



Four Years On: The Development of the Humanitarian Crisis in Yemen

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Foreword

Since the outbreak of the conflict in 2015, Yemen's conflicting parties have created and exacerbated the worst humanitarian crisis of this century. Critical infrastructures and necessities have become scarce and rare or have crumbled and collapsed.

In 2018, 'Yemen The Continuing Tragedy' was published. The Report covered the ongoing crisis in Yemen up until 2018. This paper is the updated version of the humanitarian section from that report and explores how severe or hopeful these humanitarian areas have become in four years.

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Conflict Development

1.1 Late 2018

The US Administration begins to hint towards a Yemen troop withdrawal, including the provision of support for Saudi Arabia.¹ This is followed by an open letter signed by former Obama Administration officials such as Secretary of State Antony Blinken, National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan and future UN Ambassador nominee Linda Thomas-Greenfield.² This withdrawal process would be finalised in December with the passing of the War Powers Resolution, a US Senate decision to officially end the US presence in Yemen.³

Later that month, new mediation efforts between the Yemeni government and the Houthis would unfold. The signing of the Stockholm Agreement came as a result which included a ceasefire, prisoner swaps, mutual redeployment of forces away from the contentious Hodeidah port as well as a new committee to discuss the contested city of Taiz.⁴ Unfortunately, the agreement

would not be fulfilled as both sides broke the ceasefire by December 18.⁵

1.2 2019

Off the back of the failed Stockholm Agreement, fighting would increase in severity from January to June. The Houthis launched a drone attack on al-Anad air base, resulting in mass injury and the death of the head of the Yemeni intelligence service.⁶ During June, the UAE would follow in their US counterpart's footsteps with the scaling back of their military presence but continued to maintain a strong relationship with the Southern Transitional Council (STC).⁷ In light of this, the Houthis increased their military efforts towards Saudi territory, firstly by attacking oil installations and airports.⁸ These small Houthi victories would be enhanced with the capture of the leader of the Islamic State-Yemen Province armed group (IS-YL), Abu Osama al-Muhajer.⁹

Between July-September, the UAE officially concluded its troop withdrawal from

¹ M. Weisbrot 'Congress is finally pushing the US to withdraw from Yemen. It's about time' *The Guardian*, 30 November 2018. Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/nov/30/congress-finally-pushing-us-withdraw-yemen> [accessed 20 May 2022]

² *ibid*

³ US Senate Resolution S.J.Res.54 'A joint resolution to direct the removal of United States Armed Forces from hostilities in the Republic of Yemen that have not been authorized by Congress', 19 December 2018. Available at: <https://www.congress.gov/bills/115th-congress/senate-joint-resolution/54/text> [accessed 20 May 2022]

⁴ OSESGY, 'Full text of the Stockholm Agreement', 13 December 2018. Available at: <https://osesgy.unmissions.org/full-text-stockholm-agreement> [accessed 20 May 2022]

⁵ Arab Center Washington DC, 'A Timeline of the Yemen Crisis, from the 1990s to Present' 19 February 2021.

Available at: <https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/a-timeline-of-the-yemen-crisis-from-the-1990s-to-the-present/> [accessed 20 May 2022]

⁶ A. Mahmood, 'Houthi drone targets senior officers at Yemen's Al Anad military base' 11 January 2019. Available at:

<https://www.thenationalnews.com/world/mena/houthi-rebel-drone-targets-senior-officers-at-yemen-s-al-anad-military-base-1.811544> [accessed 20 May 2022].

⁷ *ibid*

⁸ K. Fahim & M. Ryan, 'Saudi Arabia announces capture of an ISIS leader in Yemen in U.S.-backed raid' *The Washington Post*, 25 June 2019. Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/saudi-arabia-announces-capture-of-islamic-state-leader-in-yemen-in-us-backed-raid-backed/2019/06/25/79734ca2-976a-11e9-9a16-dc551ea5a43b_story.html [accessed 21 May 2022]

⁹ *ibid*

Yemen.¹⁰ The STC assumed control of Southern governorates such as Aden, Abyan and Shabwa. Resulting from this were UAE airstrikes against Yemeni forces as an attempt to regain control of Aden.¹¹ In August, the Houthis would launch 'Operation Victory From God' against Saudi-led forces.¹² This operation resulted in the use of drones to bomb oil processing facilities in Abqaiq and Kurais.¹³ Additionally, Saudi Arabia lost half of its oil output capacity due to the attacks and Iran is accused of providing the Houthis with the technical expertise required for the attacks.¹⁴

In November, another power-sharing agreement similar to the Stockholm Agreement would be discussed and implemented. The Riyadh Agreement was signed and includes a number of major changes to the conflict.¹⁵ These focused specifically on political, military and security changes.

Political changes included the formation of a new technocratic government with a maximum capacity of 24 ministers.¹⁶ These ministers are chosen after consultation with the Prime Minister and must have no history of taking part in the conflict. Additionally, a governor and director of security were appointed for Aden, Abyan and Dhalea.¹⁷

¹⁰ Al-Jazeera, 'UAE withdraws troops from Yemen's southern port city of Aden' *Al-Jazeera*, 30 October 2019. Available at: <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/10/30/uae-withdraws-troops-from-yemens-southern-port-city-of-aden> [accessed 21 May 2022]

¹¹ *ibid*

¹² P. Wintour, 'Houthis claim to have killed 500 Saudi soldiers in major attack' *The Guardian*, 29 September 2019. Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/sep/29/houthis-claim-killed-hundreds-saudi-soldiers-captured-thousands> [accessed May 21 2022].

¹³ *ibid*

¹⁴ *ibid*

Military changes focused on restructuring military presence in Aden, Abyan and Shabwa by forcing troops to return to their initial positions.¹⁸ These troops were replaced by local security forces with both the retreating military and security forces being redeployed elsewhere.¹⁹ Security changes altered the role of the STC forces as they're incorporated into the Ministries of Interior and Defence under the authority of the Hadi Government.²⁰ Government and STC forces were forced to leave Aden within 30 days of ratification alongside a new defence force being formed aimed at the defence of civilian structures.²¹

Despite this new promising outlook, the ceasefire contained in the new agreement would be violated by both parties and violence would continue to escalate.

1.3 2020

In March, the Houthi would capture the strategically significant city of al-Hazm during the al-Jawf offensive.²² Saudi forces would respond with relentless airstrikes on the city of Sana'a. The UN called for an immediate reinstatement of the ceasefire agreement between the parties as COVID-19 began to plague the country, yet neither side agreed to these terms.²³ As a result, US

¹⁵ Al-Jazeera, 'Yemen's Riyadh Agreement: An overview', *Al-Jazeera*, 29 July 2020. Available at: <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/7/29/yemens-riyadh-agreement-an-overview> [accessed 21 May 2022].

¹⁶ *ibid*

¹⁷ *ibid*

¹⁸ *ibid*

¹⁹ *ibid*

²⁰ *ibid*

²¹ *ibid*

²² M. Al-Madhaji, 'Capture of Al-Hazm Positions Houthis Well, Militarily and Politically' *Sanna Centre*, March 4 2020. Available at: <https://sanaacenter.org/publications/analysis/9140>

[accessed 22 May 2022]

²³ *ibid*

humanitarian aid totalling \$73m was frozen out of fear the Houthi would use it for their own gain.²⁴

From April to May, another ceasefire attempt would be unilaterally made by Saudi Arabia as the country tried to mitigate the ongoing spread of COVID-19.²⁵ The Houthi and Saudi-led coalition would continue to launch attacks despite the call for a ceasefire. Alongside this, the STC would make a public call to be self-ruling in violation of their agreement with the Yemeni government.²⁶

In December, the STC and Hadi governments would agree and formalize a new power-sharing agreement in Aden. Prime Minister Maeen Abdulmalik Saeed was reappointed into the Hadi cabinet and the seats were split between the STC and the Yemen Islah party.²⁷ Just prior to an official meeting of the cabinet in Aden, an attack on the arriving airport would cause two dozen deaths. Eyes pointed towards the Houthi for the attack as retaliation to Saudi warplanes performing raids on Sana'a.²⁸

1.4 2021

In January, the Trump administration would officially designate the Houthis as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO).²⁹ The Houthis had continued to grow in Yemen and gather control of over 70-80% of the Yemeni population.³⁰ They began to threaten the city of Marib, a stronghold to the North-East corner of Houthi territory. In February, newly sworn in US President Biden announced the revocation of the FTO designation as well as support for the Saudi-led coalition.³¹ The Biden Administration further ensured their support for the peace process in Yemen by the UN and reassured Saudi Arabia about US support for its territorial defence.³²

Peace talks between Yemen and Saudi Arabia would be proposed in March, suggesting a UN-monitored ceasefire.³³ The Houthis rejected the proposal, stating this new initiative was 'nothing new' and fell short of their demands for the complete removal of the *de facto* blockade.³⁴ Further peace talks between UN envoy Martin Griffiths and US President Joe Biden focused

²⁴ S.Raghavan, 'U.S. aid cuts are deepening Yemen's misery. Now comes the coronavirus' *The Washington Post*, April 23 2020. Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle-east/us-aid-cuts-are-deepening-yemens-misery-now-comes-the-coronavirus/2020/04/23/649ce02a-82e9-11ea-81a3-9690c9881111_story.html [accessed 21 May 2022].

²⁵ Al-Jazeera, 'Saudi-led coalition extends unilateral Yemen ceasefire by a month' *Al-Jazeera*, 24 April 2020. Available at: <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/4/24/saudi-led-coalition-extends-unilateral-yemen-ceasefire-by-a-month> [accessed 22 May 2022].

²⁶ *ibid.*

²⁷ Al-Jazeera, 'New Yemen gov't sworn in after Saudi-brokered power-sharing deal' *Al-Jazeera*, 26 December 2020. Available at: <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/12/26/yemens-new-government-sworn-in-after-power-sharing-agreement> [accessed 21 May 2022].

²⁸ *ibid.*

²⁹ L. van der Kroft, 'Yemen's Houthis and the Terrorist Designation System' *International Centre for Counter-Terrorism*, 10 June 2021. Available at: <https://icct.nl/publication/yemens-houthis-terrorist-designation-system/> [accessed May 22 2022]

³⁰ *ibid.*

³¹ Z. Miller, 'Biden revokes terrorist designation for Yemen's Houthis' *AP News*, 6 February 2021. Available at: <https://apnews.com/article/joe-biden-donald-trump-civil-wars-yemen-d17b50e3995827838a19fb8bd09e9f64> [accessed May 22 2022].

