The Baltic States and the NATO Shield

2 September, 2024

By Oliver Hegglin

A visitor to the Presidential Palaces in Vilnius, Lithuania, and Tallinn, Estonia, may be surprised to see the flag of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) next to that of the respective State and European Union (EU). While the flag of the inter-European political body is common next to the flags of EU member states across the continent, the flag of a military alliance not so much. This display of NATO ‘pride’ can also be seen in the Latvian War Museum in Riga, Latvia, where an enormous banner celebrating 20 years of NATO membership covers the lobby from entrance to exit. These flagrant displays of NATO membership are no coincidence and exhibit the significance of NATO as a central pillar of Baltic foreign policy. This, perhaps now more importantly than ever, 20 years after ascension into the military alliance.

Baltic History

Immediately after gaining independence from the United Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR)/Soviet Union (SU), in 1991, the three Baltic States of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania strived for NATO membership as their main post-independence goal. On March 29, 2004, the three Baltic Republics became NATO members. The reason is a 70-year long occupation, under which the Baltic States suffered immensely. This most recent occupation began in 1940, when they were annexed by the USSR and during which – aside from a brief interlude of brutal rule by Nazi Germany – their existence was slowly being systematically eradicated by the Kremlin-led regime. Having experienced this menace, it was no surprise that Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania warned the collective West of the existential threat Russia posed to them and Europe. This warning went ignored by political and military leaders for decades, but eyes were opened when Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, proving the small Baltic States right. Knowing that what befell Ukraine could have also happened to them, had it not been for their NATO membership, it is no surprise that the trio have been among the first and the strongest supporters of Ukraine.

Systematic oppression, cultural repression, mass deportations, atrocities, and attempts at russifying Baltic cultures resulting from the invasion and annexation by the USSR, have traumatized Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians. This is immortalized in the occupation museums in the three capitals of these states, all with the same message; remember and never let occupation happen again. However, the conditions under which Russia’s President Vladimir Putin justified his invasion of Ukraine exist in the Baltics as well. These, as consequence of Soviet policies, including the transfers of ethnic Russians into the three small states during Soviet occupation, resulting in ethnic Russians composing about 24% of the population in Estonia, 27% in Latvia, and 5% in Lithuania. Narva in northeastern Estonia, is notable for its nearly 73% native Russian speaking majority, some of whom are sympathetic towards Moscow. In total, about one million ethnic Russians live in the Baltics today, with the Russian government asserting its “right and obligation” to protect Russians anywhere in the world, including in what it asserts as being historical Russian land. Parallels between Ukraine and the Baltics are likely what was behind Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky warning that they could be Russia’s next target, echoing the general sentiment that if Russia is not stopped in Ukraine, it will go further, and the Baltics meet Moscow’s criteria for a potential target.

Russia’s Position

With accusations that the Baltic states persecute their Russian-speaking minorities by destroying Soviet-era memorials, and closing down Russian-language media and schools, Moscow has claimed ethnic Russians are being treated as “second-class people”. By using terms such as “russophobic” and “fascist”, Moscow further compares the Baltics to Ukraine and the backdrop under which Russia first invaded the latter. The aforementioned Estonian Narva for example, is a potential flashpoint under which Russia might claim to come to the support of ethnic Russians. In response to these ‘actions’ taken by the Baltic states, Russia has severed several ties with its three small neighbors and previously declared its intent to respond with “asymmetric measures”, primarily in the fields of economic affairs and transit.

Baltic Position

Together, the Baltic states have a population of about six million people, inhabiting largely flat, forested terrain, with Russia to the east, Russia’s Enclave Kaliningrad to the southwest, Russia’s ally Belarus to the southeast, and a small 50km wide border to NATO ally Poland between Kaliningrad and Belarus; the Suwalki Gap – another potential flashpoint which could be targeted to cut-off the Baltics from the rest of NATO. Acknowledging these geographic, demographic and historic vulnerabilities and the threat posed by Russia, it is not surprising that following the invasion of Ukraine, the Baltic states have agreed on the need to raise defense spending to 3%, surpassing the 2% NATO-requirement and going as far as advocating for raising the NATO defense spending goal to 2.5 or even 3%. Estonia is set to reach 3.4% this year, the 2nd highest in NATO.

