Rwanda’s Interests in the Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo

By Oliver Hegglin, Junior Fellow

17 April, 2025

After nearly three decades of active conflict in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), the M23 rebel group succeeded in taking control of the key city of Goma in the North Kivu Region in late January 2025. This military success is not one the group has achieved autonomously, as it is generally accepted that Rwanda has supported M23 and its objectives with not just material assets, but with its own Armed Forces. The DRC declared that it is “in a war situation” and severed diplomatic ties with Rwanda, following the “frontal aggression” and “invasion” by its neighbor in what international humanitarian law recognizes as an armed conflict. Rwanda systematically enabling and ensuring the instability of the region around Goma can be explained by political, economic and historic facets that have dictated Rwandan-Congolese relations since the 1994 Rwandan Genocide.

Managing M23 Near the end of the Rwandan Genocide, during which Hutu majority extremists systematically killed some 800,000 people, mainly of Tutsi ethnicity, in a planned and organized campaign, many perpetrators (genocidaires) fled to the DRC (then Zaire), forming the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR). Along with about a million Hutus who fled over the border, they now found themselves in the Tutsi-majority eastern DRC. With the FDLR’s goals being to overthrow the Rwandan government, formed by the victorious Tutsi-led Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) who were able to stop the genocide, and placing Hutus in power, they used their presence in the eastern DRC as a base from which to launch attacks into Rwanda. Since then, ethnic armed groups have been fighting each other in a resource-rich region. M23, referring to the March 23, 2009, agreement that ended a Tutsi-led uprising in eastern DRC, was formed in 2012, when some fighters accused the Congolese government of not upholding the peace deal by failing to integrate Congolese Tutsis into the national army and not recognizing the political wing of the M23 as a political party. The group had managed to take control of Goma for ten days but withdrew, following international pressure on Rwanda to pull support for the group and a UN-mandated African offensive which helped the DRC retake control over the city. M23, of which the majority of fighters are from North Kivu, launched this most recent rebellion in 2022 and may enjoy support from much of the population.

There are believed to be some 200 armed groups in the DRC, with M23 being the most significant. They accuse the Congolese government of failing to address the threat towards Tutsis posed by the FDLR, consequently pledging to protect Tutsi interests. The FDLR operating from the DRC forced Rwanda to intervene and support the RPF, spiraling into the First (1996 – 1997) and Second (1998 – 2003) Congo Wars. Support for M23 can be seen as a continuation of Rwanda’s policy of protecting ethnic Tutsis in the DRC and defending its own borders.

The United Nations asserts that M23, under the leadership of Sultani Makenga, an ethnic Tutsi who fought in Rwanda in the 1990s, is under “de-facto” control of the Rwandan Armed Forces. Recruits are believed to be trained under Rwandan supervision and the group is equipped with high-tech equipment (signal jammers, anti-tank guided missiles, and night-vision devices, for example) unbeknown to the region, indicating established support and rendering Rwanda “liable” for the actions of M23. The DRC, which has labelled M23 a Rwandan proxy, and international organizations, also accuse Rwanda of providing logistical support, direct military assistance with about 4,000 soldiers, and intelligence services.

Kigali denies supporting M23, though President Paul Kagame, who headed the RPF when it ended the Rwandan Genocide, has called the group a “genocidal militia” and accused Congolese President Félix Tshisekedi for failing to handle the FDLR and seeking dialogue with M23. The Rwandan government consequently sees the FDLR as a major threat. Rwanda does not deny having some military assets (troops, missile systems and armored vehicles, among other resources) in the eastern DRC, though says these are to defend the country against the FDLR. Kigali further claims the Congolese army and the military governor of North Kivu are collaborating with the FDLR.

A Gold Grab and Congolese Coltan

Without Rwandan support, it is unlikely M23 could have taken control of Goma and the surrounding areas. And though Goma is often on the headlines due to its large population of around one million people, the lands around the city are rich in mineral resources, primarily gold and coltan. M23 uses these resources to sustain its operations. The UN believes that a “state-like administration” issuing permits for mining, trade and transport for the resources routed through Rwanda onto the international market as “conflict minerals” is bringing in more than $800,000 per month. According to the 2022 – 2023 National Bank of Rwanda annual report, gold accounts for 34% of Rwandan exports and is an important source of foreign currency, despite Rwanda not operating a single gold mine.

Where smuggled minerals could be ‘re-exported’, this latest conflict allows for a direct path from the eastern DRC to Kigali, with the UN detailing such a coltan supply line from the Rubaya mine to Rwanda. Coltan, a mineral vital to the technology industry, has had armed groups and states fighting over this resource, and the US Geological Survey reports a nearly 50% increase in Rwandan coltan exports from 2022 to 2023 – recalling that 2022 is when this latest M23 uprising began. It is therefore in Rwanda’s economic interest to maintain an unstable DRC control over the region.

As such, the DRC and Uganda’s plan to build and renovate 1,200km in roads connecting the eastern cities of Goma, Bunia and Beni to Uganda, can be seen as competition to Rwanda’s exports. If the DRC had an avenue to export resources to Uganda, and from Uganda to the international market, Rwanda’s illicit trade would be challenged. The road could also be used to facilitate the transport of military forces and promote development through civilian use, also presenting a security and economic threat. Rwanda’s support for M23 in controlling border areas to Uganda can be construed as a way in which to obstruct these roadway projects.

