Understanding the Serbo-Croat “Arms Race”

14 December, 2024

By Oliver Hegglin

The Republics of Croatia and Serbia have long been major rival players in the Balkans. Their histories are tied together by war and peace, unified statehood and independence. The result is animosity established over the course of a century, leading to tensions and mistrust today. At a time when the EU and NATO present opportunities for regional integration and security, war in Europe and foreign influence present challenges. Under this backdrop, military modernization programs and political rhetoric taking advantage of past conflicts and modern disputes have resulted in the characterization of an “Arms Race” in the western Balkans. However, a chronology of this history and an understanding of relevant events  can shed light on the complex causes and subsequent effects that have produced this outcome to allow us to garner a more nuanced appreciation of the situation.

A Century of History

Croatia and Serbia are “symmetrical” to each other in that they developed in parallel for over a century, simultaneously undergoing social and political changes. Both were core republics of the “first Yugoslavia” in the form of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia (1918 to 1941) and later also in Tito’s “second Yugoslavia”, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (1945 to 1992). During the war-time period (1941 to 1945), power shifted between ethnic and political groups under occupation and influence of foreign powers, resulting in how Memory Politics played a major role in the later disintegration of the second Yugoslavia and post-independence life of Croatia and Serbia.

Most significant to the contemporary age, are the Yugoslav wars, which in the case of Croatia and Serbia (Croatian War of Independence) lasted from March 1991 to November 1995. With the modern states of Croatia and Serbia emerging as independent, the war especially, but also the past century of history, served as formative years in establishing their national identities and geopolitical positions. Where the Kingdom of Yugoslavia was dominated by Serbs under a Serbian royal family, the inter-Yugoslav period of WW2 saw the Nazi-aligned Croatian-dominated Ustaša regime come to power over much of the region as the Independent State of Croatia, with much of modern-Serbia coming under German occupation.

Under the Ustaša -regime, many Serbs were either killed, deported, or ‘converted’ out of their national identities. Later during the Yugoslav Wars, with Belgrade serving as the capital of Yugoslavia once more and the Yugoslav Army becoming the Serbian Army as the other Republics established their own, it was the Serbs who were perceived as the aggressors and oppressors, waging a war to prevent the Federal Republic from splitting apart. The result is both Croats and Serbs today having established their ‘victim narrative’ through revision of history, justifying perceiving the other as a threat. This history has led to today’s rivalry and mistrust, causing many issues to remain unresolved.

Since the Yugoslav Wars, Croatian and Serbian politicians have accused the others’ state of genocide, claims rejected by the International Court of Justice. Reconciliation remains difficult, with many families in both countries still without information about relatives who disappeared during the war, and social animosity remains. Previously mixed parts of Croatia have been homogenized, and both countries having disputed delimitation along the Danube river. In Croatia, the war is celebrated, not commemorated, with independence serving as grounds for nationalist sentiments. This narrative has become widely accepted and used by political elites and in popular culture.

Despite this setting, efforts at reconciliation and dialogue exist. For example, Croats and Serbs invest in each other’s country, pop culture is mutually consumed, and tourism between the two is regular. Reconciliation throughout the past decade has occurred, as both countries attempt to acknowledge the others’ victims, and Croatia formally encourages displaced Serbs to return. Nevertheless, such attempts are at the mercy of political and social will, the modern discourse resulting from the Yugoslav Wars’ legacy, and a century of troubled relations.

Three Decades of Nation-building

Despite three decades since the end of the Croatian War of Independence and pledges to resolve war-time animosities, the inter-state relationship between Croatia and Serbia continues to be affected by war-time events. One such ‘spike’ in relations which personifies the current state of affairs occurred in the summer of 2022, when Croatia denied permission to Serbia’s President Alexander Vucic to privately visit the Jasenovac concentration camp, where tens of thousands of Serbs were murdered by the Ustaša regime during World War II. Croatian authorities stated that the government not being informed of this visit was unacceptable and that the visit was not sincere about honoring the victims. Serbia refuted this and Prime Minister ana Brnabić labelled the decision as “scandalous”, describing it as “an anti-European… and brutal violation of the freedom of movement”, adding that “I don’t know what our relations will look like in the future”. Serbia reciprocated by restricting Croatian officials’ travel through Serbia, accused Croatia of not facing up to the actions of the then-government. Croatia responded by accusing Serbia of using the issue for domestic politics and for similarly not facing up to their role during the Yugoslav Wars. In the fall of 2023, Croatia and Serbia expelled diplomats from the other, initiated by Belgrade accusing the Croatian embassy’s first secretary of espionage and recruitment. Zagreb, in reciprocation, expelled the advisor to Serbia’s embassy, rejecting Belgrade’s justification as “a step toward the deterioration of mutual relations”.