³² *ibid.*

³³ BBC, 'Yemen conflict: Saudi Arabia puts forward peace plan' *BBC Website*, 22 March 2021. Available at: <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-56491503> [accessed July 1 2022].

³⁴ *ibid.*

on closing out the ongoing conflict, yet no exact resolution was reached.³⁵

From September, the Houthis would make great strides towards territorial expansion. They successfully held most of the North and West of Yemen, including the capital city of Sana'a.³⁶ They continued to fight in the Sana'a region and made significant progress to ensuring their continual control. In October, the UN Human Rights Council (HRC) would shut down their mandate tasked with investigating war crimes in Yemen, ending the glimmer of hope for the suffering population.³⁷ The UN Group of Experts has choice words for the HRC, stating the decision was a 'major setback' for the Yemeni victims.³⁸

1.5 2022

In January, much of the Houthi's progression into North and West Yemen would begin to crumble as the STC and Hadi government launched retaliatory attacks against the armed group, capturing much lost territory in the region.³⁹ In January and February, a series of attacks against the UAE would be launched by the Houthis in retaliation for

their loss of territorial control in Marib.⁴⁰ As a result, the UAE is currently considering scaling up its involvement in the ongoing conflict.⁴¹

Late March hosted the Riyadh consultations, a weeklong negotiation effort aiming to bring closure to the conflict. Despite an invitation from the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), the Houthis decided not to attend and instead launched attacks across Saudi Arabia, most notably at Jeddah racetrack.⁴² The Houthi' Supreme Political Council stated that unless Saudi Arabia ceased the *de facto* blockade, fighting would continue regardless.

Despite tensions, the Houthis and Saudi-led coalition agreed to a two-month truce in consideration of the escalating violence in April. The blockade in Northern Yemen would supposedly allow fuel deliveries and commercial flights to resume from Sana'a to Amman, Jordan, Cairo and Egypt. However, Riyadh refused to allow these commercial flights to restart.⁴³ Riyadh then successfully forced Yemeni President, Mansour Hadi, whom had been living in exile, out of his presidency and into house arrest.⁴⁴ The

³⁵ *ibid*

³⁶ K.Robinson, 'Yemen's Tragedy: War, Stalemate, and Suffering' *Council on Foreign Relations*, April 8 2022. Available at: <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/yemen-crisis> [accessed 22 May 2022].

³⁷ Al-Monitor, 'UN vote shuts down Yemen war crimes investigations' *Al-Monitor*, 8 October 2021. Available at: <https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2021/10/un-vote-shuts-down-yemen-war-crimes-investigations> [accessed 22 May 2022].

³⁸ J.Williams, 'UN halts war crimes investigation in Yemen' *MSN*, 8 October 2021. Available at: <https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/un-halts-war-crimes-investigation-in-yemen/ar-AAPhw7q?li=BBnbcA1> [accessed 22 May 2022].

³⁹ A.Almeida & M.Knights, 'Breaking Point: Consolidating Houthi Military Setbacks in Yemen' *The Washington Institute*, 19 January 2022. Available at: [https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-](https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/breaking-point-consolidating-houthi-military-setbacks-yemen)

[analysis/breaking-point-consolidating-houthi-military-setbacks-yemen](https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/breaking-point-consolidating-houthi-military-setbacks-yemen) [accessed 23 May 2022].

⁴⁰ Al-Jazeera, 'Timeline: UAE under drone, missile attacks' *Al-Jazeera*, 3 February 2022. Available at: <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/2/3/timeline-uae-drone-missile-attacks-houthis-yemen> [accessed 23 May 2022].

⁴¹ *ibid*.

⁴² M. Ali Kalfoud, 'Yemen peace talks give little hope for displace civilians' *Thomson Reuters*, 1 April 2022. Available at: <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/4/1/yemen-peace-talks-give-little-hope-for-displaced-civilians> [accessed July 1 2022].

⁴³ B.Riedel, 'How to bolster Yemen and Saudi Arabia's brittle peace deal' *Brookings*, 10 May 2022. Available at: <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2022/05/10/how-to-bolster-yemen-and-saudi-arabias-brittle-peace-deal/> [accessed July 1 2022].

⁴⁴ *ibid*.

blockade remains mostly intact as Saudi Arabia refuses to accede to the demands of the Houthis despite the new agreement, the main concern being a permanent extension

of the ceasefire regardless of the *de facto* blockades' status.

Food Security

2.1 Current World Food Picture

As of 2022,⁴⁵ over 20.7m people need humanitarian assistance in Yemen, a staggering near 3m increase since the 2018 APPG Report. 11m people were beneficiaries of food donations in 2021 alone, just peaking the 50% mark. Additionally, commodity vouchers worth \$196m were distributed, aiding over 2.6m people.

General Food Assistance (GFA)

In 2021,⁴⁶ the World Food Programme (WFP) reached over 13.8m people across 22 governorates with GFA. Additionally, 9.6m beneficiaries received general food distributions (GFD), 2.6m received commodity vouchers (CV) to lower the cost of food while 1.5m people received cash-based transfer (CBT) to purchase food. These aid consumption statistics have been steadily rising since the 2018 APPG Report. From 2020 to 2021,⁴⁷ GFD consumption rose from 14% to 18%, voucher recipients (CV) rose from 11% to 14% and CBT beneficiaries rose from 17% to 26%. The WFP provided food assistance under their Rapid Response Mechanism (RRM),⁴⁸ a programme designed to deploy rapid humanitarian aid and funding considering severe developments. This programme successfully distributed food to 495,000 people in 2021, a 2.5% representation of those in desperate need.

⁴⁵ World Food Programme, 'Yemen: Annual Country Report 2021', 24 January 2022. Available at: <https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000137883/download/> [accessed May 2 2022]

⁴⁶ ibid

⁴⁷ ibid

⁴⁸ D.Harris, 'Rapid emergency and humanitarian responses: how fast is fast enough?' *Oxford Policy Management*, November 2021. Available at:

Nutrition Assistance (NA)

Acute malnutrition hit record highs in 2022 with 2.3m children and 1.1m pregnant and lactating women (PLWG) suffering from acute malnutrition.⁴⁹ The WFP set up a new strategic outcome to combat acute malnutrition in their 2021 report on Yemen. This new strategy is split into two key components.⁵⁰ First, a new malnutrition programme targeted both children aged 6-59 months as well as PLWGs who were suffering from 'moderate acute malnutrition' (MAM). Second, the WFP provided the treatment under MAM while UNICEF provided additional treatment for those suffering from severe acute malnutrition (SAM). Under MAM, the WFP successfully deployed lipid-based nutrient supplements to 6-59-month-old children, these supplements roughly equate to 510 calories a day for an average of 90 days.⁵¹

With a target of 3.3m recipients, WFP provided NA to over 3 million people with these programmes in 2021 alone, 88% of their targeted 3.3m people. 697,400 children aged 6-59m months as well as 754,100 PLWGs received treatment under MAM across 327 districts. Additionally, another 787,000 children aged 6-23 months and 694,700 PLWGs received nutrition support through nearly 4,000 humanitarian distribution points in 167 districts.⁵²

<https://www.opml.co.uk/blog/rapid-emergency-humanitarian-responses-how-fast-enough#:~:text=A%20Rapid%20Response%20Mechanism%20> [accessed 3 May 2022].

⁴⁹ See Note 39.

⁵⁰ ibid

⁵¹ ibid

⁵² ibid

2.2 IPC Statistics

The IPC measures the levels of severity relating to acute food insecurity within a given State. These levels are split 1-5: ⁵³

1. Minimal/None
2. Stressed
3. Crisis
4. Emergency
5. Catastrophe/Famine

2022 Severity Levels

17.4m people are classified as level 3 or above, meaning they are in a food crisis, emergency or are suffering from famine.⁵⁴

The projected statistics for level 5 rise from 31,000 in March 2022 to 161,000 by June 2022. Additionally, 2.2 million children under the age of 5 and 1.3m PLWGs will suffer from further acute malnutrition in 2022 alone. Of all 333 districts in Yemen, 151 or 45% are currently classified as level 4, representing 5.6m people in March 2022. Within the March-June projection period, this number is expected to rise to 233 districts or 70% of Yemen, causing a 1.5m rise in the number of those in level 4 or above to 7.1m.⁵⁵

Figures relevant to the PM Report in 2018 show a dramatic increase since the time of writing. Between March-July 2017, 10.2m people were in level 3 or above with another 6.8m in level 4 and none in level 5.⁵⁶ This is

7.2m lower than the current statistics and nearly 9m lower than the end of 2022 projections. This represents an 86.3% increase in level 3 or above areas in just a 5-year period.

2.3 Food Imports

Yemen relies heavily on food imports, so much so that 97% of their cereal was imported as of 2020.⁵⁷ In 2020, over 6.1m tons of food were imported alongside 3.3m being domestically produced. If divided between all those suffering, 870g of food a day could be given to each Yemeni.⁵⁸

Russia-Ukraine Influence

The ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict has had a dramatic effect on the food crisis in Yemen. Ukraine is responsible for 30% of wheat imports to Yemen. Additionally, Russian and Ukrainian imports of wheat and wheat products accounted for 42% of Yemen wheat imports in 2020.⁵⁹ This has exacerbated the scarcity of imports as it effects the flow of assistance coming from neighbouring countries such as Egypt, Turkey and UAE. These countries are crucial for the import of processed foods and Ready-to-use supplementary foods (RUSF) for humanitarian assistance. As of March 2022, 14.9% of imports were RUSF or other supplements, 15% was wheat while

⁵³ IPC, *Acute Food Insecurity Classification*, Available at: [https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipcinfo-website/ipc-overview-and-classification-system/ipc-acute-food-insecurity-classification/en/#:~:text=In%20particular%2C%20the%20IPC%20Acute,\(5\)%20Catastrophe%2FFamine](https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipcinfo-website/ipc-overview-and-classification-system/ipc-acute-food-insecurity-classification/en/#:~:text=In%20particular%2C%20the%20IPC%20Acute,(5)%20Catastrophe%2FFamine) [accessed May 2 2022].

⁵⁴ IPC, *Food Security and Nutrition Snapshot (March 2022)*, Available at: https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Yemen_Food_Security_Nutrition_2022March_Snapshot_English.pdf [accessed 3 May 2022].

⁵⁵ *ibid.*

⁵⁶ IPC, 'Yemen: Projected Acute Food Insecurity Situation for March-July 2017' Available at:

<https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1026467?iso3=YEM> [accessed May 2 2022].

