Human Security Centre Human Rights and International Security Research
By Sam Biden, Junior Fellow 25 April, 2025
The origins of Rwanda’s involvement in the DRC can be traced back to the Rwandan Genocide, where ethnic majority group the Hutus killed over 800,000 civilians, mostly Tutsis, an ethnic minority at the time. Under the leadership of Paul Kagame, current Rwandan president, Tutsi rebels took the capital Kigali and seized power. As a result, Hutus fled into neighbouring eastern DRC, forming rebel groups of their own, motivated by the same ethnic hatred for Tutsis that sparked the Rwandan Genocide.
The Tutsi-led capital of Kigali saw these groups as enemies, leading to the invasion of DRC by Rwanda, starting the First Congo War in 1996, allowing the Congolese government to be overthrown and replaced by a coalition of armed groups called the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF). Tensions rose across two years as members of the Congolese government began to suspect Rwanda of having too great an involvement in Congolese politics, eventually calling for all Rwandan forces to leave DRC immediately, sparking the Second Congo War in 1998. The following five years resulted in bloodshed as Ugandan and Rwandan backed armed group, the Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD), fought for control of eastern DRC. The Congolese government under Laurent-Désiré Kabila was dealt a heavy blow after his assassination in 2001, with his son, Joseph Kabila, taking control after his death. The RCD began to crumble post Kabila’s assassination, leading to rebel armed groups forming from defectors, eventually requiring a peace agreement in 2003. That same year, the first wave of militia reintegration into the Congolese army occurred, aiming to bring stability to the region. Despite the integration, fighting continued in the east of DRC, leading to various extremist groups contesting the Kivu region, namely the ADF, Co-operative for the Development of Eastern Congo (CODECO) and eventually, the March 23 Movement (M23). These ethnic tensions have prevailed for over three decades of fighting, with mounting pressure to gain solid ground in DRC, Rwanda would back the anti-Hutu defectors, creating the first wave of M23.
First emergence of M23
M23 emerged in April 2012, born from a mutiny within the Congolese armed forces (FARDC). The first members originated from various Kivu regions, just shy of the North Kivu capital, Goma, with strong roots in Rwandan armed groups, such as the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), Laurent-Désiré Kabila’s AFDL, the RCD and later the National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP). The group’s name is a direct reference to the 2009 peace deal, the March 23 Agreement, through which the Congolese state had attempted to pacify the CNDP by integrating its fighters into the national army.
With the dismantling of the CNDP on paper, Bosco Ntaganda was made deputy commander of military operations in the east, with Sultani Makenga, his counterpart, taking control in south Kivu. By 2012, the Congolese government had grown wary of the parallel chains of command inside its own army, with a high possibility of violent defection looming. In response, a plan to redeploy crucial ex-CNDP officers away from their power bases caused a fractured hierarchy, with the Congolese government eventually targeting Ntaganda, causing the first wave of defectors, later forming the basis for M23. These defectors set their eyes on Goma, fighting alongside forces from Kigali with the duo rapidly seizing the capital and adjacent city, Rutshuru. Intense pressure began to mount upon Rwanda, resulting in an international call for aid after over $200m in EU aid was suspended, eventually forced Rwanda’s withdrawal from the battle for Goma. The retreat of Rwandan support caused control of the capital to slip away from M23, with M23 withdrawing to surrounding areas of North Kivu. The chain of events was a diplomatic failure among the African nations, with such unpreparedness among national forces to defend against prompt rebellions. To combat this, eleven African nations signed the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework in Addis Ababa (PAPS) in 2013. The agreement focused on internal reforms from the Congolese state and a commitment from regional actors, namely Rwanda and Uganda, to cease support for armed proxies like M23.
M23 largely remained quiet for many years with little support and control as many M23 members remained exiled in neighboring Uganda and Rwanda. With Félix Tshisekedi assuming the role of President in 2019, a deal with outgoing president Joseph Kabila allowed the incoming President to retain significant control over the state apparatus, including parliament and security sectors. With the transfer complete, the private attempted revival of M23 had begun. In October 2019, Congolese intelligence chief Delphin Kahimbi met with former M23 political chief, Jean-Marie Runiga and Rwanda’s intelligence director, Anaclet Kalibata, in Kigali. A roadmap for the reintegration of M23 was established; arrest warrants would be lifted, political prisoners released and some M23 members reintegrated into the FARDC and national park service. Despite the plan being enrolled, implementation halted as little political backing remained a barrier. Small fights occurred the following year with the remainder of M23 engaging against Congolese forces, with additional political meetings in Kinshasa showing little progress towards M23 re-emerging. With few political entities willing to lend aid to M23 initially, the group needed regional instability to regain a necessity for their presence. Like in 2012, M23 turned to their Rwandan roots, capitalizing on a growing friction between Uganda, Rwanda and DRC. Uganda and DRC had grown close, forming security operations alongside their neighboring borders with Rwanda, with the latter claiming the new operations encroached on Rwandan sovereignty. With tensions rising, M23 capitalized, launching assaults on Virunga National Park in 2021, alongside various suicide bombings by other groups such as ISIS.
