Human Security Centre Human Rights and International Security Research
By Sam Biden, Junior Fellow
19 April, 2026
Current Story
Amnesty International (AI) reported that on 24 November 2025, Tunisian authorities released Mustapha Djemali and Abderrazak Krimi following a ruling by the Tunis Court of First Instance, which ultimately sentenced both men to two years’ imprisonment, with six months suspended. The two individuals were prosecuted in connection with their work supporting refugees, asylum seekers and migrants, raising concerns regarding the criminalization of legitimate humanitarian aid missions through vetted organizations. Throughout the proceedings, Amnesty International maintained that their detention was arbitrary and called for their immediate and unconditional release, alongside the dropping of all charges.
The case marks a significant and worrying trend in the troubled African state, representing the first known prosecution in Tunisia targeting NGO staff solely based on their humanitarian and human rights activities. However, the precursing conditions that led to this landmark case have been brewing since the Jasmine Revolution of 2011.
The Jasmine Revolution and Early Signals of Media Repression
Tunisia’s 2011 uprising, often framed as the sole “success story” of the Arab Spring, emerged from deep structural inequalities rather than an immediate demand for democratic reform. Long-standing regional disparities created conditions of economic marginalization, unemployment and political disenfranchisement among the growing population. Compounded by the rise of militia-style groups operating across North Africa, both rising global food prices and drastic security measures pushed the already vulnerable Tunisian community into further unrest. As a result, protests erupted and while initially centered on economic demands, they radically developed when the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi, done in protest against government harassment, sparked nation-wide mobilization. Within weeks, protests spread from marginalized interior regions to the capital, culminating in the departure of sitting President, Zine El Abidine Ben Ali in January 2011.
However, even at the height of the uprising where government control was at its least effective, early warning signs of repression against critics, despite the ousting of Ben Ali as a dictator, were already beginning to form. As protests escalated in early January 2011, remaining authorities moved to suppress the flow of information with bloggers, activists and reporters being arrested in an attempt to minimize mobilization, particularly as social media played a central role in documenting events and amplifying dissent. At the same time, a near-total blackout of domestic media coverage was imposed during some of the deadliest protests, allowing the state to operate with impunity beyond the eyes of international media. While the immediate post-revolution period saw an expansion of media freedoms on paper, this shift proved fragile and fragmented less than 2 years after the Jasmine Revolution.
By 2013, Tunisian authorities were already reverting to restrictive practices, prosecuting individuals for expression deemed critical of public institutions or “harmful to public morals”, with the trial and conviction of Alaa Eddine Yaakoubi, illustrating this trend. Yaakoubi was sentenced to imprisonment for his song “Cops are dogs”, charged with insulting the police, defamation and undermining public morals. Although his sentence was later reduced and he was released, the case demonstrated the willingness of authorities to criminalize artistic expression. That same year, Hakim Ghanmi was prosecuted before a military tribunal for criticizing staff at a military hospital, facing charges of defamation and undermining the reputation of the army. Immediately following this was former presidential advisor Ayoub Massoudi being handed a suspended prison sentence following his criticism of the government’s extradition decision against former Libyan Prime Minister, Baghdadi Mahmoudi. Meanwhile, Sboui faced prosecution and potential imprisonment for actions interpreted as violating public morals, with charges extending beyond expression into broader accusations linked to her activism.
2016-2020 saw the use of military courts to prosecute speech, with the cases of Rached Khiari and Jamel Arfaoui, both journalists, taking the spotlight. Both were charged under military justice provisions for reporting on or criticizing the army, like Ghanmi. These cases, centered on allegations of harming military reputation or morale, highlighted the continued reliance on legal frameworks that allow civilians to be tried before military courts for speech-related offences first found in 2013. This trajectory intensified further from 2018- 2020. According to AI, at least 40 bloggers, Facebook administrators, activists and human rights defenders were prosecuted for online expression during this period, with most cases involving criticism of police conduct, allegations of corruption or comments deemed insulting to public officials. By October 2020, Myriam Bribri, a youth activist often associated with “Manich Msamah”, a youth-led activist movement in Tunisia, was summoned for questioning after posting criticism of police behavior on Facebook, following a complaint by a security forces union. Her case confirmed a wider pattern in which authorities and security institutions could increasingly initiate or threaten legal action in response to online criticism against government authorities.
Emergency Powers and New Cases
On 25 July 2021, President Kais Saied invoked emergency powers under Article 80 of the constitution, citing an “imminent danger” to the state. The measures fundamentally altered Tunisia’s political structure and created a monopoly-style, authoritarian rule over previously independent bodies. Saied dismissed the serving parliament, lifted parliamentary immunity and consolidated prosecutorial authority within the presidency itself, aligning ultimate control with his office. While framed as a response to the COVID-19 crisis and political deadlock, the move marked a decisive shift toward executive control that would continue until today. The constitutional legitimacy of these measures was immediately contested. Tunisia was effectively left without a functioning constitutional court, leaving no institutional mechanism to adjudicate competing interpretations of presidential authority. Drawing attention from international actors, including the US, EU and UN, new concerns over the long-term implications for Tunisia’s democratic trajectory began to emerge. Rather than remaining temporary as they are typically governed, emergency rule has since become embedded within normal governmental operations, continuing to consolidate control away from independent bodies.
