Russia: Janus-faced Middle East Policy

The Russian- Iraq Relationship

As with Iran, economic considerations and political opposition to the US guided Russian policy toward Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. This became strongly apparent in the run up to the 2003 Iraq invasion. At the time, sanctions were crumbling and the no-fly zone over the northern and southern part of Iraq was no longer working. Furthermore, Saddam’s regime was able to smuggle prohibited items in and out of the country through its neighbouring borders.

Consequently, the US and its allies pushed for new and stronger sanctions in the UN Security Council, aimed at restoring the no fly zone over the Kurdish region and to seal off the borders to stop illegal trade. This however was strongly opposed by Russia. Moscow was the leading force in trying get sanctions lifted and Putin’s government threatened to veto any UNSCR of that kind.

As the UK’s former ambassador to the UN, Sir Jeremy Greenstock, recalled “Russia had its own direct relationship with Iraq and was talking with Iraq probably more than any other country”.  He also stated that Iraq’s debt to Russia “was in many billions of dollars resulting from the Iran/Iraq war purchases” and the country “wanted sanctions to be lifted so they could get some of their money back”. At some point, the US and UK even discussed to pay parts of the $8 billion owed to Moscow to gain the country’s support.

Other economic reasons for Russia to oppose a stronger sanction regime and the invasion of Iraq was that Saddam offered them lucrative contracts in return and Moscow wanted to preserve the cashing-in from the UN’s oil-for-food-programme.

But the country also opposed the US-led policy towards Iraq for political considerations. The reasons given by Moscow were highly dubious. While on the one hand, Putin stated that he opposed the war in Iraq because of the strong opposition of Russia’s Muslim, he never displayed much concern about their opinion on Russian policy toward Chechnya.

Another piece of evidence which suggests that the Putin administration actively tried to wage public opinion against the US is that many of the 20,000 protesters, who went on the streets against the war, were given favours in return.

Russia’s relationship with Iraq is a further example of the country’s troubled Middle East policy and unlike in case of Iran, Moscow has not gained a lot from boycotting the toppling of the Baathist regime. In fact, it can be argued that Saddam, by offering Russia lucrative contracts in return to opposition to the US, influenced Russian policy as much as vice versa, which again is an indicator that Moscow’s Middle East policy is defensive rather than offensive.

Further, with Saddam gone, Russia has lost yet another ally in the region and Putin’s decision not to support the removal of Iran’s arch-enemy, also put Russia’s relationship with Teheran under strain.

Russia’s Janus-faced Middle East Policy

Especially on the issue of Islamic extremism, Moscow’s approach has been Janus-faced. While determined to brutally crushing down those movements at home and on the northern Caucasus, Putin’s administration at the same time maintains close ties with regimes, such as the Islamic Republic of Iran, which represents a similar ideology.

Although Teheran has officially refrained from condemning Russia’s policy in Chechnya, Putin is playing with the devil and Iran continues support for organisations like Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza. It proves where Iran’s solidarity ultimately lies. Also, despite having been granted observer status in the Organisation of Islamic Conference, many Arab states are still publicly condemning Russia’s approach to Chechnya. Thus, in the short-term, Moscow maybe succeeds in containing the situation on the northern Caucasus with its purpose alliances in the Middle East, but in the long-term it will hardly solves the problem.

Moreover, even though Russia experienced a limited surge of influence when the US and allies where under severe pressure in Afghanistan and Iraq, Russia failed to sustainably increase its influence in the region, and consequently Moscow’s Middle East policy remains defensive rather than offensive. Additionally, Russia did not effectively boycott and sabotage decisive policy decisions of the US and its Western allies, as for instance in case of Iraq. Also, with Saddam’s regime gone, Iran under tremendous pressure from the international community and Assad, another ally of Russia, on the brink in Syria, the country has to expect further backlashes.

The only of the three objectives Russia fulfilled was to enhance its economic partnerships in the region. Especially its support for Iran’s nuclear programme has brought in a lot of money for Moscow. In recent years, in particular under Putin’s leadership, Russia has also successfully intensified economic relationships with Israel and other Arab countries, which were not traditional trading partners of Russia.

In sum, Russia has failed to make priorities in the Middle East and got caught up in many conflicts of interest and policy dilemmas. Instead of focusing on specific goals, Moscow has often pursued opportunistic ends, resulting in inconsistent and ambivalent decision-making processes.

Julie Lenarz is contactable at: Julie.Lenarz@hscentre.org

Please cite this article as:

Lenarz, J. (2013) ‘Russia: Janus-faced Middle East Policy’. Human Security Centre, Global Governance, Issue 3, No. 2.