The following 2 years showed M23 gaining huge momentum and support. M23 started off 2022 with an attack in Bunagana with some 400 fighters, causing the designation of a “terrorist organization” by Uganda. The FARDC immediately struggled against the growing militia, relying on a coalition with smaller rebel factions. Despite this outreach, M23 made ground up to October, finalizing their conquest with the capture of Kiwanja, allowing them to cut off primary access to Goma with the shutdown of Route Nationale 2. They finished the year by beginning to advance towards their next three major objectives: Ishasha, Tongo and Goma. With such success, questions over Rwanda’s allegiance to M23 following high tensions with Uganda emerged, with the answer following shortly after as forces in Rwanda’s standard issue military gear were spotted alongside M23 during the capture of Kiwanja.
Openly discussing the joint goal of protecting the interest of Tutsis, M23 and Rwanda have continued to grow close due to their disdain for Hutu extremists, particularly those allegedly operating under the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda, a far-right extremist group operating in the contested Kivu region. Their rivalry extends beyond ethnicity and into economics, contesting natural resources in the region such as gold and cobalt, to which funds from their exportation have been used to finance the ongoing conflict, with Rwanda operating as a sole trading route for M23.
Preparations for Goma
By January 2024, the Rwandan backed M23 escalated hostilities against the FARDC and its loosely organized allies, forcing the Congolese forces to draw the support of private military contractors and the Burundian army. Despite the additional support, the M23-RDF coalition proved too strong even against the better equipped and organized defences of the FARDC, allowing them to rapidly expand their territorial gain with a net increase of 70% control over the previous year. According to testimonies and geospatial evidence reviewed by the UN Group of Experts, the advance was neither incidental nor improvised but a byproduct of months of planning and cooperation with Rwanda, showing a troubling and violent development in the previously private relationship. The use of advanced weaponry allowed the RDF to advance across the Congolese border, paving a path for the M23 forces to promptly follow. The Petit Nord region of northern Kivu was swiftly taken by M23, bolstering a 3,000-man army at this stage, allowing the RDF to frontline for the next wave of progress. A 1,000-man RDF force broke the borders and marched further into North Kivu, rapidly capturing the surrounding bases in Kibumba and Lake Kivu, facilitating the further capture of key bases operated by the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), a UN backed arbiter. By the end of the offensive, a conservative estimate placed M23-RDF coalition strength in North Kivu between 3,000 and 4,000 personnel by early April, deployed across Nyiragongo, Rutshuru and Masisi. With such a strong force looming over Goma, EU bodies began to take notice, publicly calling for the ceasing of support for M23 by Rwanda and the return of respect for the Congolese border crossings which had been routinely used for M23-RDF military activity.
The Goma Offensive
On 23 January 2025, the M23-RDF coalition stormed towards the final strategic junction west of Goma, serving as the last defensive position for the FARDC before the provincial capital. The capture was successful and severed the city’s primary supply of troops, weapons and aid, allowing for an isolated and vulnerable Goma to be marched upon. M23 pincered the city and launched assaults from the north, initiating a multidirectional offensive on the city. By the following day, the M23-RDF coalition announced the goal of the “liberation of Goma” as supporting forces joined around the contested capital. That same day, orders from the capital of DRC, Kinshasa, formally announced the severance of diplomatic ties with Rwanda. Rwandan personnel, including those acting in allegiance with M23, were ordered to leave the DRC within 48 hours.
25 January marked the beginning of a 5 day war for Goma, as Goma came under sustained shelling, and RDF reinforcements amassed near the Rwandan border city of Gisenyi, less than a kilometer from Goma. Early that same day, M23 caused mass panic by shelling the surrounding areas of Goma, displacing hundreds of thousands of civilians with the coalition successfully getting airspace clearance revoked from the area, trapping those in the city. Despite the chaos, the FARDC maintained order within parts of the city, establishing fortified positions across northern districts with support from the Wazalendo militia and Romanian private military contractors. The bloodshed rapidly escalated as peacekeepers became the primary target of M23, with 20 of them being killed across the 5 days, followed by infrastructure collapsing because of electricity being cut off by M23, forcing the FARDC to negotiate safe passage for some 300,000 civilians out of Goma.