In early 2026, Saied extended the state of emergency for a further 11 months, continuing a pattern of renewals that dates back to its initial introduction. Currently, the Ministry of Interior exercises expansive powers without prior judicial oversight. These include the ability to ban public gatherings, impose curfews, conduct searches of private property and monitor media outputs across press, broadcasting and cultural production.
Arbitrary Detention and Politicized Prosecutions
The first notable case post-2021 emergency power expansion was known formally as the “Instalingo Case”. Instalingo is a digital content company, working on anything from translation to video production and editing. Authorities accused suspects of offences including incitement to violence, insulting the president, money laundering and attempting to destabilize the state. However, the evidence presented reportedly consisted largely of online publications, private communications and tenuous associative links. The prosecution of individuals linked to Instalingo illustrated the expansion of repression into media and communication sectors. 3 key individuals were prosecuted.
Riadh Bettaieb, a former minister, was sentenced to eight years’ imprisonment despite limited evidence to suggest he was involved with the content accused of being illegal, with financial ties and personal associations with Instalingo staff being the backbone of the case against him. Chadha Hadj Mbarek, a journalist from Instalingo, was sentenced to five years in prison. Despite claims of her producing content that incited violence, her role was reportedly limited to producing lifestyle content relating to Tunisia. Yet, she faced prosecution under national security charges with her reporting that the detention conditions were inadequate, with denial of medical support, restricted communication and documented mistreatment at the hands of staff. Said Ferjani, a senior opposition figure and member of rival party “Ennahda” was also convicted. Despite the claims being based largely on unverified witness testimony and unproven allegations, Ferjani was given a 13-year sentence on “conspiracy” charges, often relating to acts taken to undermine the authority of the government.
In 2023, Tunisian authorities initiated a new, sustained campaign targeting critics across political, legal and media spheres relating to conspiracy charges, similar to Ferjani. Human Rights Watch (HRW) reported that in February 2023, a wave of arrests brought in opposition figures, lawyers, judges, journalists and business figures under a broad and highly politicized case commonly referred to as the “Conspiracy Case.” President Saied publicly labelled those arrested as “terrorists” and “traitors” prior to trial, undermining the presumption of innocence and signaling executive influence over judicial processes. Those detained were frequently charged under vague provisions such as “conspiracy against state security,” “undermining external state security” and attempting to “change the nature of the state.” In total, at least eight individuals remain in prolonged pretrial detention under this case alone, exceeding Tunisia’s statutory limits. Many others were detained simply for engaging in political discussions, communicating with foreign diplomats or participating in opposition networks. In August 2024, Sihem Bensedrine, a longstanding human rights advocate and former head of Tunisia’s Truth and Dignity Commission, was arrested. She faced charges including fraud and forgery linked to the Commission’s final report, however, her detention has been widely interpreted as retaliation for her decades-long work exposing state abuses and her criticism of President Saied.
The Decree-law
Beyond the consolidation of authority under the emergency powers, the use of specific provisions has allowed the interim measures to be exploited to greater lengths, with long-form analysis being done by UK-based NGO, “Article 19”. The provisions in question, known formally as the “Decree-Law”, act as a form of secondary legislation issued by the President. The Decree-Law was intended to operate only until the newly constituted Assembly of the Representatives of the People could review and approve it, however it has continued to operate regardless.
The Decree-law directly addresses criminal matters and issues affecting human rights and freedom of expression areas that have been continually under heavier scrutiny since 2021. While legislation like this should be operated beyond the sole scope of the President, the Decree-law is operated without the input of an executive/judicial branch of government.
The Decree-law contains multiple content-based offences, particularly in Article 24 (dissemination of false information) and Article 26 (child exploitation and corporal aggression), often compounded with specific hate speech provisions in Article 24 (2). Article 24 is particularly complex, encompassing several distinct offences that lack clarity and precision. Vague terms such as “false news,” “rumours,” and “infringing on the rights of others” are open to multiple interpretations without independent judicial input, typically being interpreted by military courts under the direct rule of Saied. Article 24 criminalizes the dissemination of false information based on intent alone, without requiring demonstrable harm or a concrete risk to public order, national security, or the population’s well-being, carrying punishments of five years imprisonment and a fine of 50,000 dinars. Provisions on incitement to aggression and hate speech are similarly problematic, with vague references to “incitements to aggression” may be used to criminalize critical, albeit legitimate, coverage of public figures. The Decree-law does not provide clear definitions, and the additional criminalization of “incitement to hate speech” only muddies the waters. Article 24(3) only amplifies the harm the provisions cause, doubling penalties when the targeted individual is a public official, creating a greater fear of consequences for those doing legitimate journalism.
Conclusion
The promises of the Jasmine Revolution have unfortunately unraveled as it approaches its 15th anniversary. The goals of solidarity away from dictatorship appear much like a dream rather than a reality in contemporary Tunisia, with the expansive use of emergency power showing a regression, not a revolution. Until those in power revert control back to the independent bodies that are needed to maintain social order, we will likely see further progression towards total impunity.