⁵⁷ S.Kurdi & Others, 'The Russian invasion of Ukraine threatens to further exacerbate the food insecurity emergency in Yemen' *International Food Policy Research Institute*, 23 March 2022. Available at:

<https://www.ifpri.org/blog/russian-invasion-ukraine-threatens-further-exacerbate-food-insecurity-emergency-yemen#:~:text=As%20with%20Egypt%20and%20other,oil%E2%80%94from%20Russia%20and%20Ukraine> [accessed May 1 2022].

⁵⁸ *ibid*

⁵⁹ *ibid*

sunflower oil and fortified wheat flour made up 28.2% and 35.7% respectively.⁶⁰

Private, Commercial & Aid Imports

There are severe barriers to private imports in Yemen for two reasons: purchasing power and access to foreign exchanges. Yemen's purchasing power is negligible and has caused private imports to only become available, if necessary,⁶¹ such as increases to ICP level 5. Civilians have little purchasing power as well. Many working in the public sector have not been paid for months or years, causing them to be reliant on humanitarian aid.⁶² The currency crisis as inflation skyrockets has only worsened their position, food has become more expensive and scarcer to import, driving inflation. Foreign exchanges are also heavily affected by inflation. For example, 3.4m tons of imports would cost over \$700m alone, the equivalent of \$206 per kg.⁶³ This means not only is the public sector being hit with supply and demand conflicts but also the private sector.

Commercial imports comprised roughly 88% of all total available food in Yemen as of early 2021.⁶⁴ These imports are heavily reliant on access to seaports. Between Hodeidah, Saleef, Aden, Mukalla and Al Wadiah, they comprised 58% of total commercial imports

in 2020.⁶⁵ These figures fell in early 2020 as only 1.4 million tonnes of food was commercially imported, a 6% decrease from 2021. Of this 1.4 million tonnes, 70% was wheat grain that came through commercial ports. Predictions by the Ministry of Trade and Industry (MTI) show that a total of 744,000 metric tons of food will be imported between April-June 2022, just enough to cover SBA-controlled areas for around 6 months.⁶⁶ Aid imports helped 13.5m people in 2020 and made up 14% of total imports between 2018-2019.⁶⁷ Additionally, wheat and flour made up 80% of these imports. As of 2019, aid imports of wheat accounted for 20% of total wheat imports.⁶⁸

2.4 Inflation Rates

In 2012, Yemen families spent roughly 45% of their household income on food – this has now doubled.⁶⁹ The inflation rate rose 40% between 2014 to 2021, a staggering two and a half times higher than their Nigerian counterpart.⁷⁰ These inflations have ensured access to basic meals and nutrition only comes to an extremely privileged few while those in poverty continue to question when they will eat next. Staple ingredients such as white flour have risen from the equivalent of \$15 to \$40 as the exchange rate between Rials and Dollars suffers.⁷¹

⁶⁰ *ibid*

⁶¹ E.Thomas, 'Food security in Yemen: the private sector and imported food' *ODI*, 8 March 2022. Available at <https://odi.org/en/publications/food-security-in-yemen/> [accessed 1 May 2022].

⁶² *ibid*

⁶³ *ibid*

⁶⁴ ACAPS, 'Yemen Food supply chain', 16 December 2020. Available at: https://www.acaps.org/sites/acaps/files/products/files/20201216_acaps_yemen_analysis_hub_food_supply_chain_0.pdf [accessed 1 May 2022].

⁶⁵ *ibid*

⁶⁶ *ibid*

⁶⁷ *ibid*

⁶⁸ IPC, 'Integrated Food Insecurity Phase Classification Snapshot (October 2020-June 2021) Available at: https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Yemen_Acute_Food_Insecurity_2020Oct2021June_Snapshot.pdf [accessed 1 May 2022].

⁶⁹ N.Oyedeki & S.Mohammed, 'How Inflation is Driving a New Wave of Malnutrition in Yemen, Nigeria' *Daraj*, 29 April 2022. Available at: <https://daraj.com/en/90127/> [accessed May 4 2022].

⁷⁰ Statista, 'Yemen Inflation rate'. Available at: <https://www.statista.com/statistics/524141/inflation-rate-in-yemen/> [accessed 4 May 2022].

⁷¹ See Note 63.

Water Security

As with food security, water security has taken severe hits since 2018. Yemen is located within a semi-arid yet dry region, causing an over reliance on water despite its domestic scarcity. At least 50% of the Yemen population reported serious issues with water quality, let alone water access.

3.1 Threats to Water Security - Consumption & Water Production

Yemen's water consumption rested upon three sectors prior to the conflict outbreak. Agriculture made up 90% of all water use, with domestic and industry using 8% and 2% respectively.⁷² Since the outbreak, the public and private sectors have collapsed and shifted water consumption towards humanitarian needs. Water consumption dropped from 151.1m cubic meters in 2013 to 124.9m in 2017, a 17.3% decrease. By 2018 and 2019 these figures had risen another 7.4%,⁷³ causing desperation around water access. In 2020, these figures rose another 1.3%, the lowest of the recorded four years.⁷⁴ Meanwhile, overall water consumption has remained largely static between 2013-2020. In 2013, the water consumption to water production ratio sat at 65.7%, falling to 60.8% in 2017 and rising again to 65.6% in 2020.⁷⁵

⁷² Ministry of Planning & International Cooperation, 'Yemen Socio-Economic Update 2021, Issue 61' *Economic Studies and Forecasting Sector*, June 2021. Available at: <https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/YSEU%2061-English%20version.pdf> [accessed 5 May 2022].

⁷³ *ibid*

⁷⁴ *ibid*

Groundwater Depletion

Much of the Yemen population relies on groundwater as a primary source. Since 1970, the use of water for irrigation in Yemen has increased 15-fold.⁷⁶ Significant evidence shows there is a major disparity between water withdrawals and recharge. For example, in 2019 there was 2.5b cubic meters worth of renewable water sources verses a requirement of 3.9b cubic meters needed to meet the demand. Current predictions put total demand at 4.4b cubic meters by only 2025, a 76% increase.⁷⁷ These levels of demands show that domestic, natural water production is not sufficient and if not balanced out by 2025, a linear assessment puts the Yemen population at a 76% greater chance of having no groundwater access.

3.2 Conflict Effects

Assets, facilities, installations and equipment have all become targets during the conflict. When these are damaged, the water companies in major cities cannot meet the demands they could prior, resulting in dramatic increases in water demand and decreases in water consumption.

In 2020, the World Bank highlighted serious concerns regarding the crumbling water infrastructure. They displayed 16 cities were affected because of the conflict.⁷⁸ This

⁷⁵ *ibid*

⁷⁶ *ibid*

⁷⁷ *ibid*

⁷⁸ The World Bank, 'Yemen Dynamic Needs Assessment: Phase 3 (2020 Update)', 12 January 2020. Available at: <https://documents.worldbank.org/en/publication/document/ts->

included the destruction of wells, home connections, water towers and plants, water pumps and buildings. More than 40% of total assets in water plants have been damaged or destroyed.⁷⁹ Further estimates put the proportion of asset damage as 73% with the remaining 27% for other facilities. Completely destroyed equipment made up 72.7% of total asset damage and total facility damage constituted 49.1% while partial damage equated to 50.9%.⁸⁰

The cities of Hodeidah, Taiz and Amran suffered the highest level of damage. Taiz suffered over 250 damaged water facilities, with Amran and Hodeidah suffered around 150 attacks.⁸¹ Due to their undeveloped infrastructure and lack of funding, the cities of Aden and Ma'rib struggled to pipe clean water into their cities prior to the conflict.⁸² Due to the influx of people into these cities as they try to escape rural warfare, these pipelines have become even more essential.⁸³

At least 122 airstrikes against water facilities and equipment were made between 2015 and 2021.⁸⁴ A damage assessment made by the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) shows direct damage

caused to water infrastructure has disproportionately affected different governorates. They highlight how mostly conflicted-affected areas have become the victims of damaged water infrastructure, specifically the cities of Aden, Sa'ada and Sana'a.⁸⁵ These findings are reflected in the January 2022 attacks against water infrastructure in Sa'ada. Late on January 11, Saudi warplanes conducted three airstrikes against the Sa'ada water project in the Talmous water station.⁸⁶ The attack caused over 120,000 people to be cut off from water reservoirs.⁸⁷

3.3 Fuel Shortage

Yemen relies mainly on diesel-powered equipment to gather water from the ground. With the increasing scarcity and fuel costs, this equipment cannot function. This has resulted in the partial

and total suspension of water facilities because they cannot function without fuel.⁸⁸ Fuel subsidies have become essential due to these circumstances. UNICEF has been a staple body in the supply of fuel subsidies for generators to allow water to be pumped. One director of the Water Corporation in

[reports/documentdetail/490981607970828629/yemen-dynamic-needs-assessment-phase-3-2020-update](https://www.giz.de/de/documentdetail/490981607970828629/yemen-dynamic-needs-assessment-phase-3-2020-update) [accessed May 5 2022].

⁷⁹ ibid

⁸⁰ ibid

⁸¹ ibid

⁸² A. Rahman Hussein, 'Trying to find a reliable water source is like digging for gold': Yemen's crippling water shortage', *The New Arab*, 20 August 2021. Available at: <https://english.alaraby.co.uk/features/how-yemens-water-crisis-has-reached-new-depths-despair> [accessed 5 May 2022].

⁸³ ibid

⁸⁴ UNICEF, 'Water Under Fire: Volume 3', May 2021. Available at: <https://www.datocms-assets.com/30196/1621931090-waterunderfire.pdf> [accessed May 7 2022].

⁸⁵ Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit, 'Damage Assessment Report of Twelve

Water Supply and Sanitation Local Corporations (LCs) and their Affiliated Branch Offices and Utilities', September 2018. Available at:

<https://www.giz.de/de/downloads/giz2021-en-yemen-water-sector-stage-3-part-1.pdf> [accessed May 8 2022].

⁸⁶ PressTV, 'Yemen: Saudi attacks on water facilities in Sa'ada 'war crime' amid severe shortages' 12 January 2022. Available at:

<https://www.presstv.ir/Detail/2022/01/12/674609/Yemen--Saudi-attacks-water-facilities-Sa%E2%80%99ada-war-crime> [accessed May 8 2022].

⁸⁷ ibid

⁸⁸ Ministry of Planning & International Cooperation, 'Yemen Socio-Economic Update 2021, Issue 61' *Economic Studies and Forecasting Sector*, June 2021. Available at: <https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/YSEU%2061-English%20version.pdf> [accessed 5 May 2022].

