Human Security Centre Human Rights and International Security Research
24 February, 2025
by Oleksandra Zadesenets, Research Assistant
In the hours after the fall of the Bashar al-Assad regime, the rebels freed the inmates from the Sednaya prison – a notorious symbol of oppressive rule. Under the rule of the Assad family, the Syrian population was subjected to alarming human rights abuses, becoming the victims of war crimes and experiencing suffering on a massive scale. Whatever the de jure provisions, Syrians were de facto left without any human rights protection, making them the vulnerable targets of the civil war and open to being exploited as a weapon in the war waging of competing forces. The violence of the Assad regime backed by Russia included targeting civilian infrastructure alongside the employment of the barrel bomb, incendiary and chemical weapons, internationally banned cluster munitions strikes, torture, displacement, enforced disappearances and extermination.
After fifteen years of violence, the people of Syria are attempting to seize the chance for long-awaited peacebuilding, allowing them to actualise their human and political rights and revive their state. This political momentum could potentially be utilised by the international community to eventually address the decades of grave injustices, punish the wrongdoings and commence Syrian post-war reconstruction. Yet, how attainable is it to bring Syria to a sustainable peace? The current geopolitical reality appears to make success a dubious prospect.
Truth and Reconciliation Commission: The Feasibility of Restoring Justice in Syria
As a rule, the post-war peace-building of any divided society includes the integral step of justice restoration. It is focused on healing the state’s psycho-social dimension and addressing the collective trauma of a society that has endured human rights abuses. In the attempts at post-conflict reconciliation, states often form a Truth and Reconciliation Commission, tasked with uncovering the truth about atrocities, raising the voice of the victims and building the dialogue between the divided factions of society.
In the case of Syria, this peacebuilding step is paramount. The war crimes such as the 2012 Houla Massacre, the 2013 Al-Bayda and Baniyas Massacres and the 2018 Eastern Ghouta Bombardment to name but a few led to mass murder and human suffering, engraving an indelible mark on the memory of Syrians. If the root grievances stemming from the people’s trauma remain unaddressed and the perpetrators face no repercussions, it will fuel ongoing cycles of violence, hinder post-conflict reforms, and further erode trust between the new government and the population.
Colombia is internationally cited as a successful example of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission concept. After the prolonged atrocious civil war involving multiple armed groups, paramilitary organisations and the Colombian government, a peace agreement was signed between them, establishing a foundation for a comprehensive approach to transitional justice.
The success of the Columbian restorative justice mechanism is closely tied to the all-encompassing dialogue involving all segments of society, addressing rural reforms, drug policy, and guaranteeing political participation. It is combined with the youth peacebuilding education of the Non-Repetition Dialogues initiative that supports the ex-combatants in overcoming their violent pasts and their reintegration into civilian life. This approach helped Columbia to shed light on the war crimes and foster trust among citizens and their political inclusion, precluding the escalation of violence. The international community was deeply involved in the Columbian restoration, where the United Nations, International Criminal Court, United States, Norway and Cuba were serving as facilitators and guarantors of peace.
Yet, despite the impressive results in the social aspect, Columbia is still facing the unresolved issue associated with inadequate demobilisation efforts, resulting in the insurgency of the FARC-EP revisionist group that uses terrorist methods and the civilian population to declare its non-conformity with the status quo. It undermines the successful peace-building efforts despite the international recognition of Columbian achievements.
The Syrian scenario, however, is even more complex. It is very hard to conclude if Syrian restoration can start with the Columbian scenario. The key difference there is the coherence of international backing and their unanimous agreement on whether peace should be pursued in Syria in the first place.
The establishment of peace in Syria poses a zero-sum game for the opposing international actors entangled there. The battlefield in Syria evolved beyond the struggle between the government and opposition, becoming a battlefield of ideologies, security and economic pursuits, geopolitical interests and power ambitions. It can be argued that there are more sides interested in the continued Syrian disintegration and the fostering of a power vacuum after Assad’s fall rather than reconciliation and reconstruction, risking leaving Syria in limbo and shattering the hopes of its people.
Potential risk factors
1) The United States
It may seem inevitable that initial American enthusiasm about the Arab Spring in 2011 would be reinforced by the eventual collapse of the Assad regime and lead to its active participation in the democratisation and rebuilding efforts. In 2011, the Democratic administration seized the unique chance for democratisation in the Middle East, viewing the encouragement of revolutions as a counterterrorism strategy to foster new allies, reduce the hazard of hostile actors and maintain a balance of power in the region.
However, the current context of the American political landscape can challenge this expectation. Anticipating the next move of the newly elected US President, Donald Trump, is no easy feat. Swinging between domestic priorities, acquiring new territories, imposing tariffs on the allies, and aspirations of earning an international peace broker title, Donald Trump’s concrete foreign policy goals and geopolitical strategies remain foggy.