Congo in Crisis Despite

its authoritarian leadership, Rwanda paints itself as an island of stability in an unstable region, with a friendly business environment for trade. The small country has made significant strides in combating poverty, inequality, and maternal mortality rates, increasing life expectancy, economic growth, promoting gender equality, and land restoration, among other achievements. In just two decades, President Kagame has transformed the country from a war-torn victim of genocide, to a prosperous and reconciled land. Its military is also an experienced force, having combatted Islamist movements abroad and deployed on UN peacekeeping missions in support of international partners such as the UN, USA and EU.

The Democratic Republic of Congo, on the other hand, has experienced instability and ethnic conflict for decades. Kinshasa is some 1,600km from Goma with poor or no infrastructure connecting the capital to much of the country. In comparison, Goma, adjacent to the border with Rwanda is just some 100km from Kigali. The DRC’s national army is notoriously dysfunctional, corrupt, ill-equipped, low on morale, and allegedly kept weak to prevent potential coups. This setting allows Rwanda to assert its political and security interests, making it crucial that the DRC not be in a position to challenge Rwanda’s status as effectively a regional power. And because efforts by President Tshisekedi to reform and update the military will take much time to bear fruit, if at all successful, he has instead appealed to global powers to put pressure on Rwanda to pull support for M23, as was the case in 2012.

Goma, the DRC’s biggest city in the east of the country, a key regional hub for security, trade, humanitarian efforts, and the home of the UN’s largest peacekeeping mission, MONUSCO. While MONUSCO had been supporting the DRC in its fight against M23, the mission was set to close at the end of 2024 upon request by President Félix Tshisekedi due to accusations of failing to keep peace and becoming unpopular by the Congolese population. However, due to M23 military gains, the Congolese government requested the UN extend its mission, which the Security Council approved.

M23 holds Goma. The United Nations believes it is planning for “territorial expansion and the long-term occupation and exploitation of conquered territories”. While Rwanda’s strategic goals have been arguably achieved with proxy control over the city, it may be that the possibility to expand control over more territory is driving M23 opportunism and the realization that with the poor state of the Congolese army, the group could acquire more resources and revenue. Where Goma, the capital of North Kivu fell in January, so too did Bukavu, the capital of South Kivu, the DRC’s second-largest city in the east and on the southern end of Lake Kivu also adjacent to the Rwandan border, in February. M23 has also gained control over the areas around Rutshuru and Masisi, among other towns around Goma, effectively creating a buffer-zone between Congolese-controlled DRC, and Rwanda and Uganda. Counter to open M23’s open desire for territory, Congolese and Rwandan leadership have called for a cease-fire in March 2025.

Ending the Cycle

President Tshisekedi has refused to meet with M23, but on March 18 surprisingly met with his Rwandan counterpart in Qatar. Qatar, already having an established reputation in mediation, has a vested interest in stability in the region in question by having invested over two billion USD in both the DRC and Rwanda. This meeting also follows European sanctions spurred on by Belgium, to which Rwanda responded by severing ties with its former colonial ruler. Rwanda’s defiance in this regard can be explained by economic and military ties with non-western partners, such as Singapore, Turkey and Qatar, which now may have more leverage on Rwanda than the West. And at a time of war in Europe and the Middle East, and with ongoing domestic turmoil in the USA, it would appear that there is little political will, particularly from the West, to divert attention to Rwanda and the DRC. A second round of talks at the end of March 28 also included a separate meeting between Qatari mediators and M23, who did not meet with Rwandan or Congolese officials and rejected calls for a cease-fire. As it stands, fighting in north and South Kivu continues, and no resolution has yet been found.

Rwanda has long-term security, economic and political interests in the eastern DRC, a region it considers to be within its sphere of influence. These interests are supplemented by ethnic ties and historic animosity. A lasting solution to peace will require addressing Rwanda’s security concerns, which it arguably has done by effectively having an M23-controlled buffer zone, while respecting some vestment of Congolese sovereignty in North and South Kivu. This is the topic most likely being discussed in Doha while Rwanda looks to consolidate its gains and ensure stability for economic benefit. The current status-quo is favorable for Kigali and explains why talks for an “immediate and unconditional cease-fire” to “establish solid foundations for lasting peace” are taking place.

M23 not meeting with Rwandan diplomats may also be an indication that the goals of these partners are now diverging – Rwanda seeking an end to the fighting having arguably achieved its security and economic goals, and M23 aiming for more territory and formal control over the region it has conquered. From a formal buffer-zone to Rwandan annexation of the contested areas, few options are open to a vast region subjected to decades of conflict, state-intervention and armed groups each vying for their own interest.

Despite a possible cease-fire between Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo, history shows that cease-fires have a record of failing, making any agreement fragile. The real challenge is how to address the severe humanitarian crisis in eastern DRC. UN numbers indicate there have been 700,000 people displaced, 3,000 deaths, accounts of sexual violence and civilian injuries, and reports of looting since January 2025 alone. It has also warned of a risk of genocide following anti-Tutsi sentiments in North and South Kivu and the continued presence of genocidaires. Addressing the human security of the different ethnic groups will be vital in the ongoing negotiations, or they risk causing a potential cease-fire agreement to fail and cause the established pattern of violence continuing.

Image: A coltan mine in Rubaya, DRC (Source: MONUSCO/Sylvain Liechti (image cropped) via CC BY SA-2.0)