This second example comes after relations had improved, with cultural and social initiatives by the Serbian minority in Croatia and the Croatian minority in Serbia to enhance relations with their host states. The 2023 World Economic Forum in Zagreb was also a setting under which then-Prime Ministers Andrej Plenkovic of Croatia and Ana Brnabić of Serbia met, and Serbia’s Foreign Minister Ivica Dačić and EU Integration Minister Tanja Miščević similarly visited Zagreb for Orthodox Christmas that January. Dačić is quoted as saying “we have to talk with each other. Dialogue on an equal basis is the only way to resolve the open issues that continue to burden us.” EU membership is a topic, and Croatia had also been supporting Serbia since 2013.

These examples of recurring tensions and relationship building measures are indicative of modern Serbo-Croatian relations. While the governments are undoubtedly keen on improving relations for mutual benefit, such as more EU-integration, regional stability and economic prosperity, invoking wartime sentiments and bringing up alleged wartime atrocities remains a proven method by politicians to rally political support for actions and elections. What the global media has labelled to be an “Arms Race” between the two countries personifies this rhetoric and serves to sustain Serbo-Croat tensions.

A “mini” “Arms Race”

Talk of a Balkans, or “mini”, “Arms Race” between Croatia and Serbia can be traced back to 2015, when Croatia approached the United States for 16 M270 Multiple Launch Rocket Systems. Serbia, feeling addressed by this intent, turned to Russia for a response, which recommended the S-300 missile defense system. Over the course of the next year, a military build-up that led to discussion of reintroducing conscription in Croatia took place. Ultimately, none of this happened due to financial constraints, however many future acquisition projects would come to realization. In addition to hardware acquisitions, both Croatia and Serbia have recently indicated their intentions to re-introduce mandatory military service, further stoking fears of conflict.

Croatia Sharpening its Claws

Just a year after 2015, Croatia acquired 12 Panzerhaubitzen 2000 howitzers from Germany and 16 Kiowa Warrior helicopters from the USA. Jump to the 2020s, when a string of military acquisitions by both sides truly began, in part spurred on by Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. In November 2021, Croatia acquired 12 second-hand Rafale fighter jets from France to replace Soviet-era MiG-21s. France’s President Emmanuel Macron visited Croatia for the signing of a Croatian-French strategic partnership agreement to strengthen defense collaboration with the defense ministers of both countries, Mario Banožić and Florence Parly. Prime Minister Plenkovic testified to this acquisition as giving Croatia the ability to “avert those who have any aspirations towards our territory” but also to serve as an “exporter of security” and of “stability in southeastern Europe”. At the same time, the USA approved the sale and modernization of 76 Bradley Fighting Vehicles for Croatia.

In February 2022, the USA donated two UH-60M Black-Hawk helicopters to Croatia, and in December, the latter announced the “urgent procurement” of short-range MBDA Mistral 3 air-defense missile systems from France. Adding to the justification beyond the war in Ukraine was the crash of an unmanned aerial vehicle in Zagreb the previous March which is believed to have originated in Ukraine. In January 2023, Zagreb agreed to purchase 89 Bradley Fighting Vehicles from the USA to equip an infantry brigade.

April 2024 saw the arrival of the first six Rafales, with the rest slated for 2025. In August, Zagreb announced plans for an acquisition of an undisclosed amount of M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARs), a weapon also ordered by Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Romania following its successful utilization by Ukraine. In October, Croatian Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defense, Ivan Anušić, and German Federal Minister of Defense, Boris Pistorius, signed a letter of intent for Croatia to acquire up to 50 Leopard 2A8 Main Battle Tanks at a reduced price in exchange for transferring its M-84 tanks and M-80 Infantry Fighting Vehicles to Ukraine. Most recently, in November 2024, Croatia announced an “urgent procurement” of six Turkish Bayraktar TB2 drones, with the ability to cover Croatia’s entire territory.