It is worth analysing the approach to the Syrian Civil War Trump took during his first presidency. The key factor one should distinguish here is that Donald Trump narrowed the goals identified by the Obama administration in Syria. The multifaceted approach of the Democrats was driven by domestic security concerns, counterterrorism efforts and the urge for political change in Syria alongside stability in the Middle East. In 2014, the United States intervened in Syria predominantly to eliminate ISIL. The agenda of this organisation presented an escalating threat to the US regional allies and its military personnel. During his first presidency, Trump continued Operation Inherent Resolve until the fall of the ISIL capital and the collapse of the caliphate. In 2019, US special forces killed leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. After the success of this operation, Trump ordered the withdrawal of the American troops (although some remain there to this day) and left the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) to fend for themselves. Trump largely ceased the US involvement in Syria once the goals serving the interest of the United States and its allies were met, turning a blind eye to the human rights abuses and atrocities that continued under the Assad regime after the US withdrawal. The withdrawal of the US troops created a power vacuum quickly filled by Russian and Turkish interests — the factor that ultimately put the Syrian post-conflict restoration into gridlock.
While Syria’s new leader Ahmed al-Sharaa shared his confidence that Trump “is the leader to bring peace to the Middle East”, Trump’s rhetoric regarding Syria in 2025 did not differ significantly from his previous actions. On the day when Assad was ousted from the country, Trump posted “Syria is a mess, but not our friend,” on his Truth Social network. Embracing the “it’s not our fight” paradigm, Trump claimed that Syria was of no interest to him and that he had no desire to intervene. In this scenario, Washington’s role in Syria’s reconstruction may be scarce, with the easing of certain sanctions likely serving as an initial step toward alleviating the economic turmoil.
The scope of further US intervention in Syria and the participation in its reconstruction depends on Trump’s priorities in the Middle East and the US perception of security threats. The relationship with NATO ally Turkey and its President Recep Erdoğan can also come into play as a crucial factor limiting American engagement in Syrian reconstruction since their bilateral relations faced a significant сrack amid US backing of the SDF.
The US involvement in the Israeli-Hamas war and the eventual ceasefire are widely perceived as a tipping point for its engagement in the Middle East. After the final implementation of the ceasefire deal between Hamas and Israel, the tensions in the Middle East may be temporarily frozen. It will reduce the immediate threats to Israel, allowing the US foreign policy focus to be reshifted to the most urgent security threats coming from China. Under these circumstances, any US intervention in Syria can be expected as a reactionary response to the possible Iranian influence insurgence.
From another perspective, there is a certain continuity between Biden’s and Trump’s positions on Syria despite the different tone and discourse that envisages a positive outcome for the Syrian future. Both Trump and Biden are interested in reducing the US role in Syrian affairs, passing the responsibility of state-building on the shoulders of the Syrian elites. Moreover, both Biden and Trump are eager not to see Syria be run by US forces. For its part, the new Syrian government was eager to collaborate with the US and contribute to peacebuilding efforts. It hints that the US can acquire a new ally in the Middle East, directly serving its security interests.
Finally, both Biden and Trump want to leverage Iran and Russia’s humiliation in Syria. Thus, analysing this context alongside the possible strategic US interest in the region and the geopolitical gains of participating in the post-Assad state-building, there is a low probability of seeing the United States pursuing the completely isolationist stance toward Syrian restoration.
2) Turkey
With the power vacuum emerging after the fall of Assad and his Iranian and Russian supporters, Turkey is maneuvering to establish itself as a key player in shaping the future of liberated Syria. During the thirteen years of the Syrian Civil War, Turkey positioned itself as the greatest supporter of the Syrian opposition factions aligned to its interests. Over this time, the Syrian question became both a domestic and international concern of Turkey, shaping its domestic politics, relationships with NATO and international affairs.
The Syrian conflict put Turkey at a crossroads with NATO, causing Ankara to switch priorities, fluctuating between collective NATO interests and its border security. Turkish-led military operations, such as Euphrates Shield, Olive Branch, Peace Spring, and Claw-Sword targeted the Kurdish-led SDF that received US backing in the fight against ISIS. Turkish military actions endangered US troops embedded with the SDF, putting them at risk of Turkish airstrikes, which led to a direct clash between Ankara and NATO.
However, this friction established Turkey as an independent actor in the region. Consequently, the collapse of the Assad regime poses a unique chance for insurgent Turkey to solidify its status as a regional power. Ankara remains the single channel through which Russia and Iran can reach the new Syrian government, placing Turkey in the relative position of power. To uphold this status, Ankara is largely expected to leverage its influence to encourage the new Syrian government to establish a more transparent and legitimate political system, eradicating the shades of the Assad rule.
The talks about the joint defence pact between Syria’s transitional President Ahmed al-Sharaa and Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan in February 2025 hint at Turkey meeting the expectations of seizing this opportunity. This defence pact envisages the establishment of Turkish air bases in central Syria and training for Syria’s new army, according to Reuters.
With the collapse of the Assad government, the concerns about Kurdish forces become especially nascent for Turkish security. The possible new status of SDF leaders in the new Syrian government and the prospect of expanded territorial rights for the Kurdish population might cause a spillover effect in Turkey. This development can attract the oppressed Kurdish population, increasing the risks of insurgency that Turkey endeavours to preclude. Thus, the presence of the Turkish military forces would be an integral provision of the emerging defence agreement between the Turkish and Syrian governments. But what risks does it pose for the Syrian restoration of justice?