By the morning of 27 January, M23 had reached central Goma, expanding their control across key military zones previously contested by the FARDC, resulting in a pre-emptive call of victory. However, many rebels within Goma continued fighting alongside the FARDC, granting time to the innocent civilians headed for refuge across the border. A total of 17 deaths and 360 injuries were reported at the end of the 2nd day as fighting continued in the south of Goma. By 28 January, M23 controlled most of western Goma, while FARDC forces remained entrenched near the airport, their last major stronghold. With the foresight that M23 were going to breach the final defence position in less than a day, the remaining 1,200 Congolese troops surrendered themselves, later being transferred to a MONUSCO base alongside fleeing civilians. In the following 2 days, M23 took effective control of Goma, announcing the establishment of an interim administration to act alongside the current administration. Across the 5 days, a total of 100 civilians were killed alongside another 1,000 being injured, overwhelming local hospitals, forcing the International Committee of the Red Cross to deal with the developing humanitarian crisis.
Both the M23-RDF coalition and the FARDC have used explosive ordnance mortars, rockets and armed drones in or near densely populated urban areas and displacement camps since M23s resurgence. These are not incidental misfires but are deliberate operations carried out with full knowledge of their human toll.
Between January and March 2024 alone, over 30 incidents involving heavy weaponry were documented in civilian-populated zones. More than 50 civilians were killed, hundreds injured and key infrastructure, including medical facilities and schools were destroyed. In Goma, blast trauma accounted for nearly 40% of all injuries treated in hospitals during this period, highlighting a disturbing trend of urban bombardment that disproportionately affects internally displaced populations. This pattern is especially clear in Sake and the outskirts of Goma, where the M23-RDF coalition systematically targeted residential neighborhoods. On 26 October, a joint assault on Bambo saw mortar shells rain down on civilian centers without warning, promptly followed by another attack on 7 November and again on 25 January in Mweso. The repeated use of complex weapons systems by trained personnel, the deliberate targeting of known civilian zones, the absence of early warning mechanisms and the recurring mass casualties point to a systematic disregard for international humanitarian law.
Among the direct violence is the abduction of refugees and children. The M23-RDF coalition has routinely targeted these vulnerable groups for exploitation, most notably in the regions of Rutshuru and Masisi. Since December 2023, M23 has escalated its forced conscription campaign in these regions, abducting boys as young as ten from farms, homes and even refugee camps. Some are seized during daily labor, others lured by false promises of education, employment or money with reports confirming that those who resist face execution. Local leaders are also coerced into compiling lists of boys and men aged 15 to 60, while recruiters under the command of senior M23 figures like “Colonel” Bahati Erasto employ a dual strategy – forced abductions in rural zones and psychological manipulation in towns, often using community intermediaries pressured into collaboration. Even more disturbing is the transnational dimension of this operation. M23’s recruitment pipeline extends beyond DRC’s borders into Rwanda and Uganda, where Congolese refugees have become a captive population. In camps across Rwanda, including Mahama, Gisagara, Kizimba and Gihembe, RDF intelligence officers reportedly prey on young refugees with similar promises that quickly turn coercive. Former RDF insiders detail a systematic process involving ideological indoctrination and economic coercion to facilitate the recruitment of child soldiers. Children taken from Rwandan refugee schools describe being transported to Musanze, an RDF military base, before being marched into Congo’s Tchanzu area, where they undergo military training, showing a structural approach to Rwanda’s role in providing M23 with support.
Conclusion
The rise of the M23-RDF coalition is not simply the re-emergence of an armed group, but the culmination of a state-enabled insurgency that’s influenced by the continued ethnic tensions stretching back three decades. With the continued drive to flatten their Hutu counterparts, the M23-RDF coalition has demonstrated its capabilities, gaining itself vast territorial control and access to vital natural resources. DRCs fragile infrastructure, coupled with the competing interests of neighboring powers, created strong grounds for this militarized opportunism to resurface, exposing the limitations of both regional diplomacy and international peacekeeping efforts, which have often been reactive rather than preventive.
Image: Masisi, Nort Kivu, DR Congo (Source: Yohann Bouvier / MONUSCO / CC BY-SA 2.0)
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