Despite seeing NATO as an existential necessity, Estonia Latvia and Lithuania never took NATO membership for granted and contribute to the Alliance as equal partners. Eager to show their worth even before membership, Estonia and Lithuania both appointed retired US Army colonels of Baltic origin as the commanders of their newly formed armed forces. All three also participated in UN peace missions and have contributed to the NATO operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Despite their small size, populations and number of resources, what the Baltics disproportionally carry is an immense will to defend themselves, something their NATO allies need to see before committing themselves to them. As an alternative in 1997, Russian President Boris Yeltsin had offered unilateral Russian security guarantees in exchange for the Baltics giving up their NATO prospects, an idea that was categorically rejected. Had they accepted and not joined NATO, then a Russian attack under the guise of the abovementioned justifications would have nearly been certain as they were for Ukraine.

Baltic Defensive Measures

That there exists a will to fight to prevent occupation from repeating is supported by the growing number of volunteers in the Baltic militaries. To harness this, the three countries are increasing the size of their armed forces, with Latvia crucially having reintroduced conscription in 2023 after being the only one to halt it in 2006. Latvia itself plans to double the size of its military to 61,000 by 2032, Estonia to increase the size of its armed forces to 43,700, and Lithuania to 36,000 active servicemembers with a reserve of nearly 120,000.

The will to defend and the increase in spending results in a “total defense” approach to national security. Perhaps the most significant measure is the mutual Baltic Defense Line, planned along the Russian border of all three republics. Integrating Baltic defense is considered a necessity for the three states to survive, similar to how they acted together as the “B3” as a region to achieve NATO and EU membership. In line with NATO’s communiqué from the 2023 Madrid Summit confirming NATO’s determination to fight for “every meter of its ground”, Baltic defense ministers also acknowledged that the lack of geographical depth means that an eventual Russian assault must be countered right at the border. This is crucial because Baltic states are so small that their capitals are not too far from their borders with Russia. Abandoning territory to defend more in-land is also a moral non-option, as the human rights violations and atrocities committed by Russia in Ukraine would befall those living between the Russian border and defensive line otherwise.

The Baltic Defensive Line is a monumental project that will require substantial investment to cover the frontline. Estonia’s border to Russia is about 295km, Latvia’s nearly 215, and Lithuania’s (to Kaliningrad) some 175. Added to this is Latvia’s 172km and Lithuania’s 680km long borders to Russia’s ally Belarus, from where the invasion of Ukraine also originated. While details are scarce, what is known is that Estonia intends to build 600 bunkers, support points and distribution lines starting in 2025. Further, while no mines, anti-tank defenses or barbed wire would be deployed during peacetimes, these would be held in local reserves for quick deployment. Overall, the defense ministers of the Baltic states approved together in Riga the concept of building anti-mobility defensive installations to deter and defend against military threats.

In addition to the Baltic Defense Line, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are in the process of acquiring a range of conventional military equipment, including IRIS-T air defense systems (Estonia and Latvia), NASAMS air defense systems (Lithuania), 20 HIMAR systems combined, a division-worth of Leopard 2 tanks (Lithuania), anti-ship systems (Estonia and Latvia), and more. While the scale of resources is impressive, the challenge remains to counter the seemingly limitless number of personnel and equipment Russia is able to muster, regardless of quality. Russia now has more active military forces than it did before the war in Ukraine and will undoubtedly rebuild after the war ends, with the Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service assessing Russia’s military presence near the Baltics could be rebuilt in four years. This has launched a race between the establishment of Baltic defenses and the reconstituted Russian military on the Baltic border following the eventual end of the war in Ukraine. For the Kremlin is undoubtedly making the same assessments in the Baltics, a region it considers to be the most vulnerable part of NATO, forcing the Baltics and NATO to ask what Putin will do with his military post-Ukraine War.

Baltic Defense thus follows the concept of “deterrence by denial”, which has the aim of preventing Russia from invading by acquiring more conventional weaponry, showing a NATO-wide will to defend on the back of Baltic determination, and the deterring effect of the Baltic Defense Line. In other words, Baltic defenses combined with greater NATO support must be strong enough to convince the Kremlin that the cost of an attack is higher than any potential gain.

Baltic Support for Ukraine

To buy time for themselves and to support Ukraine in preventing Russian occupation, the Baltic states have established themselves as some of the strongest supporters of Ukraine relative to their GDPs. This includes not only financial and military aid, but also lobbying for increased NATO support and advocating for a Ukrainian path to NATO. Knowing that NATO membership saved their countries from invasion, the mentality is likely that Ukrainian NATO membership would prevent a future Russian invasion there as well.

