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Kathrin Möbius via Wikimedia Commons

The 50th Munich Security Conference and the Shift in German Foreign Policy

Power vacuums do not exist in international politics, at least not for very long. And Germany needs to realise that at some point in the near future she will have to address the question of her national security. Of course, many people currently do not see a threat to Germany’s national security and are worried that those threats might come once Germany starts pursuing a more active foreign policy. But it was exactly this logic that led to this defensive comfort that the former foreign minister called culture of restraint and that ultimately isolated Germany among its partners.

It was indeed an obvious goal of the former Merkel government to remain as quiet as possible in the field of foreign policy in order not to displease its voters. In the end this strategy paid off, at least for Merkel and her party. (Less so for Guido Westerwelle whose liberal party dropped altogether out of the Bundestag, the German federal parliament, after the last elections). But it also came at a high price. The political debate on foreign policy reached a level that is not adequate to a powerful country like Germany. Among her partners, it provoked allegations of passivity and complacency.

This is what Joachim Gauck wanted to change with his formidable speech in Munich. For, foreign policy is first and foremost a question of mentality and self-conception that needs to be addressed in a public debate in the media, in society and in parliament.

Ukraine as a first success of the new German Foreign Policy

A first hint at what the new German foreign policy could achieve was given during the recent protests in Ukraine. Frank-Walter Steinmeier was credited all over the world not only for his diplomatic skills but also for his personal effort to prevent a civil war in Ukraine. Flanked by his French and Polish counterparts he went to Kiev, forced government and opposition to the negotiating table and wrenched an agreement from the opponents. In his personal view it was the very last opportunity to stop the spiral of violence. Even though he was successful, his diplomatic coup did not solve all the problems in the country. Enormous political, social and economic challenges lie ahead. But at least he paved the way for a democratic solution of the crisis. The former constitution has been re-enacted, president Yanukovich is ousted, the guns remain silent. All this is partly due to the rediscovery of German diplomatic skill.

And it would not have been possible under Guido Westerwelle and his policy of ‘without me’. Steinmeier’s predecessor visited Kiev’s Maidan Square in December to revel in the attention; diplomatically, though, he was a lightweight. At his side, hardly any French foreign minister would have settled for the role of the second. After all, France is a proud nuclear power and a self-confident permanent member of the Security Council. On Russia, too, Westerwelle would not have made much of an impression.

But it was not only his predecessor that Steinmeier outshined, but also the EU’s High Representative, Catherine Ashton. In previous weeks she repeatedly offered her services as a mediator but once the first shots had been fired, Baroness Ashton fell silent. It was not the EU that changed the course of events in Ukraine, but Germany.

So, the new German foreign policy takes shape. Finally, one can imagine what the grand coalition has in mind when it talks about a more active role in the world. Finally, the new German foreign policy is no longer reduced to the question: What business has the Bundeswehr (German Federal Army) in Africa? Whoever asks questions like these still does not understand that a change of course in German foreign policy is long overdue. The formulation of German national interests must not be a taboo anymore. It is not wise anymore to hide behind the EU when it comes to foreign policy. The recent events in Ukraine have shown that Berlin, unlike Brussels, is taken seriously in Kiev and Moscow. Of course, these events also show that the new German foreign policy has its price. Having taken the first steps, Germany now is expected to keep its leading role even during the coming months of difficult political change. This requires courage and geopolitical far-sightedness.

About David Innerhuber

David Innerhuber is a PhD-Candidate at the Department of War Studies, King’s College London. He holds a BA in social sciences from the University of Graz (Austria) and an MA (with distinction) in history and international relations from Brunel University London. From 2005 to 2006 he served in the Austrian Army and, during that time, participated in the NATO-led peace-keeping mission to Kosovo (KFOR).