Yemen described how they cannot run their generators without electricity and how they need at least 150litres of fuel per hour for each of their four generators.⁸⁹ Without the subsidies from UNICEF, the Water Corporation like many other water facilities would not be able to pump and supply clean water.

⁸⁹ UNICEF, *Fuel Subsidies mean life*, 23 March 2022. Available at: <https://www.unicef.org/yemen/stories/fuel-subsidies-mean-life> [accessed May 8 2022].

Disease

4.1 Cholera & Diphtheria

Cholera is an acute diarrheal illness that is typically contracted when consuming water or food contaminated with the virus. Cholera can lead to severe dehydration and in extreme circumstances can cause shock, coma or death within hours. Diphtheria is a bacterial infection that can be spread from person to person from coughing and sneezing. They cause a multitude of issues such as respiratory failure, myocarditis and even death.

Post-2018 Levels

The Ministry of Public Health and Population for Yemen reported a total of 5120 cholera cases in April 2021, resulting in 3 deaths and a fatality ratio of 0.06%.⁹⁰ Between 2016 and 2021 there were over 2,538,677 cases and 3,997 associated deaths, resulting in a fatality ratio of 0.16%.⁹¹ The most severe period was highlighted in the 2018 APPG Report where 1,080,422 people became infected in just an 11-month period, resulting in 2,266 deaths. Between 2016 and 2021, the governorates of Amran, Sana'a, Al Mahwit, Al Bayda and Al Hudaydah had the highest rates of infections and deaths. This resulted in an average of 42,311 cases every month during the period, resulting in a net

reduction of deaths and contractions of over 726% in 5 years.⁹²

2020 saw the highest rate of diphtheria cases since the outbreak of the conflict with infections soaring passed the 30,000 a month mark.⁹³ 2019 saw similar results but not as widespread. Diphtheria cases peaked at around 30,000 but remained at below the 10,000 infections mark for most of the year.⁹⁴ Between 2017 and 2020, men were slightly more prone to death from diphtheria as opposed to women. Other vulnerable groups saw similar issues, the fatality rate increased to 11% for children under 5 and the vaccination status of the civilian population sat just shy of 54% overall.⁹⁵

During the height of the cholera outbreak in 2017, there were a number of barriers to providing oral vaccines. In July 2017, 500,000 doses of the vaccine were cancelled just before delivery to Sana'a.⁹⁶ Additionally, humanitarian organizations stated that even if mass immunization was the objective that it would likely have little to no effect due to the scale of the outbreak.⁹⁷ Other efforts on behalf of UNICEF were made to ensure at least some people received a cholera vaccine. UNICEF provided transport and fridges to store the vaccines in and successfully had nearly 692,000 people vaccinated in the 10 highest rate districts.⁹⁸

⁹⁰ WHO, *Cholera Situation in Yemen, April 2021*, 1 August 2021. Available at: <https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/cholera-situation-yemen-april-2021> [accessed May 9 2022]

⁹¹ *ibid*

⁹² *ibid*

⁹³ BMC, *Diphtheria resurgence in Sada'a-Yemen 2017-2020*, 11 January 2022. Available at: <https://bmcinfectdis.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s12879-022-07033-x> [accessed 9 May 2022].

⁹⁴ *ibid*

⁹⁵ *ibid*

⁹⁶ BMC, *The cholera outbreak in Yemen: lessons learned and way forward*, 4 December 2018. Available at: <https://bmcpublihealth.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s12889-018-6227-6> [accessed 9 May 2022]

⁹⁷ F.Qadri & Others, 'Cholera in Yemen — An Old Foe Rearing Its Ugly Head' *The New England Journal of Medicine*, 23 November 2017. Available at: <https://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMp1712099> [accessed 9 May 2022].

⁹⁸ UNICEF, *Yemen Country Office – Humanitarian Situation Report*, 16 March 2022. Available at: <https://www.unicef.org/media/117511/file/Yemen->

4.2 COVID-19

COVID-19 had negative but not severe effects on Yemen. By March 2022, a total of 11,803 cases had been reported alongside 8,994 recoveries and 2,143 associated deaths.⁹⁹ The most affected governorates were Hadramawt, Aden and Taiz totaling 75% of cases and 60% of deaths.¹⁰⁰ Movement restrictions were placed across Yemen, primarily in IRG-Controlled areas. The Saudi government relieved entry restrictions to Yemen where you previously had to present proof of vaccination status alongside other quarantine requirements.¹⁰¹

Vaccine hesitancy, availability, rates of immunization and access

By December 2021, less than 1% of Yemen's population had received one dose of the COVID-19 vaccine and 0.05% are fully vaccinated.¹⁰² A new mission by the WHO and UNICEF is aiming to have at least 10% of the population vaccinated by early 2022 yet has not been accomplished.¹⁰³

Anecdotal evidence suggests that those who are least likely to be vaccinated are most at risk. For example, men working in Saudi-Arabia, women and the elderly are amongst the categories of people with the lowest vaccine rate.¹⁰⁴ Vaccine rollouts are extremely limited in DFA-controlled areas. This is prominent because of the Houthi

narratives being spread in the North stating that the virus does not exist in Houthi areas. Because of this, denials of aid from the WHO have been made by the controlling parties.¹⁰⁵ This narrative continues to ensure that local NGOs and international bodies cannot inform those about that importance of the vaccine.

With almost 30m people in Yemen and current vaccine rate of 0.05%, there is no push for additional vaccines within Yemen itself. The WHO aided these issues but cannot vaccinate everyone quickly enough. In IRG/STC areas, the availability of vaccines has decreased since the global shortage in mid-late 2021.¹⁰⁶ Since then, the areas have not recovered from the shortage and are not deploying programmes to ensure vaccination.

Vaccine hesitancy has taken a serious toll on the level of immunization due to misinformation. People are convinced that the vaccine will lead to death after a period. Several informants have cited that the vaccine would lead to death.¹⁰⁷ There are religious aspects to the hesitancy as well. Other informants have stated that assumptions about lockdowns, curfews, movement restrictions and overall control of people's lives is an effort to divert attention away from the conflict. This caused a movement that claims the vaccine programmes are being used to cause sterility

[Humanitarian-SitRep-End-of-Year-2021.pdf](#) [accessed 10 May 2022].

⁹⁹ IOM, *COVID-19 Movement Restrictions: Yemen Mobility Restriction Dashboard #35 (31 March)*, 14 April 2022. Available at:

<https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/covid-19-movement-restrictions-yemen-mobility-restriction-dashboard-35-31-march-2022> [accessed 10 May 2022].

¹⁰⁰ *ibid*

¹⁰¹ *ibid*

¹⁰² G. Krishna & S.Howard, 'How Yemen's healthcare has been destroyed', 22 December 2021. Available at:

<https://www.bmj.com/content/375/bmj.n3110> [accessed 10 May 2022]

¹⁰³ *ibid*

¹⁰⁴ ACAPS, *ACAPS Thematic report: COVID-19: Current situation and reasons for vaccine hesitancy*, 10 January 2022. Available at:

<https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/acaps-thematic-report-covid-19-current-situation-and-reasons-vaccine-hesitancy-10> [accessed 10 May 2022].

¹⁰⁵ *ibid*

¹⁰⁶ *ibid*

¹⁰⁷ *ibid*

amongst the Muslim population.¹⁰⁸ DFA controlled areas appear to have a 'very-low risk perception' regarding COVID-19. Some people have claimed that COVID-19 does not exist, and that the vaccine is especially dangerous for women and can directly cause their deaths.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁸ *ibid*

Children

5.1 Violence Against Children

Between March 2015 and February 2021, a total of 3,336 children were killed during the conflict.¹¹⁰ Within the first two months of 2022 alone, 47 children were reported as being killed through the conflict.¹¹¹ This steady flow of killing and maiming resulted in a staggering 10,200 confirmed child deaths since 2015, yet many deaths are still undiscovered or unreported.¹¹² This is a three-fold increase in a 12-month period.

5.2 Killing & maiming

During January 1 2019 to December 31 2020, the UNSC would finalize a report on the violations against children. The UNSCs report highlighted a total of 678 children being killed and another 1,984 were maimed.¹¹³ Of the

total 2,612 cases, 1,889 were boys and 723 were girls. In comparison to the 2018 APPG Report, these figures are slightly lower. During that reporting period there was a total of 3,043 deaths or maims within a two-year period, representing a reduction of 16%.

¹¹⁰ M.Blackall, 'Yemen war: Seven years of bloody conflict killing an average of four children every day', iNews, 26 March 2022. Available at: <https://inews.co.uk/news/yemen-war-seven-years-bloody-conflict-an-average-of-four-children-every-day-1531612> [accessed 11 May 2022].

¹¹¹ UNICEF, 'In Yemen, the number of children killed or injured continues to increase as violence escalates', 12 March 2022. Available at: <https://www.unicef.org/press-releases/yemen-number-children-killed-or-injured-continues-increase-violence-escalates> [accessed 11 May 2022].

¹¹² UNICEF, "Shameful milestone' in Yemen as 10,000 children killed or maimed since fighting began' 19 October 2021. Available at:

548 casualties were attributed to the Houthi, 436 to the coalition, 217 to the Yemeni armed forces, 60 to the Security Belt Forces, 48 to the Popular Resistance, 13 to ISIS and 7 to Al-Qaida.¹¹⁴ The remaining child deaths were attributed to unidentified actors. 545 casualties were attributed to crossfires between the parties, an additional 738 were from indiscriminate attacks against civilians and the remaining 272 were from explosives.¹¹⁵

Mortars and shelling were the largest cause of death, resulting in around 831 child deaths or 32% of the total for the reporting period, largely taking place in the cities of Hudayah and Ta'izz.¹¹⁶ Ground fighting was the second largest with 631 children being affected, accounting for 24% of the death toll. These have been attributed to the use of small arms fire and sniper fire primarily in Hudayah and Ta'izz.¹¹⁷ Mines and explosives were the third largest, accounting for 545 child casualties and 21% of child casualties. The nature of the explosives makes it very difficult to identify the perpetrator of the attacks. Hudayah, Bayda and Ta'izz were the three most affected governorates.¹¹⁸

5.3 Grave violations

There are six grave violations that can be committed against children during conflict.

<https://www.unicef.org/press-releases/shameful-milestone-yemen-10000-children-killed-or-maimed-fighting-began> [accessed 11 May 2022].

¹¹³ UNSC, *Children and armed conflict in Yemen - Report of the Secretary General, S/2021/761*, 26 September 2021. Available at:

<https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/children-and-armed-conflict-yemen-report-secretary-general-s2021761-enar> [accessed 12 May 2022].

