodik’s insistence on the integrity of the Republika Srpska (RS). Since any form of dissolvement of the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) would subsequently imply the dissolvement of the RS, and therefore the loss of his powers, Dodik blockades any attempts in this direction. These blockades are problematic, because from the Bosniak perspective the RS is a direct result of the war. In this regard, the demand for the dissolvement of the RS plays a crucial role in their reconciliation. At the same time, these demands support Dodik’s narrative of a critical threat to the Serbian identity, inevitably leading to stalemate.

Covic’s Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) party on the other hand, wants EU accession only through “Croat gates”, which means that the process itself ought to be facilitated by Croatia. The use of moderate rhetoric is trying to disguise the plan that BiH’s accession should depend on the approval of Croat terms. At the same time the HDZ is profiting from secessionist threats in the RS, as it indirectly strengthens its own demands for the establishment of a Croat entity as well, as Croats and Bosniaks currently share the Federation of BiH. This creates a situation for the HDZ where they can expect to profit from either way BiH is going without any incentive to actively support any agenda.

Over the last years, this situation has trapped the political system in BiH in continuous stalemate, with the country appearing to face its least productive legislative period. The period started in 2021 with a boycott imposed on all state institutions by Dodik in July, after the former High Representative (HR), Valentin Inzko, adopted laws which criminalized the denial of genocide in BiH. Dodik depicted these laws as another effort to delegitimize the Serb identity and a further example of a western narrative that would unjustly impose the guilt for the war on Serbs. This difficult situation was further aggravated by a blockade in the Federation by the HDZ, as it strived for changes to the electoral system. These changes aimed at strengthening the influence of the HDZ in mainly Croat regions. To achieve this, the HDZ made repeated use of threats to establish its own entity.

The Pitfalls of Everyday Politics

This quandary was partially resolved by an infamous decision of the newly appointed HR, Christian Schmidt, on the eve of elections in October 2022. Made public just after the closure of the polls, the decision included the amendment of the election law and constitution of BiH. The amendment changed the number and the proportional representation of the constituent peoples, with the goal being to resolve deadlocks and to facilitate the formation of coalitions on state and federal levels. After the leading Bosniak party, the Party of Democratic Action (SDA), failed to form a government, the HDZ party managed to do so together with eight small Bosniak parties after three months. The main actors within the state level government of 2022 where thus the HDZ, the Serbian Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD), and the so called “Troika”, which is a collective of four liberal Bosniak parties. While coalition forming was achieved on state level, the decision of the Office of the High Representative (OHR) could not sufficiently dissolve stalemate in the federation. This was only achieved through another intervention by the OHR in April 2023, in which he forcefully appointed the cabinet.

Despite its successful formation, the newly elected government faced severe disagreement shortly after taking up its work. In January 2023, the illegal adoption of a law on the possession of state properties within the RS caused two of the eight Bosniak parties to leave the government coalition. The law ascribed institutional properties solely to the possession of the RS and not to the State of BiH.  This has been a longtime goal of Dodik, which he tried to adopt unilaterally in 2022 but had to withdraw due to a constitutional court ruling deciding that institutional properties could only belong to the State. In order to achieve his goal, Dodik used his powers to blackmail the newly founded coalition. They were left with the choice to either permit the use of the properties as he demanded or to risk the complete implosion of the government. Though the remaining coalition stayed strong enough to form the government, this example clearly illustrates the challenges of the tit-for-tat games in BiH. Giving these circumstances, it is not surprising that no further significant progress on any central political issue could be reached throughout 2023.

Another example of the difficulties within the political system can be found in the second intervention by HR Schmidt in March 2024. Just like in 2022, the intervention was triggered by disputes over changes to the election law which were necessary for compliance with EU standards. Both Serb and Croat leaders were only open towards changes of the respective election districts, which would have effectively gerrymandered these districts towards increased ethnic homogeneity. As more progressive changes would have undermined their individual powers, the main political actors were not interested in implementing them, leaving no choice for the OHR but to forcefully impose them.

Politics at the Crossroads

Despite this, the recent opening of membership negotiations with the EU has raised hopes that at least some policy progress could be reached to a degree where joint negotiation efforts are possible.

However, due to the recently adopted UN resolution declaring the event in Srebrenica during the Bosnian War a genocide, this little progress faces backlash again. Already the preparation of the resolution has caused a standstill in BiH politics. In the RS and Serbia, the national rhetoric grew even stronger, falsely proclaiming that the resolution would accuse Serbia as a country to be genocidal, further aggravating ethnic tensions within BiH.