In August 2024, Defense Minister Anušić announced Zagreb would re-introduce conscription starting on January 1, 2025 after suspension in 2008, on the justification that Russian aggression in Ukraine, Hamas’ attack against Israel, tensions in Kosovo, threats from illegal migration, and terrorist attacks in Europe over the past 15 years made this necessary. The service, which would last for two months, would be supplemented by increased salaries for military personnel. Anušić indicated that all the modernization efforts are in accordance with an agreement with allies and NATO leadership and that there would be no “saving of funds” in this area.

Serbia’s Shifting Strategy

Croatia’s military acquisitions are in-line with its EU and NATO memberships, in sticking with the West and supporting Ukraine. Serbia, on the other hand, while on the “European path”, also intends to continue “nourishing” its ties with Russia and China and has pursued neutrality in regards to the Russo-Ukrainian war. Personifying this balance, between 2022 and 2023, Serbia procured eleven H-145 helicopters, as well as 15 Mi-35 attack and Mi-17 transport helicopters. January 2022 also saw the delivery of diverse weapons from Russia, including anti-tank Kornet missiles and a total of ten MiG-29 fighter jets; six from Russia and four from Belarus, and by February 2022, Serbia had also received 30 tanks, 30 Armored Personnel Carriers, and Pantsir-1 anti-aircraft missile systems from Russia. From China, Serbia received in March 2022 an HQ-22 surface-to-air missile system, the largest delivery of arms from China to Europe, and in June 2020 had received CH-92A drones, China’s first export of military aviation equipment to Europe.

In January 2023, Serbia received French Mistral Air Defense Systems, signed for back in 2019 along with other equipment. Later in September 2023, Serbia received the first of two Airbus C-295 transport aircraft, replacing Soviet-era Antonov An-26, in a deal including government-to-government oversight between the ministries of defense of Spain and Serbia. In January 2024, the Serbian Defense Ministry declared that conscription should be re-introduced following suspension in 2011, to “increase the defense capabilities of the Serbian Armed Forces, through the rejuvenation and improvement in the training of the active and reserve forces”. In September that year, government ministers agreed and Vucic praised the decision as important to improving defense readiness, saying “we do not want to attack anyone. Nor will we do so. But we want to deter those who threaten us with savage relentlessness everyday”. Notably, this decision on conscription comes just one month after Croatia’s and is also to last about two months.

Most significant however, is Serbia signing a deal with France for 12 Rafale fighter jets in August 2024 to replace its MiG-29 fleet. Both the President of Serbia and France, along with Serbian Defence Minister, Bratislan Gašić, and CEO of Dassault Aviation, Éric Trappier, met in Belgrade for this occasion, with the first jet set to arrive in 2028. This is significant for a country that had previously flown Soviet/Russian aircraft and notable, as Croatia had purchased the same amount of the same jets. President Macron referred to this deal as “an opening, a strategic change… and an opportunity for Europe”. He further commented on a process of strategic autonomy in Europe, the process of which included doing military deals with “aspirant” EU countries.

France’s multiple arms deals with Serbia can be explained by the historic relationship between the two countries, with 2019, the year several arms deals were made, marking 180 years of re-established diplomatic relations, with a longer history prior. Serbian soldiers fighting for Napoleon, French support for Serbian independence, and French support to Serbia during WW1, all contributed to warm French-Serbian relations today. France has seemingly been able to use this history to ease Serbia towards the West, using military deals as a means with which to cut Serbian connections to Russia.

The French connection can also be understood to come in response to the USA warning Belgrade to align with western military standards if it were sincere about joining the EU and other western associations. Simultaneously, likely to satisfy political forces in the country and to retain the positive relationship with Moscow, President Vucic stated that Serbia would not “be a punching bag for anyone”, referring to NATO’s bombardment of Serbia in 1999, and saying that its weapons acquisitions are not a threat but rather a “powerful deterrent” against potential attackers. Concerns are that Russia selling weapons to Serbia is in an effort to increase tensions in a historically volatile region and shift attention away from the war in Ukraine. Simultaneously, Belgrade likely believes more weapons, particularly from the East, puts it in a better diplomatic position by enhancing leverage. And despite a decade-long EU accession negotiation requiring the harmonization of EU foreign policy towards Russia, Serbia has not imposed EU sanctions against its traditional ally.

The Russo-Ukrainian War

The “hot phase” of the Serbo-Croatian “Arms Race” began in 2020 and increased after Russia initiated its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. With Croatia as both an EU and NATO member, and Serbia balancing between East and West, one would imagine support for Ukraine differs. This, however, would not appear to be the case, as Serbia too sees practical benefits to supporting Ukraine.