¹¹⁴ ibid

¹¹⁵ ibid

¹¹⁶ ibid

¹¹⁷ ibid

¹¹⁸ ibid

These are; killing and maiming, recruitment and use of child soldiers, sexual violence, abduction, attacks on school or hospitals and denial of humanitarian aid.¹¹⁹

Most grave violations were attributed to the Houthis and accounted for 5,304 instances or 62%. The Yemeni forces were responsible for 1,022 violations, the Coalition a further 627 and the remaining were affected by crossfire, indiscriminate shelling and bombing as well as explosives.¹²⁰

Child Soldiers

The UN has confirmed that 861 child soldiers were used in both 2019 and 2020. This is a decrease from the two prior years of a total 1,266 child soldiers. Two thirds of these children were trained, armed and used in active combat while the remainder were assigned to guard military checkpoints, clear mines and used as porters or cooks.¹²¹

The use of these child soldiers is intrinsically linked to other forms of grave violations. Many of the child soldiers were killed during hostile activities through explosive remnants of war, airstrikes and crossfires.¹²² One example is that of three boys abducted and trained at a Houthi ran summer camp in the Ma'rib governorate. Three days later the camp was targeted with a series of airstrikes

and all 3 boys were killed. Another boy was killed during hostilities when an airstrike was launched on a base in the Jaws governorate.¹²³

An estimated 2,000 children have been killed during combat fighting for the Houthi per the UN.¹²⁴ These 2,000 victims were spread across 1,406 deaths in 2020 and a further 562 deaths in 2021 alone. UN Experts stated that they found evidence the Houthis were using summer camps and mosques to indoctrinate children and train them up.¹²⁵

New Houthi 'Action Plan'

In response to the international criticism the Houthi received, they implemented a new 'action plan'. The signing of the agreement was pushed as evidence suggested the Houthi had recruited a predicted 18,000 child soldiers by 2018, with 3,500 being verified.¹²⁶ Abdul Eluh Hajar, one of the Houthis top diplomats signed an agreement alongside representatives of the UN's children agency.¹²⁷ This new action plan aims to rid the Houthis of their use of child soldiers. This includes ending the recruitment and use of children, identifying and releasing all children from the Houthi within six months as well as providing those released with reintegration support as they

¹¹⁹ Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary General for Children and Armed Conflict, *The Six Grave Violations*. Available at:

<https://childrenandarmedconflict.un.org/six-grave-violations/> [accessed 12 May 2022].

¹²⁰ UNSC, *Children and armed conflict in Yemen - Report of the Secretary General, S/2021/761*, 26 September 2021. Available at:

<https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/children-and-armed-conflict-yemen-report-secretary-general-s2021761-enar> [accessed 12 May 2022].

¹²¹ *ibid*

¹²² *ibid*

¹²³ *ibid*

¹²⁴ Al-Jazeera, '2,000 children recruited by Yemen's Houthis died fighting: UN' *Al-Jazeera*, 30 January 2022.

Available at:

<https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/1/30/2000-children-recruited-by-yemens-houthis-died-fighting-un#:~:text=%E2%80%9CIn%20one%20camp%2C%20children%20as,between%20January%20and%20May%202021> [accessed 13 May 2022].

¹²⁵ *ibid*

¹²⁶ M. Michael, 'Children fight, kill and die in Yemen's civil war' *APNews*, December 19 2018. Available at: <https://apnews.com/article/0232eaa4f3fd4f4eaf3882e4160a747c> [accessed May 13 2022].

¹²⁷ NPR, 'Yemen's Houthi rebels will stop using child soldiers, the U.N. says' April 19 2022. Available at: <https://www.npr.org/2022/04/19/1093516886/yemen-houthi-child-soldiers> [accessed 13 May 2022].

return to their family lives.¹²⁸ Additionally, there are new provisions that focus on the protection of health and educational facilities from attack.¹²⁹

5.4 Education

By mid-2021, a supposed 2 million school children were out of education because of poverty, conflict and the lack of opportunities to learn.¹³⁰ In 2015, this number was a mere 890,000, more than doubling in a 6-year period.¹³¹ Additionally, the UN reported in 2021 that a total of 8.1m children in Yemen were in need of some form of emergency education assistance, a near eight-fold increase since 2014.¹³²

Education Pillars

The underpinnings of the Yemen education system have been almost destroyed. An estimated 131,600 teachers have not been paid a regular salary in 4 years. This figure puts a minimum of 4m children out of reach for teachers.¹³³ One such teacher is Mohammed, a 49-year-old educator from Sana'a. He has not received a salary since 2016 and was forced to become a tuk-tuk

driver just so he could pay his bills.¹³⁴ He claims when the education system collapses, the 'values and fundamentals' fall with it.¹³⁵ Recent findings show that some teachers are paid through donations monitored by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to supplement the missing salaries on the public payrolls.¹³⁶ Despite these donations and other external funding, one economist claims that roughly 22% of the teachers on the public payroll now live on the poverty line.¹³⁷

These fundamentals were further dampened when COVID-19 struck Yemen. The 'dual crises' of war and COVID-19 only exacerbated pre-existing disparities within education. Yemen forcefully closed all schools in March 2020, putting 5.8m primary and secondary school children out of education.¹³⁸ To combat this loss of education many of the schools commissioned a 'catch-up' programme. One student, Muhammad, said that they were made to do a years' worth of work within one month to ensure all students did not miss anything.¹³⁹

¹²⁸ Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary General for Children and Armed Conflict, 'New Action Plan to Strengthen the Protection of Children Affected by Armed Conflict in Yemen Signed with the Houthis' 18 April 2022. Available at: <https://childrenandarmedconflict.un.org/2022/04/new-action-plan-to-strengthen-the-protection-of-children-affected-by-armed-conflict-in-yemen-signed-with-the-houthis/> [accessed 13 May 2022].

¹²⁹ *ibid*

¹³⁰ UNICEF, *Education Disrupted: Impact of the conflict on children's education in Yemen*, 6 July 2021. Available at: <https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/education-disrupted-impact-conflict-children-s-education-yemen> [accessed May 14 2022].

¹³¹ OCHA, *Yemen Humanitarian Needs Overview 2021 (February 2021)* 21 February 2021. Available at: <https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-humanitarian-needs-overview-2021-february-2021-enar> [accessed May 14 2022].

¹³² *ibid*

¹³³ *ibid*

¹³⁴ *ibid*

¹³⁵ *ibid*

¹³⁶ Reuters Staff, 'IMF urges Yemen government to pay public sector wages across country' *Reuters*, 19 July 2019. Available at <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-economy-imf-idUSKCN1UE2GE> [accessed May 17 2022].

¹³⁷ A.Ali, 'How Yemeni parents are banding together to keep their kids in school' *The New Humanitarian*, 8 March 2022. Available at: <https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news-feature/2022/03/08/how-yemeni-parents-are-banding-together-keep-their-kids-school> [accessed 15 May 2022].

¹³⁸ OCHA, *Yemen Humanitarian Needs Overview 2021 (February 2021)*, 21 February 2021. Available at: <https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-humanitarian-needs-overview-2021-february-2021-enar> [accessed May 14 2022].

¹³⁹ *ibid*

External incentives have been initiated to try and restore some of the teaching aspects in Yemen. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) alongside the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) have begun training programmes to get teachers the support they need to return to work.¹⁴⁰ Voluntary teachers are tested, interviewed

and received enhanced teachers training as well as being provided with basic education necessities such as notebooks and bags. NRC has further begun building new schools equipped with whiteboards, chairs and toilets next to those who have been destroyed.

¹⁴⁰ M.Mohammed, 'In Yemen, education comes too late for millions of children' NRC, 24 November 2021. Available at: <https://www.nrc.no/perspectives/2021/in-yemen->

[education-comes-too-late-for-millions-of-children/](https://www.nrc.no/perspectives/2021/in-yemen-education-comes-too-late-for-millions-of-children/) [accessed May 15 2022].

Women and Girls Rights

6.1 Gender-based violence (GBV)

Yemen has historic practices of GBV and currently ranks second to last in terms of gender equality.¹⁴¹ During the conflict, all parties have conducted widespread GBV, including sexual violence, the transgression of gendered norms and exacerbated existing inequalities.¹⁴² Current predictions put 2.2m women and 1.9m girls at risk of GBV.¹⁴³

Women have held subordinate roles within Yemen and GBV was a recurring issue prior to the outbreak.¹⁴⁴ Many victims do not speak up for fear of being socially shamed by the community.¹⁴⁵ Sexual violence and rape in Yemen is protected by legislation. For example, marital rape is not a criminal offence and the wives must engage in sexual activity whenever requested.¹⁴⁶ Restrictions on movement, specifically when leaving the house without a male companion only heightens the tensions and increases sexual violence in circumstances of refusal.¹⁴⁷

¹⁴¹ World Economic Forum, *Global Gender Gap Report 2021*, 30 March 2021. Available at:

<https://www.weforum.org/reports/global-gender-gap-report-2021/> [accessed May 18 2022].

¹⁴² HRC, 'Situation of human rights in Yemen, including violations and abuses since September' 2014, A/HRC/42/CRP.1, 3 September 2019. Available at: https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/GEE-Yemen/A_HRC_42_CRP_1.PDF [accessed 14 May 2022].

¹⁴³ OCHA, *Yemen Humanitarian Needs Overview 2022 (April 2022)*, 19 April 2022. Available at: <https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-humanitarian-needs-overview-2022-april-2022> [accessed May 17 2022].

¹⁴⁴ Oxfam, *From the Ground Up: Gender and conflict analysis in Yemen*, 20 October 2016. Available at: <https://policy-practice.oxfam.org/resources/from-the-ground-up-gender-and-conflict-analysis-in-yemen-620112/> [accessed May 18 2022].

Common forms of GBV are domestic violence, emotional violence and denial of access to services and opportunities.¹⁴⁸ Women struggle to find support in areas such as healthcare, mental health treatment, displacement, sexual violence, childbirth and discrimination. Significant evidence concludes that there are severe long-term impacts after exposure to repeated and high levels of distress facilitated by GBV.¹⁴⁹ Many women need multi-level mental health and psychological support (MHPSS), yet access to these services is limited as they are often in hard-to-reach areas or aren't operating at all. Safe service areas are also hard-to-reach and are almost entirely absent in remote areas and severely overstretched in urban areas, dramatically decreasing their utility.¹⁵⁰

6.2 Gender Discrimination

Research conducted by the Yemen Information Centre, an independent research institute, found that 69.9% of women are victims of GBV and an additional 15.1% is attributed to young girls. The electronic poll found that the root causes of GBV are:¹⁵¹

¹⁴⁵ N.Krishnan, 'The Status of Yemeni Women : From Aspiration to Opportunity' *MENA*, 2014. Available at: <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/20547> [accessed May 18 2022].