Turkish military forces are accused of war crimes against the civilian population in northeastern Syria. A recent Amnesty International report shed light on the atrocities conducted by the Turkish military, many of which included the attacks on civilian residential areas leading to the mass murder. On October 17, 2019, around 218 civilians were killed in Syria as a result of the Turkish offensive, which Ankara later denied. One of the pieces of evidence suggests that on October 13 of the same year, a Turkish airstrike hit a market, targeting a civilian convoy, consisting of about 400 civilian vehicles, while travelling between Qamishli and Ras al-Ain. This attack killed 6 and injured 59 civilians. The journalist who witnessed this attack recalls it as “an absolute massacre”.
If Ankara keeps denying the wrongdoing, the continued deployment of Turkish troops in Syria can contradict the core principle of restorative justice. The failure to hold Turkish troops accountable risks perpetuating the circles of violence in the psychological dimension of society. It deeply impedes the restoration of justice and largely neglects the healing of Syria’s collective trauma.
The Turkish scenario of the Syrian reconstruction holds a paramount domestic component, suggesting the continuing pressure on the SDF by Turkish troops. It may result in inadequate demobilisation, opening Pandora’s box for the escalation of violence between different groups. It leads to the conclusion that the Turkish scenario is mostly about Turkish internal security concerns with little connection to genuine peace-building or the restoration of justice in Syria.
3) Russia
The collapse of the Assad regime in Syria represents the greatest geopolitical loss for Russia in the XXI century. With its resources concentrated on the war in Ukraine, it is hardly feasible to envisage Russian troops backing Assad’s return to power. Russia is one of the main actors that would benefit the least from the reformation of Syria.
Seeing the Arab Spring as an extension of the American geopolitical strategy, Russia perceived the Assad rule as an ideologically friendly power: the maintenance of the authoritarian kinship was important for Russia to сounter the West and restore the scale of influence it once had.
By employing hybrid tactics, such as airstrikes, limited naval and ground presence and operating through Iran and its proxies, Russia engaged all of the key actors involved in the conflict, becoming a key player in the Syrian Civil War. It helped Russia to reassert itself as a robust geopolitical power in the Eastern Mediterranean and underpin the “peacekeeper” status. This quick victory achieved at a relatively low cost resulted in the unprecedented military presence of Russia in the Eastern Mediterranean. This strategic approach allowed Russia to counterbalance the United States and appease Turkey through arms deals, swiftly exploiting the NATO-Turkey crisis.
The expansion of Russian power to this region established a solid platform for future Russian military operations, becoming increasingly relevant in the context of its war with Ukraine. The presence of the Russian naval bases in Syria was crucial in sustaining its position in the Black Sea region following the Crimea annexation. Later on, Russia significantly leveraged its military bases in Syria over Turkey and Israel, which officially stated its reluctance to send the weapons to Ukraine because of the close proximity to Russian forces.
In this way, Syria became an integral pillar of the grand Russian geopolitical plan. Hence, maintaining this influence was one of Russia’s key strategic objectives.
The fall of Assad exposed Russian vulnerability in the post-Cold War world and its ideological defeat. The political transformation of Syria would undermine Russia’s influence and international image, with adversaries like the United States gaining greater strategic advantages as Russia delays its response.
Therefore, given the paramountcy of Syria in Russian foreign policy, Russia is envisaged to persist in its efforts to safeguard this strategic gain. In light of the ongoing military engagement in Ukraine, it is likely to see Russia employing covert operation tools to ensure Syrian internal chaos and destabilisation. Analogically to the hybrid warfare doctrine Russia uses to weaken European and American democracies, Russia can exploit Syrian fragmentation.
One caveat Russia can exploit is the unresolved issue with the wives and children of ISIS fighters at the Al-Hol Camp, who are viewed as the continuation of ISIS operations and perpetrators of its ideology. The placement of these families together with a large number of Iraqi and Syrian refugees in the al-Hol camp after the defeat of ISIS in Syria is regarded as one of the biggest blunders of the West that Russia can benefit from. Russia targeted the moderate anti-Assad opposition groups that also opposed ISIS, launching airstrikes outside of the ISIS-controlled territories and rejecting the US-led coalition request to strike Islamic State targets near al-Tanf. This way, Russia strengthened ISIS indirectly and helped to eliminate their enemies. Russia managed to place the West over the choice between ISIS or Assad – chaos or stability. Now, with Assad gone, Russia can cause chaos by exploiting the isles of ISIS influence remaining in Syria – not for the sake of Assad’s return, but for the deterrence of the West.
Conclusion
This article is not about peace and reconciliation; rather, it is about the fidelity of these efforts amid competing geopolitical tensions and interests. The prospects for Syrian peacebuilding and the restoration of justice appear gloomy and challenging due to the competing geopolitical interests. Hence, it is important to embrace this political momentum until the liberated Syria becomes another hybrid battlefield.
Image: Rebels celebrate the fall of the Assad Regime during the first Friday Prayers at the Umayyad mosque, 14 December 2024 (Source: VOA/public domain)
