The 50th Munich Security Conference and the Shift in German Foreign Policy

The Question of Military Interventions

And, of course, in the end remains the question of military operations. For, more political responsibility also means more military responsibility. Not immediately but some time in the future, not in Ukraine but somewhere else. But people who now cheer for Steinmeier should bear that in mind. In his speech at the MSC he said: “Military action is a last resort.” But in the new German foreign policy it is an option on the table, a radical departure from its recent stances.

Some people now tend to think about the good old times when Germany, guilty of two world wars, could hide away on the international stage and devote herself to her newly discovered pacifism. The dirty work – military interventions in regional conflicts – was left to others, mainly the Americans, British and French.

Now, though, this complacent self-restraint has come to an end. The reunified and politically powerful Germany not only claims, but already bears international responsibility. Thus it already participated in several military interventions: Somalia, Bosnia, Kososvo and most of all Afghanistan. Since Afghanistan, however, most Germans and many politicians have become tired of military interventions. They long for the time when no one called for German soldiers and instead preach a culture of military restraint. For, the politicians, first and foremost chancellor Angela Merkel have learnt: there is not much to gain from military interventions, not in the field and certainly not in elections.

Therefore, the announcement made by foreign minister Steinmeier and defence minister von der Leyen that Germany would step up its commitments in the Central African Republic and in Mali has been highly appreciated among Germany’s partners, especially in France.

For, the civil war in former Yugoslavia has shown that there is not only a right but a duty to intervene militarily in order to prevent or stop genocide, ethnic displacements and other crimes against humanity. It is common sense today that a vigorous intervention by international troops could have prevented the Serbian massacre of thousands of Muslims in Srebrenica. In Rwanda, too, almost one million Tutsi would not have fallen victim to genocide had the international community not looked away.

Critics, however, point out that Afghanistan clearly shows that even a long-term presence of international troops cannot pacify a country. But was it wrong, therefore, to intervene in the first place? Should we have left the Taliban in power, oppressors of their own people and sponsors of international terrorism? Was it not rather a mistake not to intervene earlier and with many more troops and also to start the civil reconstruction of the country earlier and with much more financial means?

Military interventions do not always make sense and are not always the right response. Often, they simply cannot resolve a conflict. And they are definitely no substitute for diplomacy and negotiations. But sometimes they can prevent the worst and that is a very important value in itself. Of course, military intervention has consequences and innocent civilians could be killed. But the consequences of inaction can be far worse as we all know. With regard to Syria, for example, there certainly are valid reasons not to intervene, otherwise the international community would already have acted. But it is also a given that the lack of at least a credible threat has aided the radicalisation of both sides. The ones who suffer are the Syrian people who, three years ago, went to the streets in peaceful protest against their tyrant and who now feel abandoned by the international community.

That is exactly why it is so important to always balance the reasons for and against a military intervention in an open, honest and sober fashion. And this is not only about national interests, of course, but also about humanitarian and international law obligations. In Mali and the Central African Republic it is about stopping the advance of jihadists and thereby ending the violence and the suffering of the refugees.

Thus, the only questions should be: can a limited operation accomplish these objectives? And what happens if Germany does not participate? The question if the deployment of a few hundred troops to Africa would overstretch the Bundeswehr’s capacities is only of secondary importance. If it actually did, the German government should urgently reinforce it, even if that entails additional costs. If a government is prepared to spend hundreds of billions of Euros to bail out banks, it should also be prepared to spend a bit more money to save lives. For, an operational army that cannot be deployed is useless and could as well be abolished. And a nation that leads Europe and wants to be taken seriously but dodges military responsibility simply lacks credibility.

David Innerhuber is contactable at:

David.Innerhuber@hscentre.org

Please cite this article as:

Innerhuber, D. (2014). ‘The 50th Munich Security Conference and the Shift in German Foreign Policy’

Human Security Centre, Defence and Security, Issue 1, No. 1.