¹⁴⁶ A. Ghanem, 'The impact of war in Yemen on violence against women and girls' *Arabia Felix Studies*, 4 September 2021. Available at: <https://arabiafelixstudies.com/en/the-impact-of-war-in-yemen-on-violence-against-women-and-girls-2/> [accessed May 17 2022].

¹⁴⁷ *ibid*

¹⁴⁸ OCHA, *Yemen Humanitarian Needs Overview 2022 (April 2022)*, 19 April 2022. Available at: <https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-humanitarian-needs-overview-2022-april-2022> [accessed May 17 2022].

¹⁴⁹ *ibid*

¹⁵⁰ *ibid*

¹⁵¹ Yemen Information Centre, *Opinion Poll Results on Gender Issues in Yemen*. Available at: https://www.yemeninformation.org/_files/ugd/73ca82_71

- Illiteracy - **46.6%**
- Social and cultural norms - **32.9%**
- Poverty - **11%**
- Legislation - **4.1%**
- Conflict - **1.4%**
- Material pressures - **1.2%**
- Combinations of above - **2.4%**

Additionally, the root causes of discrimination are:

- Societal customs - **71.6%**
- Absence of national mechanisms - **21.6%**
- Societal - **2.7%**
- Gender - **1.4%**
- Unsure - **2.7%**

Political Discrimination

Since 2018, women's political participation has dramatically worsened. For the first time in Yemen's history, no women are involved in the relevant political bodies.¹⁵² Many former female political leaders had to flee the country during the conflict out of fear for their life. Political negotiations between the parties to the conflict have largely taken place with the complete absence of any female input. The only notable example of female participation is one input during the negotiations for the Stockholm Agreement.¹⁵³

[5669c656b24c8d9aa1a8f85bd7e2ad.pdf](#) [accessed May 14 2022].

¹⁵² CIVICUS, 'YEMEN: 'Women are completely absent from decision-making bodies; politically we don't exist' 9 March 2022. Available at:

<https://www.civicus.org/index.php/media-resources/news/interviews/5658-yemen-women-are-completely-absent-from-decision-making-bodies-politically-we-don-t-exist> [accessed May 14 2022].

¹⁵³ *ibid*

¹⁵⁴ OSEGSY, *Women, Peace And Security*. Available at: <https://osesgy.unmissions.org/women-peace-and-security> [accessed May 14 2022].

¹⁵⁵ Women Solidarity Network, *About Us*. Available at: <https://www.womensolidaritynetwork.org/p/about-us> [accessed May 14 2022].

Despite the internal political discrimination, many independent efforts have been made to push for women's inclusion and participation in the political network. One such effort is the Yemeni Women's Pact for Peace and Security, a consultative mechanism focusing on ensuring women's voices are heard in relation to the ongoing conflict and international relations.¹⁵⁴ Another group, the Women Solidarity Network (WSN) formed as a coalition and has also been transmitting women's concerns to the UNSC.¹⁵⁵ The WSN has continued to push for the inclusion of Resolution 1325 into the Yemen context. This resolution focuses on the role of women in public life, discrimination, GBV, equal treatment and opportunities as well as reaffirming women's rights.¹⁵⁶ Their efforts are being immortalized as the Minister of Social Affairs and Labour announced in March 2022 that they are planning to implement the provisions of the resolution.¹⁵⁷

Economic Discrimination

The average per capita income fell to 69.9% to the dollar by 2020 and further depreciated local currencies by 180.4% during the same period.¹⁵⁸ This had a dramatic effect on the new emerging role of female-headed households (FHH). Since they had relatively

¹⁵⁶ UNSC, Resolution 1325 (2000), S/RES/1325, 31 October 2000. Available at:

https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/S_C_ResolutionWomenPeaceSecurity_SRES1325%282000%29%28english_0.pdf [accessed May 14 2022].

¹⁵⁷ CIVICUS, 'YEMEN: 'Women are completely absent from decision-making bodies; politically we don't exist' 9 March 2022. Available at:

<https://www.civicus.org/index.php/media-resources/news/interviews/5658-yemen-women-are-completely-absent-from-decision-making-bodies-politically-we-don-t-exist> [accessed May 14 2022].

¹⁵⁸ Yemen Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, *Yemen Socio Economic Update April 2021 (Issue 59)*, April 2021. Available at: <https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-socio->

few opportunities for work and education prior to the conflict it has put FHH under great pressure to find alternative income.¹⁵⁹ For those who could not find alternative income they now represent the 72% of FHHs who live below the national poverty line. With male-headed households (MHH) sitting at 58.2%, a 13.8% disparity has now emerged as of 2020.¹⁶⁰

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) has made great strides to ensure women have these alternative incomes. They have been consistently involved in job creation, placement, training and support for the labour market. In 2021, USAID helped more than 500 Yemeni women get jobs in healthcare, education and manufacturing.¹⁶¹ They support these programmes by ensuring women have better access to loans and financial products to support themselves. USAID aided with these loans in 2021 and successfully secured \$1.34m in loans for Yemeni women.¹⁶² USAID broadened its training programmes to include technical assistance and guidance in agricultural and fishery to allow women to be self-sustainable for their families.¹⁶³

As the most displaced sex at 70%, women who become internally displaced suffer far

more than those who are not displaced.¹⁶⁴ In 2020, 23% of assisted households were FHHs and required far more support than their MHH counterparts.¹⁶⁵ Women who are forced to leave the family home to collect food and water are more likely to weaken their childcare, resulting in a deteriorating nutritional status for the mothers and their children.¹⁶⁶ This additional stress is worsened by the contractual agreements' women have with their landlords. 76% of all FHHs do not have a tenancy agreement which causes them to face far higher eviction rates than MHHs.¹⁶⁷

Judicial & Legal Discrimination

As highlighted in the 2018 APPG Report, there are several legal constraints against women in Yemen with particular reference to divorce, inheritance and child custody. The Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) highlighted and echoed their concerns in numerous areas against Yemeni women in 2021.

CEDAW noted the continued absence of equality before the law regarding discrimination.¹⁶⁸ This covers direct and indirect discrimination in both the public and private sphere. For example, economic and

[economic-update-issue-59-april-2021-enar](#) [accessed May 14 2022].

¹⁵⁹ *ibid*

¹⁶⁰ Yemen Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, *Yemen Socio Economic Update August 2020 (Issue 51)*, August 2020. Available at: <https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-socio-economic-update-issue-51-august-2020-enar>

¹⁶¹ USAID, *USAID YEMEN GENDER EQUALITY AND WOMEN'S EMPOWERMENT*, April 25 2022. Available at: <https://www.usaid.gov/yemen/fact-sheets/yemen-gender-equality-and-womens-empowerment> [accessed 14 May 2022].

¹⁶² *ibid*

¹⁶³ *ibid*

¹⁶⁴ UN Women, *Closing the Gender Gap in Humanitarian Action*. Available at:

<https://interactive.unwomen.org/multimedia/infographic/humanitarianaction/en/index.html> [accessed May 15 2022].

¹⁶⁵ OCHA, *Yemen Humanitarian Needs Overview 2021 (February 2021)* 21 February 2021. Available at: <https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-humanitarian-needs-overview-2021-february-2021-enar> [accessed May 14 2022].

¹⁶⁶ *ibid*

¹⁶⁷ *ibid*

¹⁶⁸ CEDAW, *Concluding observations on the combined seventh and eighth periodic reports of Yemen*, CEDAW/C/YEM/CO/7-8. Available at: <https://www.ohchr.org/en/documents/concluding-observations/cedawcyemco7-8-concluding-observations-combined-seventh-and> [accessed 16 May 2022].

political discrimination largely takes place within the public sphere, yet GBV often takes place behind closed doors, confirming CEDAWs findings. CEDAW found no specific legal framework for addressing the rights of Yemeni women. However, frameworks that endorse stoning, ‘blood money’ as well as other punishments for adultery are welcomed and enforced.¹⁶⁹ Exact corresponding concerns raised in the 2018 APPG report were raised surrounding the Personal Status Law (No.20) in 2021.¹⁷⁰ The legislation places severe restrictions on women’s rights to guardianship, child

marriage, divorce, inheritance and freedom of movement and is still enforced despite international condemnation.¹⁷¹

Further legislative concerns exist under the 1990 Unification Constitution of Yemen.¹⁷² Article 40 guarantees the rights of women equality before the law regarding political, economic, social and cultural areas. Despite this assertion, Article 31 states that women are the sisters of men and their duties are guaranteed to them by Sharia law, perhaps the most misogynistic legal framework to exist in the Middle East.¹⁷³

¹⁶⁹ *ibid*

¹⁷⁰ Equality Now, *Yemen – The Personal Status Act No. 20 Of 1992*, 2 November 2021. Available at: https://www.equalitynow.org/discriminatory_law/yemen_the_personal_status_act_no_20_of_1992/#:-:text=20%20of%201992%20mandates%20a,have%20sexual%20intercourse%20with%20him [accessed May 17 2022].

¹⁷¹ *ibid*

¹⁷² C.Dunbar, ‘The Unification of Yemen: Process, Politics, and Prospects’ *Middle East Journal* 46 (3), 1992. Available at: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/4328466> [accessed May 19 2022].

¹⁷³ S.Razack, ‘Anthropology: Examining the Status and Rights of Women in Yemen’ *Yo Air Blog*, 23 July 2021. Available at: <https://www.yoair.com/blog/anthropology-examining-the-status-and-rights-of-women-in-yemen/> [accessed 17 May 2022].

Civil Society & Infrastructure

7.1 Fuel Scarcity

As mentioned prior, the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict has only worsened the fuel situation in Yemen. With import costs at an all-time high and scarcity beginning to effect both water security and general infrastructure, there are several internal issues to be accounted for.