By the summer of 2024, the three Baltic states were among the top four donors to Ukraine, with Estonia providing 1.7%, and Lithuania and Latvia 1.4% each, of their respective GDPs. Latvia is also leading the creation of a drone-coalition for Ukraine and Estonia is harnessing its cyber-defense know-how to help defend Ukraine in that dimension. The Baltic governments understand that investing in Ukraine’s defenses is investing in their own.

NATO’s Position

In 2014, there was consensus between some NATO members and the Baltic states that a review of the existing deterrence strategy in the Baltics was necessary. This followed the 2008 invasion of Georgia, which served to wake NATO up from its complacency and listen to the warnings Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania made about Putin’s imperial ambitions, but more importantly Russia’s initial incursion into Ukraine in 2014. A 2016 assessment then estimated that Russia could overwhelm the three Baltic states in 60 hours, and during the Warsaw Summit the decision was made to deploy NATO troops to all three Baltic countries. That same year, NATO began its ‘enhanced forward-presence’ to demonstrate the “Allies’ solidarity, determination, and ability to defend Alliance territory.” And since 2017, three NATO battlegroups have been rotating in the region; one per country with about 1,000 soldiers each. At the 2023 Vilnius Summit, the decision was made to further enhance Baltic defense and integrate air and missile capabilities while also ensuring logistical compatibility, as they had requested the size of these Battlegroups to be increased to a brigade each (between 3,000 and 5,000 troops), including additional air defense assets. This is a significant improvement from previous NATO defense plans for the Baltics, which would have let Russia invade the Baltics before liberating them within 180 days. Estonia’s Prime Minister Kaja Kallas said this would have meant the “complete destruction of countries and our culture”, with the capitals and other cities being “wiped off the map”.

The Baltic will to defend itself notably puts moral pressure on the rest of NATO to prove that the alliance can uphold its core mission. With the defensive measures being put in place by Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, it buys the Baltics time until the rest of NATO can come in en force and help repel an attack. For should NATO fail in its deterrence and ability to repel an attack, its credibility as a military alliance would be thrown into turmoil, risking the fabric that binds the alliance together.

Fear, and Hope, for the Future

During the 2024 NATO summit in Washington DC, the three Baltic Defense Ministers: Laurynas Kasčiūnas of Lithuania, Andris Sprūds of Latvia, and Hanno Pevkur of Estonia, warned that Russia’s expansionist mindset would continue even after President Putin is no longer in that position. Despite difficulty in assessing the intent of Russia’s leadership and uncertainty on how Russia will act in the future, unless it is “utterly defeated in Ukraine”, it cannot be expected that Moscow will change its strategic objective of reclaiming territory it lays claim to through its historically imperialistic mindset, deeply rooted among the Russian populace. And should Russia win, then Russia will continue to correct what President Putin in December 2021, just three months before the invasion of Ukraine, called a “major humanitarian tragedy” – the breakup of the USSR, what he termed as “historical Russia”, in 1991. What had been built up over 1,000 years, he claimed, was lost, with Russians finding themselves in newly independent countries cut off from Russia. Already then, Russia had been amassing military resources on Ukraine’s border with accusations he was planning to recreate the USSR, starting with Ukraine, a non-NATO country.

Russia is currently not a direct threat to the Baltics, though it is an unavoidable fact that they could not successfully defend themselves against Russia on their own – they depend on the support of their allies, as Estonian Foreign Affairs Minister Eva-Maria admitted. Since independence they knew of the danger Russia presented to them, so they immediately sought out NATO membership and gained a level of security they had never before experienced. NATO membership ensured their freedoms and right to practice and celebrate their languages, heritage and culture. NATO acts as a shield for all allies, backed by the members states’ political, economic, and conventional military advantages over Russia.

Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania saw the signs that Russia was preparing its society for a large-scale war with the West, and they knew it could have occurred in their countries – but it was Ukraine who fell victim to Russia’s expansionist ambitions. The understanding that the violence consuming Ukraine could have occurred to the Baltics in an amplified capacity due to significantly fewer resources with which to mount an undoubtedly vicious defense, has led the small but proud countries to strongly support Ukraine. For they know, that even once Putin is gone, Russia will remain an existential threat, set on ‘reclaiming’ the strong, proud and independent Baltic states and NATO allies.

Image: Lithuanian soldiers with NATO allies at the Iron Sword 2014 closing ceremony (Source: U.S. Army/Public Domain)