As of now, Dodik announced that he would soon hold a secession referendum in the RS, though a date has not been set. In addition to this, the RS and Serbia held a general assembly which produced a declaration that used wordings other actors described as similar to the war-era. Among other things, the declaration highlighted the unity of Serbs within the region and called for the strict compliance to the DPA. With these increasing tensions, some commentators are pessimistic of any significant progress in BiH up until the next elections in 2026.

The ongoing Struggle with Corruption

Corruption is not a new challenge for BiH. The continuation of wartime entrepreneurship into post-war clientelist networks persisting in both private and public enterprise has led to a situation where actors profit from and depend on corruption and vice-versa. BiH, because of the high degree of decentralization inherent in the Dayton system, faces additional challenges in prosecuting corruption due to the inconsistent nature of its legal system as well as the scope of public authority.

As a result, BiH faces a tremendously difficult situation. Domestically, this is most apparent in terms of attracting new businesses and foreign direct investment (which would require legal certainty to accrue), as well as the continued trend of emigration from the country. Many young, educated Bosnians perceive that their opportunities to work and be recognized for their merit and talents are extremely limited if they are unwilling to cooperate with a corrupt and ethno-nationalist system of clientelism. Of these, many choose the route of “EU integration by foot” in order to pursue life elsewhere.

Steps to take against Corruption

Endemic corruption is a substantial hurdle in terms of the country’s joining the EU. Accession requires a number of actions to be taken with regard to addressing corruption and ensuring the rule of law. In 2019, the EU Commission published its 14 priorities for BiH to meet for EU membership.

Two of these priorities explicitly focus on how to tackle corruption. One (Priority 6) demands the general improvement of the judiciary through alignment with EU standards. The other (Priority 7) calls for the “prevention and fight against corruption” through the implementation of policies that protect whistleblowers, strengthen public procurement, ensure effective cooperation between law enforcement bodies, and ensure transparency of privatization processes.

Functional court systems and the fight against corruption are naturally interdependent; only impartial and thus non-corrupt courts can both provide rulings that support the rule of law, and adequately prosecute corruption where it occurs, both in and out of the court system.

Rooting out corruption is a notoriously difficult undertaking as a result of its self-sustaining nature. Those who are in the position to adopt and implement regulation are most often also those who have arrived in that position on account of having taken part in corrupt proceedings and profited from them. Many who were unwilling or unable to do so would not have accessed positions of power. Those who have engaged, or still engage, in corrupt networks, clientelism, and bribery, are as a rule reluctant to implement robust measures to challenge these phenomena, both because they would themselves be at risk of being harmed by enforcement and because their future careers depend in part on a continued use of such structures.

What should be done?

There is the possibility to implement anti-corruption legislation through the HR without majority willingness among BiH’s (many) parliaments, and this has been done. However, such legislation is both risky in terms of losing local legitimacy and problematic in the view of the EU. In March 2024, the OHR’s imposition of election integrity measures was coldly received in Brussels and read as interrupting a vital process of cultivating local ownership, as there were domestic initiatives towards the same end.

Beyond foreign reception, OHR imposition of anti-corruption rules fails to address a key component of increasing a country’s robustness to corruption; entrenching anti-corruption attitudes at local levels, thereby allowing enforcement of standards through methods of reporting on corrupt behavior and its effective prosecution through the courts. This requires not only changes in law, but winning “hearts and minds,” as well as reducing dependency.

Steps have been taken in BiH to improve the fight against corruption in terms of both a law on money laundering and a strategy on public procurement, which is pending adoption by the Council of Ministers. On appeal in January 2024, the sentence in the case of Novalić et al (related to public procurement fraud and including the one-time Federation Prime Minister) was upheld, marking a first in terms of final court rulings on high-level corruption. This is particularly significant as the low number of convictions in high level corruption cases was criticized in the EU’s 2023 Report on the country’s readiness.

However, there continue to be negative trends. In 2023, the RS adopted a draft law which would significantly curtail accountability of political representatives. There is no systemic and consolidated data on the integrity of civil servants.

The key steps for a successful fight against corruption in BiH, as identified by the EU, are stronger cooperation and harmonization between law enforcement and judicial entities, including with the corruption watchdog APIK. Public officials, including and particularly in the judiciary, should be subject to integrity checks, and those offices conducting them must have access to the information required to assess them properly.

EUFOR as an Indicator of EU Accession

The United Nations-mandated, EU-led international peace support mission in BiH is arguably a key indicator of the importance and determination of the regional bloc to ensure stability in the Western Balkans. The presence of this mission, the European Union Force (EUFOR) Althea, is similarly a tell-tale of BiH’s status on its EU membership path, for it is very unlikely BiH will be able to join the EU as long as EUFOR Althea continues to operate.