Houthi-controlled governorates

In Houthi-controlled governorates there is a severe and acute fuel crisis. The Houthis announced on January 13 2022 that all its governorates were suffering from major fuel shortages.¹⁷⁴ Executive Director of the Oil Company, Ammar Al-Adrai, stated all citizens are suffering from the crisis. He later contradicted this claim when he stated that they can provide fuel at a unified low cost to all of their governorates through Al-Hudayah port.¹⁷⁵ This instability has caused residents of Houthi-controlled governorates to seek oil derivatives on the black market for more than double the Oil Company's price.¹⁷⁶

Blackouts have begun to plague these governorates as more than 80% of Aden's Public Electricity Corporation's (PEC) generation capacity had to be completely shut down within 48 hours from 31 August

2021.¹⁷⁷ These blackouts are primarily caused by delayed shipments coming in from Saudi-Arabia.¹⁷⁸

Blockade influence

PECs claims are not isolated as the continual existence of the *de facto* blockade halts much of the imports required to stabilize Yemen's infrastructure. Yemen Petroleum Company (YPC) spokesman, Issam al-Mutawakel, claimed that ships docking in the port of Djibouti for inspection are being halted by the 'piracy' of the Saudi-led coalition. This piracy is continuing despite clearance being granted by UNVIM. The Minister of Oil and Minerals, Ahmad Abdullah Dares, has warned that this continual blockade is contributing to what could be a humanitarian catastrophe.

Mr. Dares' claims are represented in the statistics on diesel prices. When compared to 2015, diesel prices from January 2020 to January 2021 show a minimum of a 101% inflation and goes as high as 199%.¹⁷⁹ Overall inflation topped the 200% mark in July, August, September and October 2020.¹⁸⁰ Additional statistics for imports through Hudayah Port paint a similar picture. With a national fuel requirement of 544,000mt, not a single month between January 2020 to January 2021 met this. Some months such as June 2020 only obtained 1% of the required volume while the average is around the

¹⁷⁴ Middle East Monitor, 'Yemen: Acute fuel crisis in the Houthi-controlled governorates', 14 January 2022.

Available at:

<https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20220114-yemen-acute-fuel-crisis-in-the-houthi-controlled-governorates/> [accessed 13 May 2022].

¹⁷⁵ *ibid*

¹⁷⁶ *ibid*

¹⁷⁷ M.Ayesh, 'Arabic press review: Yemen's Aden faces imminent blackouts amid fuel shortages' *Middle East Eye*, 31 August 2021. Available at:

<https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/yemen-blackout-fuel-shortage-arabic-press-review> [accessed 18 May 2022].

¹⁷⁸ *ibid*

¹⁷⁹ OCHA, *Yemen Commodity Tracker October 2020-January 2021*, 9 February 2021. Available at:

<https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-commodity-tracker-october-2020-january-2021> [accessed 19 May 2022].

¹⁸⁰ *ibid*

17.5% mark with a peak of 48% in April 2020.¹⁸¹

7.2 Healthcare system

As of August 2021, an estimated 20.1m people lack access to basic healthcare in Yemen.¹⁸² The availability of healthcare hit an all-time low. As of late 2021, only 50% of health facilities are fully functional with over 80% of the population facing barriers to access.¹⁸³ Shortages of human resources, equipment and supplies are restricting the healthcare system from operating at all.¹⁸⁴ Yemen's healthcare system is heavily reliant on external funding as internal support is monopolized or simply doesn't exist in a form capable of handling the influx of people in need. Yemen supplements this with aid from other implementing organizations such as The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).¹⁸⁵

The ICRC began and continues to supply medical material, equipment and funding. They are responsible for opening 8 dialysis centers, 30 primary healthcare clinics and 53 hospitals in 2021 alone.¹⁸⁶ Additionally, they have provided support in a number of key areas, such as:¹⁸⁷

- Financially supporting 44 health facilities
- Aided with over 1.33m consultations
- Over 52,000 instances of pregnancy aid
- Helped deliver 13,359 children
- PPE donations to 39 hospitals
- Admitted 155,333 people to hospital
- Performed 32,384 surgeries

In 2022 there have been 2 attacks on health facilities and an additional 13 incidents of threats or violence in healthcare since 2021.¹⁸⁸ These attacks have caused major external consequences for Yemen. Aid agencies have slashed the availability and funding for life saving programs. By the end of January 2022 over two thirds of major UN aid programmes for Yemen were forced to scale back their efforts or cease operations.¹⁸⁹ The UN Population Fund (UNFPA) had similar issues. They previously supported 180 facilities in 2020, 127 in 2021 but now only support 80 in 2022.¹⁹⁰

USAID have continued to push and deliver health services under their Yemen Systems, Health and Resilience Project (SHARP) in 2022. They have trained over 210 midwives and 413 reproductive health volunteers. A further 97 health facility service providers were trained in the fields of evidence-based

¹⁸¹ ibid

¹⁸² ICRC, *Health Situation in Yemen*, 5 August 2021.

Available at: <https://www.icrc.org/en/document/health-situation-yemen> [accessed 12 May 2022].

¹⁸³ World Bank, *Health Sector In Yemen – Policy Note*, 14 September 2021. Available at:

<https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/yemen/publication/health-sector-in-yemen-policy-note#:~:text=Currently%2C%20only%2050%25%20of%20health,are%20severely%20hinderin%20healthcare%20provision> [accessed 19 May 2022].

¹⁸⁴ ibid

¹⁸⁵ ibid

¹⁸⁶ ibid

¹⁸⁷ ICRC, *Health Situation in Yemen*, 5 August 2021.

Available at: <https://www.icrc.org/en/document/health-situation-yemen> [accessed 12 May 2022]

¹⁸⁸ OCHA, Statement to the Security Council of Yemen, 15 February 2022. Available at:

<https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=28031&LangID=E> [accessed 21 May 2022].

¹⁸⁹ OCHA, Statement to the Security Council of Yemen, 15 February 2022. Available at:

<https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=28031&LangID=E> [accessed 21 May 2022].

¹⁹⁰ S.Jerving, 'Yemen's health system is hanging 'on a cliff' Devex, 19 February 2022. Available at:

<https://www.devex.com/news/yemen-s-health-system-is-hanging-on-a-cliff-102543> [accessed 21 May 2022].

reproductive, maternal, new-born and child health and nutrition services.¹⁹¹

7.3 Airstrikes

Airstrikes have continued to worsen the humanitarian situation since the 2018 APPG Report.¹⁹² In 2022, an attack on the Houthi held prison in Sa'ada left over 60 dead and 200 injured.¹⁹³ The prison is suspected to be holding 1,300 detainees and 700 migrants, and the attack came as retaliation for a series of Houthi-led airstrikes earlier that month against Abu Dhabi airport. Statistics from 2021 show that almost a third of all airstrikes headed by the Saudi-led coalition were against civilian targets, including schools, hospitals, markets and mosques.¹⁹⁴ Both the Houthis and Saudi-led coalition have been repeatedly accused of airstrikes in Marib, Taizz and Hodeidah since 2018.¹⁹⁵

The Saudi-led coalition have primarily been responsible for four major airstrikes since the 2018 APPG Report. On 11 August 2019, the Saudi-led coalition launched three

attacks against al-Sawamil, Mustaba and Hajjah, leaving 12 dead and 16 injured.¹⁹⁶ 20 days later the coalition would launch further attacks against Dhamar community college, killing 134 and injuring 40 more.¹⁹⁷

A total number of 25,054 air raids had been conducted by April 2022.¹⁹⁸ Of the areas targeted only 8,121 were designated as military, 7,055 were civilian while the remaining 9,878 were of an unknown status. Civilian death statistics do paint a more promising picture since the 2018 APPG Report. From 2015 to 2018 a total of 8,983 civilian deaths and 10,243 civilian injuries occurred due to the conflict.¹⁹⁹ 2015 was and still is the most violent year of the conflict, claiming 3,876 lives and causing 4,521 injuries. From 2018-2022 a total of 715 civilian deaths and 941 civilian injuries were confirmed.²⁰⁰ This is an eleven-fold decrease in deaths and a near ten-fold decrease in civilian injuries in the up-to-date four-year period.

¹⁹¹ USAID, *Yemen Health Fact Sheet*, 25 April 2022.

Available at: <https://www.usaid.gov/yemen/fact-sheets/health-fact-sheet> [accessed 21 May 2022].

¹⁹² S.Biden, 'Failure to distinguish: How the recent Sa'ada prison attack adds to violations of humanitarian law in Yemen' *Human Security Centre*, 17 February 2022.

Available at: <http://www.hscentre.org/uncategorized/failure-distinguish-recent-saada-prison-attack-adds-violations-humanitarian-law-yemen/> [accessed May 20 2022].

¹⁹³ UN News, 'Yemen: Call for independent probe into deadly prison airstrikes' *UN*, 28 January 2022. Available at: <https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/01/1110842> [accessed 21 May 2022].

¹⁹⁴ Human Rights Watch, *Yemen: Houthi Landmines Kill Civilians, Block Aid* *HRW*, 22 April 2019. Available at: <https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/04/22/yemen-houthi-landmines-kill-civilians-block-aid> [accessed 22 May 2022].

¹⁹⁵ HRC, *Situation of human rights in Yemen, including violations and abuses since September 2014*,

A/HRC/45/CRP.7, 29 September 2020. Available at: <https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/GEE-Yemen/A-HRC-45-CRP.7-en.pdf> [accessed 23 May 2022].

¹⁹⁶ *ibid*

¹⁹⁷ S.Biden, 'Failure to distinguish: How the recent Sa'ada prison attack adds to violations of humanitarian law in Yemen' *Human Security Centre*, 17 February 2022.

Available at: <http://www.hscentre.org/uncategorized/failure-distinguish-recent-saada-prison-attack-adds-violations-humanitarian-law-yemen/> [accessed May 20 2022].

¹⁹⁸ Yemen Data Project, *Overview of Casualties, Air Raids & Days of Campaign*, 2022. Available at: <https://www.yemendataproject.org/> [accessed May 24 2022].

¹⁹⁹ *ibid*

²⁰⁰ *ibid*

Operational & Security Challenges

8.1 De Facto blockade

As mentioned in section 7, the *de facto* blockade continues to influence much of Yemen's operations. With heightening pressure from the US, Saudi Arabia requested aid to help bolster the defence of the blockade despite US claims that the blockade should be fully opened.²⁰¹ Despite these negotiations, Yemen rebels²⁰² as well as the Yemen Government have continued to block humanitarian aid and deny clearance to fuel tankers.²⁰³ These restrictions have been internationally criticized but accepted that the sovereign right of Yemen still prevails.

These tensions have been eased with the terrific success of the UN Verification and Inspection Mechanism for Yemen (UNVIM). The task of UNVIM is to ensure compliance with UNSC Resolution 2216 regarding the allowance of vessel entry in Yemeni ports.²⁰⁴ Between May 2020 to April 2022, UNVIM received 404 requests for passage of which 392 were given clearance certificates for

²⁰¹ A.Yaakoubi & Others 'Under pressure over Yemen blockade, Riyadh seeks US help with defences' *Reuters*, 27 October 2021. Available at: <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/exclusive-under-pressure-over-yemen-blockade-riyadh-seeks-us-help-with-defences-2021-10-27/> [accessed 24 May 2022].