Croatia’s EU and NATO Position

The Croatian transfer of old tanks, likely repaired M-84s, in exchange for the abovementioned German Leopard 2A8s, is one example of Zagreb’s position an opportunity to gain political credibility with the EU and USA. Prime Minister Plenkovic went further, and during the third Ukraine-Southeast Europe Summit, held in Croatia’s Dubrovnik on October 24, signed a ten-year bilateral agreement on cooperation and support for Ukraine, saying the two countries “stand together in defense of democracy and peace”. Further providing support for Ukraine, the Croatian Parliament declared the Holodomor a genocide in June 2024, and Zagreb pledged support for demining in Ukraine as well as for war-crimes prosecution, both fields Croatia has experience in from the Yugoslav Wars. However, Zagreb stopped short of approving the participation of Croatian soldiers in NATO’s support mission to Ukraine, citing concerns about the conflict potentially spreading to the Balkans.

Serbia’s Military Neutrality

Serbia publicly does not support Ukraine with arms and follows a policy of military neutrality based on “four pillars”; cooperation with Brussels, Washington DC, Moscow, and Beijing. This is to say, Serbia does not support Russia either and officially provides weapons to neither. However, where Croatia sees support for Ukraine as an opportunity for political gain with the West, Serbia too is believed to be supporting Ukraine behind its public posture. For instance, Serbian weapons have been seen in use by Ukrainian forces, having changed hands through several international companies. A leaked April 2023 Pentagon document also implied that Serbia was either willing to provide, or by that time had already provided, support to Ukraine. Through front companies, the Czech Republic and Türkiye, Serbia is also believed to be sending thousands of artillery shells to Ukraine. Beyond military hardware, Serbia has also sent equipment to reconstruct electrical grids in March 2023 and since 2022 has accepted Ukrainian refugees, sent humanitarian aid and pledged to help with the post-war reconstruction effort while taking steps to prevent the recruitment of Serbs by Russia for the war. This is likely what was meant when in May 2024, Serbian Prime Minister Milos Vucevic expressed support for Ukraine.

These examples of believed Serbian military support to Ukraine violate its military neutrality and risk damaging relations with Russia. This begs the question, why? One the one hand, selling much-needed weapons and ammunition to Ukraine is good business for Belgrade, which has quadrupled its arms exports since 2020 to an estimated 800 million Euros. This is made possible by Serbia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina, hosting a majority of former Yugoslavia’s defense industry, resulting in over 90% of the western Balkan’s military exports.

Secondly, Belgrade recognizes Ukrainian territory in its entirety, including land occupied by Russia, in kind to Kyiv refusing to recognize the independence of Kosovo. Lastly, and also in regard to Kosovo, Serbian support for Ukraine has been suggested to have caused a shift in the US approach to Serbia in negotiations with Kosovo. Support for Ukraine is likely to also help Serbia’s EU accession negotiations. Ironically however, the USA recently supplied Kosovo with Javelin anti-tank missiles, and Pristina will also be acquiring Turkish Bayraktar TB-2 drones, arguably contributing to Belgrade’s justification of its military modernization and tit-for-tat military support from Russia. Plans for further acquisitions through 2026 are also in place and include eight Nora self-propelled howitzers, 30 turrets for Lazar III infantry fighting vehicles, 81 Milos II armored combat vehicles, and 26 upgraded M80AB1 amphibious vehicles. At the second Ukraine-Southeastern Europe Summit in Tirana in February 2024, Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelensky thanked Serbia’s Vucic for support while Vucic reciprocated by thanking Zelensky for refraining from recognizing Kosovo. This conference was significant for Ukraine, in that like Ukraine, the western Balkans uses, and consequently is able to produce both NATO and Soviet munitions relatively cheaply, all of which Ukraine needs. Zelensky also pleaded to the delegations from the region, including Croatia and Serbia, for more ammunition. He further proposed joint arms production between Ukraine and the region by linking the arms industries in Ukraine and the Balkans, which may further stoke impressions of a revitalized “Arms Race” in the region.

Perceiving an “Arms Race”

The context of a labelled “Arms Race” is that of a return of conventional warfare in Europe, affecting the western Balkans as well, and the practical need to replace outdated military hardware. What there is not, is a perceivable political or military sense in either Serbia or Croatia attacking the other with realistic goals. Media articles with headlines claiming an “Arms Race” or increasing tensions in the Balkans as a result of the continuous arms acquisitions by both countries have conversely supported domestic political rhetoric which has been used to justify such purchases, resulting in a cycle of acquisitions and words in a region where nationalist rhetoric is proven to secure votes and divert public attention from socioeconomic issues.