Mandate Requirements

While EUFOR Althea’s mandate is renewed every November, the mission was established through United Nations Security Council Resolution 1575 (November 2004), which will “have the main peace stabilization role under the military aspects of the Peace Agreement”, as per the “General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina”, (Dayton Accords). In short, the mission is tasked executively with supporting the federal authorities in maintaining a ‘safe and secure environment (SaSE), and non-executively with training the Armed Forces of BiH (AFBiH).

This mission runs in parallel to political/diplomatic efforts to mend ties between the former warring parties. The EU is working to bring BiH on its path to eventual EU membership, as per the 2003 Thessaloniki Declaration, and through EUFOR also aiming for NATO compatibility of the AFBiH. Additionally, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) supports the peacebuilding effort through political and education reform, and in the promotion and protection of human rights.

The International Presence as a Hinderance to EU Membership

EUFOR Althea is tasked with bringing the AFBiH to international/NATO standards to be able to assert sovereignty and act as the primary security provider in the country. If the AFBiH are to one day assume the military responsibility as an institution of the country – in effect being a requirement of EU membership as per the Acquis, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) – then EUFOR Althea must first end. Alternatively it could have its mandate changed to a more supportive role while the AFBiH assume the main stabilization role. Currently, BiH is a receiver of “considerable” CFSP and CSDP resources, and until the AFBiH are able to serve as primary guarantor of SaSE it will remain dependent on EUFOR Althea.

This ties in with both the Dayton Accord, as it calls for an international mission, and the annually renewed UNSCRs, which maintain its existence. Consequently, if the presence and role of EUFOR Althea is an indicator as to the viability of BiH EU membership, then the Dayton Accords, under which the current system of government in BiH is set up and under which the country has been ruled since the end of the Bosnian War in 1996, can also be construed as a hinderance to BiH EU membership. If the Accords were never meant to serve as a permanent solution, but rather to end the fighting, it is questionable if BiH can join the EU under Dayton governance. And as long as the RS continues its rhetoric of splitting from the Republic, the territorial integrity of BiH is threatened, making a negotiated settlement unlikely.

Conditions for Accession

BiH has police forces on the cantonal level, a state police on the federal level, and can manage its own border, making it able to tackle organized crime and other illegal activities. Doing so is necessary for EU membership as per the Stabilization and Association Agreement. Internally however, the country continues to face ethnic division. Political and judicial tasks needing reform and development, in addition to a slew of other points as a requirement for EU membership, can cause, and have caused, internal friction. Until these points are settled, the fear of a resumption of any degree of hostility, regardless how minute, exists. This requires the presence of EUFOR Althea as an early warning system for the international community in detecting underlying tensions and, if need be, take pre-emptive measures to prevent these and future friction because of ongoing efforts to meet EU membership requirements, from resulting in a resurgence of hostilities.

EUFOR exists to assist in creating the conditions under which BiH can continue on its EU path and reinforces the EU’s comprehensive strategy for BiH. Until the political sphere finds unitary purpose and judicial deadlock is overcome, the UN-mandated and EU-led international peace support mission will continue to prevent a relapse into conflict and serve as the international community’s presence across the country.

In-between Solution

Power game conundrums, widespread corruption, and an active peace support mission are all considerable barriers for any country seeking to enter the EU. These are all long-lasting problems, which are not being solved as fast as the EU might hope for. With this in mind, an “in-between” membership solution for BiH might be a possibility for BiH, as the EU is currently considering. This can support the young country on its path to full membership while addressing the multiple issues the country must come together to face.

Image: President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen visits Bosnia an Herzegovina in 2024. From left to right, Croatian President Andrej Plenković, Ursula von der Leyen, Chairwoman of the Council of Ministers of Bosnia and Herzegovina Krišto, and Prime Minister of the Netherlands Mark Rutte (Source: European Union, 2024 via CC BY 4.0 DEED

About Oliver Hegglin

Oliver Hegglin is a geopolitical threat analyst in the private sector and has a master’s degree in international affairs from the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies in Geneva and a dual bachelor’s degree in international studies and anthropology from Washington College. Between and during degrees he completed internships with diplomatic representations and the United Nations, and worked for a developmental NGO. Oliver is a Specialist Officer with Swiss Armed Forces International Command where he supports the training for peace support operations and has served abroad in Mali and Kosovo. He is a board member of the NGO Imholz Foundation. His research interests include peacekeeping, the Arctic and Swiss and global security issues.