²⁰² A.AL-Haj & S.Magdy 'Officials in Yemen: Houthi blockade restricts aid, movement' *AP News*, 17 October 2021. Available at: <https://apnews.com/article/middle-east-yemen-blockades-sanaa-houthis-8903ea874f5d043805a1c851de10d459> [accessed 23 May 2022].

²⁰³ J.Sharp, 'Yemen: Civil War and Regional Intervention', *Congressional Research Service*, 23 November 2021. Available at: <https://sgp.fas.org/crs/mideast/R43960.pdf> [accessed May 21 2022].

²⁰⁴ UNSC, *Security Council Demands End to Yemen Violence, Adopting Resolution 2216 (2015), with Russian*

entry.²⁰⁵ A total of 405 vessels were discharged to supply aid to Yemen and only 21 of these vessels had their arrival cancelled or denied in two years, a success rate of over 90%.²⁰⁶ UNVIM noted that four major fuel imports occurred at al-Hudayah port between June 2020 to July 2021. Fuel imported through al-Hudayah fell 38% in the reporting period and fell a total 80% when compared to all fuel imports between 2020 to 2021 at al-Hudayah.²⁰⁷

8.2 Transport

Since Yemen's maritime imports are responsible for 60-70% of all imports, restrictions upon them hinders most of the aid attempting to enter Yemen.²⁰⁸ Shipping companies are forced to pay high war insurance premiums meaning few ships can deliver aid at once.²⁰⁹ Damaged docks only worsen the off-loading process and the economy as the burden of repair falls upon the Yemen consumer. As a young yet large port, Aden has suffered greatly. The port suffers from old and outdated infrastructure with a worsening employee safety environment and increase in import delays.²¹⁰ Manager of the Aden port's technical department, Ra'afat Ramadhan,

Federation Abstaining, SC/11859, 14 April 2015.

Available at: <https://www.un.org/press/en/2015/sc11859.doc.htm> [accessed May 17 2022].

²⁰⁵ UNVIM, *UNVIM Monthly and Weekly Snapshots*, Last updated 1 June 2022. Available at: <https://www.vimye.org/opsnapall> [accessed May 29 2022].

²⁰⁶ *ibid*

²⁰⁷ USAID, *Yemen - Complex Emergency Fact Sheet #6, Fiscal Year (FY) 2021*, 16 July 2021. Available at: <https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-complex-emergency-fact-sheet-6-fiscal-year-fy-2021> [accessed 23 May 2022].

²⁰⁸ UNDP, *The Faces of Yemen's Sea ports*, 7 Jun 2021. Available at: <https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/faces-yemen-s-sea-ports> [accessed 23 May 2022].

²⁰⁹ *ibid*

²¹⁰ *ibid*

said that the container terminal is an important economic wheel for imports, yet political and security related issues have caused many 'ups and downs'.²¹¹

The Hodeidah port is a far more contentious maritime import area. On November 15 2021, the Houthis successfully took over the port and began its transition to a militarized port.²¹² The takeover caused over 6,000 people to become displaced.²¹³ The UN mission in Yemen commented on the takeover, stating how the takeover was of great concern and required inspection immediately, these requests were ignored.²¹⁴ The takeover raises a new concern, conflict spill over into the Red Sea. These concerns were immortalized with the Houthi control of the FSO Safer oil tanker to which the Houthis refuse inspection of.²¹⁵ The rotting tanker sits offshore from the Hodeidah port and is expected to be carrying 1.14m barrels of oil, capable of causing 66-82% of Yemen's Red Sea fisheries to become threatened in one week and 93.5-100% to be threatened after three weeks.²¹⁶

This vulnerable position puts Hodeidah port in a complete gridlock regarding negotiations, so much so that the use of

force is being considered. The Saudi-led coalition has stated that the militarization of Hodeidah port could turn them into legitimate military targets.²¹⁷ If this assessment rings true, per international humanitarian law, the Saudi-led coalition could launch attacks against the ports, ruining any hope of future maritime imports in the region.

Airports

Air access to Yemen through the airports is more hopeful yet still bleak. One of the major airports, Sana'a airport, was reopened upon agreement between the conflicting parties.²¹⁸ For the first time in 6 years, commercial flights will be able to come and leave the airport. As a key component of an ongoing truce between the parties over the airport, the reopening symbolizes what should be expected of its maritime counterparts.²¹⁹

Various airports have continued to be the targets of ongoing airstrikes. The Saudi-led coalition claims they are being used as military facilities to launch cross-governorate attacks.²²⁰ The coalition has launched retaliatory attacks against these

²¹¹ *ibid*

²¹² P.Wintour, 'Yemen: UN calls for talks on Houthi takeover of Hodeidah port' *The Guardian*, 15 November 2021. Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/nov/15/yemen-un-calls-for-talks-on-houthi-takeover-of-hodeidah-port> [accessed 21 May 2022].

²¹³ *ibid*

²¹⁴ Arab Weekly, 'Houthi militarisation of Red Sea ports sparks international concern' 12 January 2022. Available at: <https://the arabweekly.com/houthi-militarisation-red-sea-ports-sparks-international-concern> [accessed 23 May 2022].

²¹⁵ P.Wintour, 'Rotting Red Sea oil tanker could leave 8m people without water' *The Guardian*, 11 October 2021. Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/oct/11/rotting-red-sea-oil-tanker-could-leave-8m-people-without-water> [accessed 20 May 2022].

²¹⁶ *ibid*

²¹⁷ Reuters, 'Saudi-led coalition says Houthi actions turn Yemen ports into legitimate targets' January 8 2022. Available at: <https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/saudi-led-coalition-says-houthis-actions-turn-yemen-ports-into-legitimate-2022-01-08/> [accessed 23 May 2022].

²¹⁸ NRC, *Yemen: Reopening of Sana'a airport is a stepping stone towards sustainable peace*, 16 May 2022. Available at: <https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-reopening-sanaa-airport-stepping-stone-towards-sustainable-peace> [accessed 23 May 2022].

²¹⁹ *ibid*

²²⁰ BBC, 'Saudi-led coalition forces target Yemeni airport in air strike' *BBC Website*, 20 December 2021. Available at: <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-59736335> [accessed 23 May 2022].

airports under the guise of legitimate objectives. While the nature of these attacks remains murky, the attacks did not affect any of the core functions of the airports such that if reopened they could not function.²²¹ Since the reopening of Sana'a airport, these kinds of attacks lead to the conclusion that other airports could reopen despite the damage caused.

Further attacks on the Aden airport in December 2020 left 22 people dead and dozens wounded.²²² A car bomb would kill a further 9 people at Aden airport in late 2021.²²³ In early 2022, a series of drone attacks would be launched against a King Abdullah airport, injuring 16 civilians.²²⁴

8.3 Ground Access

Ground access is a quintessential component to conflict negotiation and resolution. Media, UN agencies, NGOs and the ICRC are all bodies who deploy ground personnel as part of their reporting and resolution strategies.

Many of these bodies have been the victim of attacks and incidents at the hands of the conflicting parties. An estimated 2,928 instances of ground access restriction were made against humanitarian organizations in

2021 with a total of 890 violent incidents against humanitarian personnel.²²⁵

During the process of implementing agreements between these bodies and the conflicting parties, staff were repeatedly assaulted, detained, intimidated, mistreated and had humanitarian assets confiscated while working.²²⁶ A series of car-jackings occurred in the regions of Lahj and Abyan in 2021 through Saudi-led forces, yet no one was harmed.

Movement restrictions occurred frequently throughout 2021 operations. Movement restrictions peaked in 2020 with over 1,971 instances followed by a decrease of 43.5% to 1,114 in 2021.²²⁷ These restrictions hindered a multitude of activities such as the delivery of humanitarian aid, conduct of needs assessments and monitoring activities.²²⁸ Many NGOs and partners were blocked at roadside checkpoints. In Ansarullah-controlled governorates required that religious conditions such as female staff being accompanied by a male partner be satisfied.²²⁹ To avoid this, many NGOs and partners refused to submit details of their female employees during travel requests to protect their efforts from interference. Fees were attached as part of the restrictions, especially in the Taiz governorate and other key routes North to the Red Sea.²³⁰

²²¹ *ibid*

²²² M.Mukhashaf, 'Twenty-two killed in attack on Aden airport after new Yemen cabinet lands' *Reuters*, 30 December 2020. Available at: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security-idUSKBN29413E> [accessed May 27 2022].

²²³ BBC, 'Yemen: Nine killed in Aden airport car bomb' *BBC Website*, 31 October 2021. Available at: <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-59109560> [accessed 27 May 2022].

²²⁴ ABC News, 'Saudi Arabia: 16 hurt in airport drone attack from Yemen' *The Associated Press*, 21 February 2022. Available at: <https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/saudi->

[arabia-16-hurt-airport-drone-attack-yemen-83030445](https://www.reuters.com/article/yemen-83030445) [accessed May 27 2022].

²²⁵ OCHA, *Yemen: Annual Humanitarian Access Overview, 2021*, 20 April 2022. Available at: <https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-annual-humanitarian-access-overview-2021#:~:text=Over%20the%20year%2C%20humanitarian%20partners,the%20parties%20to%20the%20conflict> [accessed 28 May 2022].

²²⁶ *ibid*

²²⁷ *ibid*

²²⁸ *ibid*

²²⁹ *ibid*

²³⁰ *ibid*

Non-violent means were employed by the conflicting parties to hinder the work of humanitarian organizations. A number of restrictive regulations were employed that affected the efficiency of humanitarian operations. By 2021, 197 regulations and directives had been imposed against humanitarian organizations compared to the 180 in 2020.²³¹ These new measures employed the demanding of sensitive and protected information about the humanitarian organizations to be revealed, movement restrictions and rules surrounding existing humanitarian programmes and activities. These were most

potent in Saudi-led regions. In 2021, the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour (MoSAL) required NGOs to seek prior approval with MoSAL before they could recruit international staff.²³² This was to ensure that no Yemeni nationals could qualify for the positions. Worsening the situation, MoSAL required biometric identification for all NGO members. By early 2022, 320 visa requests were approved by the Saudi-led coalition yet 159 visas for international staff were not cleared. Of these 159 visas, 28 were rejected, 122 remained pending indefinitely and nine were cancelled after clearance.²³³

²³¹ *ibid*

²³² *ibid*

²³³ *ibid*

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