The Dayton Accords

All the above-mentioned examples of weapons acquisitions by Croatia and Serbia remain within the agreed limits of the 1995 Dayton Accords. Annex 1B serves as the foundation on which arms control and procurements have been taking place, and under which both countries remain within the mandated restrictions. Through this Annex and the Accords, both countries have a channel through which they could reduce existing tensions, prevent future tensions, and increase confidence- and security-building measures in the region through consultations between their armed forces. The EU and USA would undoubtedly welcome and eagerly want to be included in such measures to ultimately eliminate the rhetoric and public perception of an “Arms Race”. This would allow nation-building to continue without animosity.

NATO and its Partnership for Peace

NATO’s expansion in the Balkans over the past two decades has helped ensure stability and peace in the region. As a security provider, aggression by Serbia against Croatia would risk triggering NATO’s Article 5 collective defense clause, forcing a response against Serbia. This insurance makes any act of aggression by Serbia highly unlikely, undoubtedly to both Belgrade and Zagreb’s full awareness. Political leaders in both countries are undoubtedly fully conscious of the cause and effect the cycle of arms acquisitions and rhetoric has, something both could do in a “less toxic” way.

Where Croatia is a NATO member, Serbia joined NATO’s Partnership for Peace program in 2006 and in 2015 signed a tailored Individual Partnership Action Plan, the highest level of cooperation a non-NATO state can have with the alliance. Through this, Serbia has come to have “excellent if discreet” relations with NATO and regularly trains with NATO states. This further testifies to Serbia’s western inclination and move towards establishing interoperability with NATO beyond the acquisition of western equipment.

Greater Serbia or the European Union?

Serbia is shifting towards the West, albeit slowly and perhaps somewhat reluctantly. Belgrade’s attempt to balance political and military relations between East and West has also resulted in frustration, with Croatia’s Foreign Minister Grlić Radman saying President Vucic must essentially pick a side; Russia or the EU. Other regional neighbors also fear nationalist rhetoric in Serbia calling for the establishment of a “Greater Serbia”, which implies adding all lands where ethnic Serbs reside. Perhaps as an unintended consequence, the “Arms Race”, and Serbia’s outspending and military superiority in the region, has contributed to expansionist ambitions by part of the political spectrum.

Yet indications are that this concept is more of a political headache for Serbia’s long-term desire for increased European integration rather than an actual threat against its neighbors. President Vucic has stated that neighboring countries know that rearmament is not “against them” and an increasing amount of Serbs, especially the youth, are in favor of eventual EU membership.

Serbo-Croat Stability

The possibility of a Serbo-Croat conflict is very low. But tensions are real, resulting in the possible destabilization of the region. The concept of an “Arms Race” between the two has become trapped in a cycle of military acquisitions and political rhetoric, leading to sensationalist headlines. Neither Serbia nor Croatia have cause to increase tensions and neither are in a socioeconomic positions nor have the political will to initiate a conflict. But as is in the Balkans, politicians know to use this to their advantage. Yet there are foreign policy objectives to be met by a legitimate modernization program of outdated military equipment.

Where Zagreb sees itself as a bastion of economic, social and political power in the western Balkans, able to address the challenges of the “southeastern neighborhood”, its military purchases can be attributed to promoting the country as an “anchor of regional stability” and presenting itself as a competent and reliable NATO partner. Belgrade on the other hand, has so far managed to balance political and military policies between East and West while trending on a westward shift while maintaining socioeconomic and political power in the region. As a result, Serbia is critical to western Balkan stability, without which peace and development would be more challenging.

The label of an “Arms Race” is an exaggerated view on current events in the western Balkans. Croatia and Serbia both have legitimate cases to modernize and strengthen their armed forces in light of war in Europe and the desire for strengthened EU and NATO integration. It is the decision of politics to turn to historical animosity to justify the ongoing developments of both armed forces for domestic purposes, when there is the opportunity to continue this growth as partners in promoting socioeconomic development in the region. Both Republics have the potential to act as regional security providers and as sources of stability. And though some sources of mutual animosity may remain in living memory, future generations have the opportunity to shift towards a cooperative spirit to achieve integrated peace and prosperity.

Image: A Croatian Air Force Rafale combat aircraft (Source: Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Croatia via CC BY 4.0)